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ABSTRACT 
FROM MODEL CONFLICT RESOLUTION TO POST-WAR 
RECONSTRUCTION IN “FAILED STATES”: THE CASE OF SIERRA 
LEONE 
 
The purpose of this study is to understand the causes of the Sierra Leonean conflict and to 
analyse the reconstruction programmes that followed it. Post-war reconstruction 
programmes must not be limited to the re-joining of families or reintegration of 
communities. It must also go a long way in providing an improved situation for all those 
affected by the war. Notably, where post-war reconstruction programmes fail to focus on the 
original causes of the conflict, it may result in reinforcement of the original social structures 
and prejudices and in continued marginalisation of certain groups. Using post-conflict Sierra 
Leone as a case study, the study attempts to examine the notion that “post-war 
reconstruction programmes tend to reinforce earlier social structures and prejudices rather 
than create opportunities for the previously marginalised”. The work focuses on the role of 
the Department for International Development (DfID)-funded Community Reintegration 
Programme (CRP).  Considering the Sierra Leone post-war scenarios, the causes and political 
resolution of the conflict and the situation in 2001 when the conflict officially came to an 
end, the thesis reviews the philosophy, planning, policies, practices and activities of donor 
agencies in general and CRP in particular before assessing impact on the process of 
rebuilding communities in Sierra Leone. 
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GLOSSARY 
TEMNE: Temne is the second largest ethnic group in Sierra Leone. It comprises about 30 
per cent of Sierra Leone’s total population and can be found in the Western Atlantic 
Provinces of Sierra Leone. The history of the Temne people goes as far back as the late 15th 
or early 16th century, where they were apparently seeking access to new trade opportunities 
with the Portuguese who were trading along the Atlantic coast. At present, the Temne are 
involved in disputes over power with other large ethnic groups in Sierra Leone, particularly 
the Mende.  
 
Sierra Leone's national politics centres on the competition between the North and the South 
of the country. The North is dominated by the Temne, and the South is dominated by the 
Mende. The latter are the former landlords of Freetown and also the tribe of the late rebel 
leader Colonel Foday Saybana Sankoh.  
 
KRIO: Krio is an ethnic group in Sierra Leone, and its members are descendants of various 
groups of freed slaves from Nova Scotia, Jamaica and of re-captives from the high seas that 
landed in Freetown between 1787 and about 1855. The Krio speak a distinctive language, 
Krio, which is a Creole language based on English and African languages. They are mostly 
found in Freetown, on the Peninsula, on the Banana Islands, York Island and in the Bonthe 
district.  
 
KAMAJORS: The Kamajors are traditional hunters from the Mende ethnic group in the 
southern and eastern regions of Sierra Leone who believe in supernatural and ancestral 
powers.  
 xii 
MENDE: The Mende are found in the southern and eastern parts of the country. They 
are the largest ethnic group comprising some 30 percent of the population.  
 
LIMBA: The Limba predominate in 7 of Sierra Leone's 149 rural chiefdoms, and their 
community affairs are dominated by the local paramount chiefs. They are the third-largest 
tribe in the country and number about 350,000 (Alie 2004) Historical records indicate that 
the Limba ethnic group was among the last groups in Sierra Leone to seek Western 
education and contact with the outside world, and for many years they suffered from a 
negative public image due to their perceived ‘backwardness.’ Their position improved 
considerably, however, between 1968 and 1992, when two successive presidents of Sierra 
Leone (Siaka Stevens and Joseph Saidu Momoh) identified themselves as Limba. Major 
Johnny Paul Koroma, former leader of the Armed Forces Revolution Council, was also a 
Limba.  
 
HOLISTIC: The term holistic may be defined as the tendency in nature to produce 
wholes from the orderly grouping of units, implying that the whole is greater than the sum 
of the parts and that all parts are important.  This can be developed to mean an approach 
to reintegration that creates opportunity for all parties – and not just for some. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
Introduction 
 
Bosnia, Angola, Cambodia, Liberia, Sierra Leone and other conflicts have posed challenges 
to peacemaking and policymaking agents alike, seeking to end such violent conflicts: How 
can the opposing warring factions be brought to a settlement? How has a peace agreement  
to be formulated to enhance a successful implementation thereof? How can the prospects of 
a stable peace be enhanced? One of the most challenging problems is the reassurance of the 
warring factions that the opposing party or parties will not renege the agreement. The 
security situation is most precarious immediately after the signing of a peace agreement, and 
there is a high risk of a renewed hostilities. The successful implementation of a peace 
agreement lays the groundwork for a long-term peace-consolidating process to set in: A 
comprehensive peace agreement is a first step towards peace consolidation but it does not 
guarantee lasting stability as long as no mid- and long-term peace-consolidating measures 
have been put in place, which take into account and/or remove the underlying causes of the 
armed conflict. 
 
The focus of this study lies on the post-war reconstruction phase of a peace process: Post-
war reconstruction is the fragile stage of the peace process when war has ended but peace is 
not yet secure (Ramsbotham et al. 2005: 185). It can involve short-term tasks such as the 
demobilization and disarmament of the warring factions as well as mid- and long-term tasks 
such as rebuilding of state institutions and infrastructure, and reconciliation processes. Post-
war reconstruction is especially challenging in a failed-state environment: the absence of a 
functioning state-apparatus has to be factored into the planning and implementation of the 
post-war reconstruction programmes. It implies that a traditional peacekeeping approach 
with a focus on the securing and monitoring of cease-fire provisions is not appropriate in 
dealing with a post-war reconstruction in a failed state.  
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In Chapter One, the concept of failed states is introduced with the emphasis on Sub-Saharan 
statehood. The literature review encompasses definitions of main terms concerning 
statehood and its failure, and Sub-Saharan statehood, and provides factors associated with 
state failure.  
 
Chapter Two presents a theoretical framework that provides the basis for understanding 
the trends of civil wars and for the evaluation of peace processes. It seeks to systematically 
address aspects of conflict resolution from the causes to conflict management up to post-
conflict reconstruction. 
 
Chapter Three of the dissertation seeks to explain the cause of Sierra Leone’s conflict, 
addressing both the political history and economic factors leading to state failure, and 
presents an outline of the conflict and the attempts at conflict resolution, involving various 
actors. Viewing intrastate conflicts from a political economy perspective, for instance, can 
improve understanding of the key dynamics of a civil war. It can also lead to a more 
systematic understanding of how these dynamics impact on conflict resolution and post-
conflict reconstruction.  
 
Chapter Four focuses on the methodology of the dissertation, including the outline of the 
research design, the relevance of the study and the chosen research method for the content 
analysis of the case study. The research methodology adopted a protocol approach to 
conducting interviews and distributing related questionnaires. Due to the sensitive nature of 
the civil war with respect badly victimised communities and or communities that played a 
vital role in the conflict, and considering the level of literacy, face-to-face interviews of 
representative communities and strategic groups were conducted in the key areas (northern 
 3 
and western) of Sierra Leone. Where appropriate, survey questionnaires were handed out. 
Target interviewee groups included planning donors, implementing and evaluating donors, 
strategic organisations, politicians, ex-combatants, internally displaced persons, community 
members and leaders, and security forces. In order to extract the emergent evaluative 
impressions and themes, a Content Analysis—a scholarly methodology used by researchers 
in the social sciences to analyse recorded transcripts of interviews with participants—was 
performed on the coded data based on 40 valid transcripts. 
 
Chapter Five combines the theories and concepts presented in Chapter Two with the results 
of the field work conducted in Sierra Leone, focusing on the role of the DfID-funded 
Community Reintegration Programme (CRP) during post-war reconstruction.   
 
The causative factors and the impact of DfID post-war reconstruction programmes in Sierra 
Leone are analysed in Chapter Six. The thesis rounds up with concluding comments and 
recommendations for further research.  
 
The dissertation seeks to address the following questions in its analysis: 
a. Why have post-war reconstruction programmes marginalised the poor? 
b. To what extent is the civil war in Sierra Leone linked to national politics? 
c. To what extent is the civil war in Sierra Leone linked to foreign influences?  
d. What are the effects of the conflict on Sierra Leone’s democratization process?   
 
Answers to the research questions provide the basis for addressing the main hypothetical 
statement that: donor-led post-war reconstruction programmes tend to reinforce earlier social structures 
and a return to the status quo rather than create opportunities for the previously marginalised. Sierra 
Leone is used as a case study, and the role of the United Kingdom, including its 
 4 
Department for International Development and the British Army, in Sierra Leone’s post-
war reconstruction serves a specific focus of paramount interest.  
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Chapter 1 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW: RETHINKING SUB-SAHARAN STATEHOOD 
 
1.1.  FAILED STATES IN CONTEXT 
The concept ‘failed states’ entered international discourse in the aftermath of the Cold War 
and is thus perceived to be a post-colonial phenomenon largely affecting Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Reno 1995). It was developed by a number of bodies and think tanks, including the 
Australian Strategic Planning Institute (ASPI) (Pha/Symon 2003), the Sydney Institute (Pha 
2003), Zartman (2005), Ignatief (2004), and The Foreign Policy Centre. Mark Leonard of the 
Foreign Policy Centre refers to it as being a state where “the Cold War dichotomy of 
Freedom Versus Communism has been replaced with a new organizing principle: order 
versus disorder” (Leonard et al. 2002).  
 
Implicit in the phrase, and the kind of philosophy of intervention being developed by the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office and U.S. State Department, is a judgment on 
governments deemed to have failed to make the grade (Zartman/Kremeni 2005). A 
successful state, according to Zartman, is a stable, democratic, free-market country such as 
Britain or the United States. An unsuccessful state is believed to be one in which the 
government has brought failure on itself by dictatorial politics and outdated economics 
(Holsti 1995).  
 
This thesis sides with Ayoob’s perspective on the matter, and contrasts with the one-sided 
Washington consensus (Ayoob 1999). The work questions if it is right that current instances 
of state failure are analysed in a historical vacuum and not seen as a part of the process of 
state making and state disintegration that have been integral components of the history of the  
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modern system of states. State failure must be studied in proper historical perspective; 
current instances should be placed in the historical context of state building; and state 
collapse should be traced back to the formation of the earliest modern states in Europe.   
 
Linking the analysis of state failure to the process of state making also emphasizes that 
instances of state failure are not unique to the present epoch but an inevitable part of the 
process of state making. Ayoob argues that “[a]nyone familiar with the history of modern 
Europe will immediately recall names like Aragon, Bohemia, Bavaria and Saxony as 
identifying putative political communities that were consigned to the dustbin of history 
because they failed to complete the process of sovereign state consolidation”. They were 
unable to do so either because of internal vulnerabilities and weaknesses or because their 
sovereign existence did not suit the interests of major European powers for reasons related 
to the European balance of power or the processes of state building involving the major 
powers themselves.  
 
In this context it is valuable to point out that there was no dearth of ‘Sierra Leones’ and 
‘Liberias’ in 17th and 18th century Europe. Moreover, as Joseph Strayer (1973) points out, 
even for those that succeeded, “[i]t took four to five centuries for European states to 
overcome their weaknesses, to remedy their administrative deficiencies, and to bring 
lukewarm loyalty up to the white heat of nationalism”. 
 
1.2.  DEFINITION AND CLARIFICATION 
It is important to define ‘state failure’ in a clear and workable way. In this research, a number 
of key terms are used: Thus, it is important to have a clear understanding of their meaning as 
they carry important connotations with them.   
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1.3.  DEFINITION OF STATE 
A state - as defined by international law - should possess the following qualifications: (a) a 
permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) a government; and (d) the capacity to enter 
into relations with other states (Tilly 1990). Given the multiple definitions of the subject-
matter within the realms of Social Sciences, this work is limited to Charles Tilly’s classic 
definition of a state. According to Tilly, the contemporary state has, since its amorphous 
beginning a thousand years ago, acquired five salient characteristics which can be summarised 
as follows: 
1. A territorially defined population with a paramount organ of government. 
2. These organs are in turn served by specialized personnel - the civil service, which 
carries out decisions, and the military to back these. 
3. The recognition of the state in its own defined territory as an independent state is 
also required by other states for its legitimacy. In fact it is this legitimacy that Tilly 
refers to as “sovereignty”. 
4. A community of feeling, a Gemeinschaft based on self-consciousness of a common 
nationality. 
5. In practice, the population is formed into a community by the members, mutually 
sharing duties and benefits (Tilly/Ardant 1975).   
 
By virtue of the above characteristics the concept of the state in international law is an entity 
with a fixed geographical boundary, a sizable and permanent population and a government 
with institutions that has firm control over security issues. Alden and Mbaya (2001) describe 
the state as the overall totality of elements, defined by traditional international law as 
population, territory and political organization. Clapham (2003) quotes Northedge’s 
definition of State as a territory of people reorganized for the purposes of law and diplomacy 
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as a legally equal member of the system of states. The United Nations Charter stresses the 
principles of sovereignty, independence and equal rights as the basic rights of all nations.  
 
In England and in France, where the concept was largely developed, only the first three of 
Tilly’s characteristics were visible during the medieval period, with the last two slowly 
acquired and becoming recognizable in the contemporary period. The last two characteristics 
are associated with nation-building whilst the first three with state-building. Both nation-
building and state-building are characteristics embedded in a state. Tilly also stresses that a 
nation is an association living under common laws and represented by the same legislative 
assembly. A condition for being a nation, according to the above definition, is simply having 
“[p]opulations which have been consolidated under [a] common organ of government” (Tilly 
1992). The United Nations Charter echoes the same by stressing that the following principles 
are important for the establishment of statehood: the principle of sovereignty; independence; 
equal rights as the basic rights of all nations; recognition of the state's claim to independence 
by other states; and enabling it to enter into agreements, although some omit the latter as a 
requirement - for instance, the Montevideo Convention.  
  
1.4.  DEFINITION OF FAILED STATE 
From the above discussion on the definition of a state as failed state can, therefore, be 
described as a state which does not meet all the criteria listed above on statehood: (1) a 
permanent population; (2) a defined territory; (3) a government; (4) the capacity to enter into 
relations with other states and the ability to exercise it; and (5) the  monopoly of the use of 
force (Tilly 2000). Whether an entity is supposed to meet all the criteria before it is accepted 
as a state by the international community is another issue. Clapham (1996) argues that no 
state meets all the above criteria, not even the United Kingdom which is a model state. He 
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argues that in 1997 the United Kingdom lacked firm control over Northern Ireland and parts 
of Scotland. However, it is clear that the degree of control over the citizens, the territory and 
the economic resources of a State are crucial to its existence.   
 
A critical look at Brownlie’s definition (1998) also supports the view that a state fails when it 
lacks state autonomy in the sense that there is no proper degree of freedom to manoeuvre 
for the state. For example, the long rule of Mobutu in Zaire is a typical reference. 
Domestically, there were no social groups that were sufficiently strong to challenge his 
position – he captured the state. The lack of adequate state capacity and statecraft 
characterised Mobutu’s regime: lack of state capacity is defined as the absence of an efficient 
bureaucratic machinery guided and shielded by a political elite that gives priority to 
development; and lack of statecraft is the lack of the ability to formulate proper policy 
responses to given developmental challenges. It is based on this view that Zartman (1995) 
describes state failure as follows: “As the decision-making centre of government that is 
paralyzed and inoperative; laws are not made, order is not preserved, and societal cohesion is 
not enhanced ... As a territory, it is no longer assured security by a central sovereign 
organization. As the authoritative political institution, it has lost its legitimacy and as a system 
of socioeconomic organization, its functional balance of inputs and outputs is destroyed” 
(Zartman 1995: 5).   
 
It is also widely accepted that the lack of a coherent national economy and capability of 
sustaining a basic level of welfare for the population of a state are indicators of the fragility of 
a nation. Although the poorest, least developed countries are in Sub-Saharan Africa, there are 
also considerable pockets of poverty in Central America and Asia (Burma, Nepal, and 
Bhutan). India, a country of enormous internal economic variation, has a relatively large part 
of the world’s poor. Another determinant of fragile states is the political fabric of a nation. 
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This refers to the institutions of the states and their legitimacy in the population. States that 
function well sustain a number of activities which are more or less taken for granted by their 
citizens: security against external and internal threats; order and justice in the sense of a 
functioning rule of law; and personal freedom including basic civil and political rights. 
However, fragile states sustain these functions only to a limited extent or not at all. In this 
respect, the institutions of the state are said to be weak, lacking capacity, competence, and 
resources. On the other hand, power is frequently concentrated in the hands of state elites 
who exploit their positions for personal gain. This is known in Sub-Saharan Africa as 
‘personal rule’ or ‘the strongman’ (Jackson/Rosberg 1982).  
 
According to Jackson and Rosberg (1982): “a state is said to have failed if it does not fulfil 
the most basic obligations of statehood”. The leadership does not have the means and 
credibility to compel internal order, to deter or repel external aggression, and is unable to 
contain political or social fragmentation of its territory (Dearth 1996: 123). William Zartman, 
using the term ‘state collapse’, supports this view on state failure. According to him, state 
failure is “a situation where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law and political order 
have fallen apart and must be reconstituted in some form, old or new” (Zartman 1995: 1). 
Sorensen prefers the more general term ‘fragile state’ to denote a broader class of state with 
weakened economic and political institutions and processes, and reserves the term of state 
failure for cases “when fragility intensifies”. Failed states may be described as states that are 
internationally recognised as sovereign territories, but which are nevertheless incapable of 
providing the domestic conditions of peace and good government discussed above.  
 
No matter what definition one prefers, the essential characteristic that qualifies a ‘failed state’ 
is consistent and includes the following: a fundamental flaw in state institutions and 
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government, and an increase in armed violence. If legislatures exist at all, they exist to ratify 
the decisions of a strong executive. 
  
1.5.  DISTINCTION OF FAILURES 
States can be classified as ‘strong’, ‘weak’, ‘failed’ or ‘collapsed’ states. The first is typified by 
its stronghold on the economy and in the exercise of a monopoly of the use of force as in the 
UK; the second can be described on the premise of the former Yugoslav State situation. The 
third encompasses a further erosion of legitimacy, while the fourth means the total collapse 
of state functions and capacity to govern. To understand what a failed state is as distinct from 
a successful one, it is important to understand what characterises a successful or a strong 
state. At its core, a successful state provides for the basic security of its population, protecting 
it from both internal and external threats. It also has the capacity to provide for the health 
and welfare of its population. Some states may never achieve the status of ‘strong’ and while 
they might not ‘collapse’, they may linger between a continuum ranging from weak to failed 
and from failed to collapsed. Somalia, Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Bosnia are examples 
of states that have travelled on this continuum (Baker/Ausink 1996: 19-31).  
 
According to Rotberg (2003), failed states provide only very limited quantities of essential 
political goods.  A failed state is a hollow polity that is no longer willing or able to perform 
the fundamental tasks of a nation-state in the modern world. Its institutions are flawed. If 
legislatures exist at all, they ratify the decisions of a strong executive. Democratic debate is 
absent. The judiciary is derivative of the executive rather than being independent. Collapsed 
states, on the other hand, are rare and extreme versions of a failed state. They exhibit a 
vacuum of authority. They are mere geographical expressions, black holes into which failed 
policies have fallen. 
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Sub-state actors take over, and parts of the collapsed state may still exist and function but in 
an unrecognized and disordered manner. Collapsed states can only return to being failed, and 
then perhaps to being weak, if sufficient security is restored to rebuild the institutions and 
strengthen the legitimacy of the resuscitated state. Weak states can quickly become failed 
states, as the case of Cote d’Ivoire in 2002 demonstrates. In the aftermath of President Felix 
Houphouet-Boigny’s death in 1993, his successors sought electoral success by appealing to 
Southerners due to being in the majority. They progressively began to discriminate against 
Northerners. Consequently, the expectations of rough equity that had long held the country 
together vanished. The legitimacy of the regime in charge vanished and Cote d’Ivoire, despite 
its decades of prosperity and success, and despite its ability to deliver many political goods, 
became ripe for failure (Kaplan 1996).  
 
It follows that not all economically wanting states are necessarily weak in political-
institutional terms. For instance, although Uruguay, Chile or Costa Rica are, in economic 
terms, referred to as Less Developed Countries (LDCs), this does not make them weak 
states. The reverse also holds – that is, not all states that are weak in political-institutional 
terms are LDCs. The Yugoslavia of yesterday and today’s Bosnia, as well as Russia, could be 
classified as weak without being LDCs. Yet in most cases there will be an overlap, so that 
states which are politically-institutionally weak are also LDCs. It is in these states that the 
danger of becoming ‘failed states’ is most likely. While some of the least developed Central 
American states, the Central Asian states emerging out of the former Soviet Union, and some 
European states such as Albania share many of the characteristics of fragile states outlined 
above, Sub-Saharan Africa is unarguably home to most of the fragile states.  
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Table 1. Matrix on indicators used to define failed, weak, strong and collapsed states 
(Carment 2003). 
Indicators Strong Weak Failed Collapse 
Internal or External 
Security 
High security 
 
Basic level of 
security 
 
No institution is 
responsible for 
security 
Free for all (anarchy) 
Extraction of 
Financial Resources 
 
High level of tax 
collection 
 
No efficient system 
of tax collection 
 
No system of tax 
collection in place 
 
Looting and banditry 
by warlords 
Domestic Authority High compliance 
with state institutions 
and the delivery of 
welfare 
State institutions are 
in place but poorly 
performing 
Absence of state 
institutions in most 
of the territory 
Absence of state 
institutions and 
emergence of ethnic 
warlords 
 
1.6.  RETHINKING SUB-SAHARAN STATEHOOD 
To fully understand the debate and policy issues regarding failed state and post-war 
reconstruction within the international community, specifically as conducted by the 
Department for International Development (DfID), it is important that one first and 
foremost revisits colonisation and the reasons for withholding independence from these 
states in the first place. The problem with independence (Perham 1961: 26) is that most 
colonial territories at the time of independence, including Sierra Leone, lacked nearly all the 
attributes of coherent and viable communities, the most important being the absence of an 
idea of community - civic, natural, or otherwise. Yet they were granted independence 
because of the overwhelming support for it. Colonial societies are typically “politically 
weak, economically immature, socially divided, and their populations ignorant of the 
obligation of citizenship and unfamiliar with the working of modern government” (Bain 
2001).  
 
The eventual collapse of these states in the 1980s proved to a large extent the points of the 
critics who argued that only ‘civilised’ nations are entitled to membership in the 
international community. ‘Barbarians’, who know nothing but passion and violence, were 
thought to be incapable of respecting the laws of nations. It is for this reason that John 
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Stuart Mill asserts that barbarians are not entitled to the right of nations: For they are fit 
only to be conquered and to be subject to foreign rule (Mill 1973: 377-78). John Lorimer 
similarly argues that barbarians and savage societies, inasmuch as they are unable to 
perform the duties of statehood, are entitled only to partial human recognition because 
they cannot be trusted to perform the duties of civilised nations. These societies, he argues, 
are populated by childlike races, and the right of undeveloped races, like the right of 
undeveloped individuals, is a right not to recognition as what they are not, but to 
guardianship - that is, to guidance - in becoming that of which they are capable in realising 
their special ideals.   
 
As such, the granting of independence did not address an estimate of ability. For 
independence to mean anything, for it to contribute something valuable, it must be subjected 
to a test of competence. To proceed any other way would be to embark upon an uncertain 
journey fraught with danger. This was the path, Reno argues, Sierra Leone was said to have 
taken, and thus made its eventual collapse an inevitable one.  
  
Is the case as simple and straight forward as Lorimer puts it? Today there are many 
explanations put forward by African academics challenging this hypothesis and giving 
evidence as to why African states find themselves disintegrated or failed as it is widely 
believed. The nature of African states is the first to be mentioned. As Kwabo (2008) posits, 
some states were born weak, as artificial constructs hewn out of colonial empires in Africa 
and Asia, a hybrid of the Westphalia state system imposed by their former occupiers 
(Amin/McDonagh 1973).  It is a common factor that the Berlin conference of 1884/5 in 
partitioning Africa did not take into account the needs and wishes of ethnic groups. There is 
a saying in Ghana that a household in the north of Ghana has a part in Burkina Faso and part 
in Togo. This connotes the confusion caused by the forced demarcation of African 
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territories. This implies that many ethnic groups were lumped together in one geographical 
entity without any commitment to nationhood (Nkrumah 1965). For example, Liberians have 
always grumbled that part of their land is in Sierra Leone (Clapham 1976). The Ewes in 
Ghana wish that they were with their kinsmen in Southern Togo (Herbst 2000).  
 
The civil war in 1969-1970 in Nigeria over Biafra is also worth mentioning. It is as a result of 
this that most of the writers on failed states argue that one of the main causes of such 
phenomena is rooted in the lack of a common identity within the nation state (Clapham 
1996). Pre-colonial states in Africa were ‘non-hegemonic’. They were not meant to be the all 
powerful entities, monopolising politics and commanding societies that the colonial 
government was making them to be.  This construct survived for centuries, even though they 
did not have the permanent precisely delineated boundaries described by the Weberian 
definition of a state. In pre-colonial Africa, power would dissipate the further a village was 
from the capital and would ebb and flow according to the fortunes of the central 
administration. This was very different from the European states of the time, where a 
government sought to be the sole source of political authority within rigidly defined 
territories.  
 
1.6.1.  PATRIMONIAL STATEHOOD 
Based on the above, it is not surprising that some commentators, including Reno, have 
argued that if Sierra Leone was a state, that state must have been a patrimonial one and not 
the legal bureaucratic state Weber seeks to describe (Reno 1995). Patrimonialism is a type of 
traditional rule or a political system that is dominated by a sovereign ruler (or a house of 
rulers) where both the army and the administration are dependent on the ruler. In Africa, this 
system was said to have been developed by the colonial government through its system of 
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divide and rule. Reno's book, which provides a comprehensive explanation of the modus 
operandi of Sub-Saharan African political systems, argues that post-independent African rulers 
have, in taking over power from the colonial government, inherited the colonial patronage 
system and its lingering effect.   
 
Reno then goes further to argue that the new post-Cold War environment has forced weak-
state rulers to revise their political calculus. The work, which targets researchers, foreign 
business partners and policy makers, observes that political players on an affected ground 
often dismantle old patronage networks and form new alliances with compliant, often 
buccaneering foreign firms, bloating bureaucracies and privatised public-sector companies. In 
the aftermath, these firms become surrogate providers of bureaucratic services (especially 
security) in the enclaves where diamonds, cobalt, timber, or other valuable resources are 
extracted. 
 
When this is not checked it eventually leads to sultanism, a hybrid form which combines 
both legal and patrimonial state systems. This hybrid form, ‘neo-Patrimonialism’ is 
characterised by combining patrimonial logic with a formal state bureaucratic system, or as 
Weber puts it, “from a structural point of view, the state is differentiated, but from a 
functional perspective it is weakly so; bureaucratic and patrimonial norms co-exist” (Weber 
1968; transl. Roth/Wittich).  
 
As a consequence of this, the most important positions in the state apparatus, whether in the 
bureaucracy, military, police or the national political frame, become filled with the loyal 
supporters of the strongman. Loyalty is strengthened through the (unequal) sharing of the 
spoils of office. The strongman controls a complex network of patron-client relationships. 
The functions of such a state have little to do with producing public or collective goods. The 
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state apparatus becomes a source of income for those fortunate or clever enough to control 
it. Such a state is by no means a source of security, order, and justice for its citizens; it is more 
of a threat, an apparatus from which the population must seek protection. Against this 
background there is lack of legitimacy. Unfortunately, vertical legitimacy is low because large 
parts of the population have no reason to support such a government; and the government 
has no authority in the sense that people support or follow its rules and regulations. The 
people’s sense of belonging together in the nation becomes weak simply because the state is 
captured by specific groups: it is no longer a state for all people. Christopher Clapham 
emphasises that such systems comprehensively lack “the capacity to create any sense of 
moral community amongst those who participate in them, let alone among those who are 
excluded” (Clapham 1996: 59). 
 
1.7.  FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH STATE FAILURE 
To avoid ambiguity, the factors of state failure will be considered in three distinct sets of 
empirical puzzles: The first associates state failure with macro level, long-term processes 
associated with system-wide transformations; the second emphasises intermediate 
perspectives; and the third emphasises micro-level strategic interactions between groups at 
specific points in time. 
 
1.7.1.  MACRO-LEVEL PERSPECTIVE OF STATE FAILURE 
According to Norton and Miskel (1997), “changes in system structure can reverse state-
building in several non-mutually exclusive ways: through the creation of highly dependent 
weak states (and the subsequent withdrawal of powerful patron-states) on the one hand and 
through processes of globalization and the strengthening of international norms of self-
determination on the other”. In Africa, there have been three such changes, the first with the 
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slave trade, the second in colonisation and the third the Cold War. Most of these systemic 
transitions were associated with either the break up or the abrupt creation of new states in 
hostile environments, involving conflicts over territory and identity. The post-Cold War era 
has, for instance, seen the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the collapse of Somalia, Liberia 
and Afghanistan. Another factor that fuelled these instabilities was superpower rivalry, which 
culminated in proxy wars and the influx of weapons into these states. 
 
In advancing this argument of systemic changes, Holm argues that the new waves of weak 
states are “a function of how the international system developed and as a result failed when 
unfavourable systemic circumstances prevailed” (Holm 1998). Ayoob (1996) also supports 
this view by stressing that during the Cold War, weak states and the international community 
propped up corrupt leaders economically and militarily. This ensured that most of these 
states survived. But with the end of the Cold War, most of these states were left to sink or 
swim. Drawing from the above premise, failure can, therefore, be said to be a function of the 
withdrawal of outside support to weak states.  
 
These changes brought by the Cold War (Herbst 2000), including the delivery of huge arms 
to new post-colonial states during the Cold War, operated as an independent factor for state 
collapse. Here the claim is made that, when the social compact between the governed and 
those governing breaks down, the availability of these arms leads quickly to the arming of 
contestants for the leading of state power. The provision of “small arms and light weapons” 
during the Cold War and after has continued to be a major slice of international assistance 
and global trade. Alger and Balasz comment that “conspicuously absent from the array of 
new threats to individual, national, and international security is a major weapons category that 
our leaders rarely mentioned” (Alger/Balasz 1985). The concluding observation is that such 
weapons are deadly, and when they are in the hands of even a relatively small group of 
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persons they can provoke major state-threatening conflicts, in time leading to state collapse 
(ibid). 
  
Even though some of the civil wars have roots in ethnic, religious, linguistic or communal 
enmity, the causes for these, as discussed above, can be traced as far back as the Congress of 
Berlin of 1884/85 with its forceful breakdown of communities, amalgamation of distant and 
inhospitable territories and the imposition of certain communities in a position of strength, 
both politically and economically. The resulting fear of the ‘other’ (and the consequent 
security dilemma) has driven much ethnic conflict and hostilities between regimes and 
subordinate and less favoured groups. Consistent with this view, Zartman (2004) notes that 
state collapse is marked by the loss of control not only of political but of economic space as 
well.   
 
The discourse has been supported by a host of commentators. Alao et al. provide empirical 
evidence by arguing that most states fail due to the way they were formed: “colonialism 
brought people of different ethnic, political and religious affiliations together to form a state 
and forge a common sense of citizenship” (Alao et al 1999: 83-102). In addition, most 
African economies were incorporated into the European capitalist framework which made 
most of these economies structurally too weak to cope with the challenges of nation-
building. In a similar vein, Herbst suggests that the ‘paradox of decolonisation’ in Africa 
stems from the formal colonization of Africa and the replacement of the continent’s diverse 
political systems with an artificial state system which was carried forward in post-independent 
Africa (Herbst 1996: 97). 
 
This supports the earlier hypothesis that there may not have been a state in Africa in the 
European sense of the word and thus, the term ‘failed state’ is by and large premature. How 
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can a state fail when it has not even emerged? The vision that the new post-colonial African 
states were to build legitimate nations, provide wealth and guarantee security and perform all 
the tasks of a nation state within the span of a decade of achieving independence, as Chong 
(2003) notes, “was somewhat naïve”. One can only expect such success from these newly 
independent states if the idea of State is taken completely out of historical context, and 
regarded as an entity that owes little or nothing to the forces that created it. However, 
another and maybe the right way to think about the contemporary anguish over state collapse 
is to note that what has collapsed is more the vision (or dream) (ibid: 10).  
 
Jackson (1990) also enters this debate by noting that while some states in Asia defied the 
odds and succeeded in achieving the desired effect of the West, in Africa it resulted to the 
formation of what he called ‘Quasi States’. These states, he argues, were never really states, 
and thus the puzzle is not how and why they may fail, but why they exist or persist at all. The 
idea that statehood is an appropriate institution in any environment is now being questioned 
and thus considered as an important impediment to the development to the African state. 
Therefore, it can be argued that the conflicts in Africa are a direct result of that act of 
commission or omission on the part of colonial governments. Alger and Balasz (1985) go 
even further, blaming the collapse on the colonial states: “the main problem was that most 
Western states failed to foresee that the self-determination of the 1960s was most certainly 
going to be followed by collapse”. As a consequence, rather than blaming post-colonial 
leaders for the failure, one can argue that the emergence of modern authoritarianism in 
Africa stemmed from a series of interrelated phenomena that arose out of the colonial legacy 
and as a result was partly responsible for Africa’s eventual collapse. For instance, whilst the 
availability of small arms and light weapons may operate as precipitating factors in the 
emergence of failed states, there is an element of uncertainty in that supplies of such weapons 
do not automatically or necessarily produce conflicts that lead to state collapse. The 
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breakdown of the ‘social contract’ between the governed and those governing could be one 
of the underlying factors. 
 
A nation state is said to fail when it loses legitimacy, when it cannot defend its nominal 
borders or when those borders become irrelevant. Once the state acquires the capacity to 
secure itself or to perform its duty in an expected manner, and once what little capacity 
remains is devoted almost exclusively to the fortunes of a few or to a favoured ethnic group 
or community, then there is every reason to expect less and less loyalty to the state on the 
part of the excluded and the disenfranchised. Baker and Ausink (1996) therefore see a 
collapsing state as one that has lost its legitimacy, has few functioning institutions, offers little 
or no public service to its citizens and is unable to contain fragmentation. This is much more 
relevant in Africa where most of the states that are plagued by state failure exist and where 
exclusive groups or classes have more ownership and control. As such, it is expected that the 
social contract, which binds inhabitants to an overarching polity, will become breached.   
 
With the social contract between the state and the people breached, people stop trusting the 
state and, as occurred in Sierra Leone, they become sectional. Community security therefore 
becomes their main recourse in times of insecurity and their main source of economic 
opportunity. There is a tendency for people to transfer their allegiance to clan and group 
leaders who then become warlords able to derive support from external sources. In the 
wilder, more marginalised corners of failed states, terror can breed along with the prevailing 
anarchy that naturally accompanies state breakdown and collapse. This explains why the 
number of rebels in a particular country increases within a short period of time and the 
dynamics of African wars are swift. Thus in Sierra Leone rebel groups decided to use “the 
interests of the marginalised” to foster their interest (Abdullah 2004).   
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Carment and Harvey (2000) consider that this process has both internal and external 
implications. Hewitt (1997) supports this point by arguing that, “high levels of domestic 
instability limit a state’s ability to act authoritatively within the international community, limit 
its ability to act on domestic society with any legitimacy, and to deliver socio-economic 
packages aimed at bringing about widespread industrialization” (ibid). Wallensteen (2005) 
sees the convergence of the internal and external dynamics as the ultimate basis for 
evaluating state performance. There are instances of decay where the state is under-
consolidated – a situation where the state is not effective in the performance of its duties; and 
cases where the state is over-extended – and thus becomes a threat to its inhabitants 
(Richards 1996). 
 
The economic failure of African States also accounts for their weakness. Most African states 
cannot feed their own people. Some people, especially government officials, manipulate 
government funds to their advantage. Rebel groups emerge to share in this booty. The 
international community usually intervenes in the form of economic aid, which usually comes 
with suicidal terms.  Any state that goes about begging for food is a ‘weak’ or ‘failed’ state as 
it cannot take decisions on its own. The implementation of the Structural Adjustment 
Programme by the International Monetary Fund and its consequences on the economies of 
many African states attests to this claim. A good economy ensures political autonomy and 
without it a country cannot claim sovereignty. Further, whilst most African States can claim 
economic sovereignty, the majority of them have had their economies penetrated by 
multinational companies.  
 
Their domestic politics are left in the hands of a few men who see themselves as elected to 
rule their people forever. The rise to power of Idi Amin in Uganda and Bokassa in the 
Central African Republic attest to this. Cruelty, financial mismanagement and corruption by 
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these leaders led to the death of many in their countries. Some heads of states were even 
richer than the countries they governed. 
 
1.7.2.  INTERMEDIATE AND MICRO-LEVEL PERSPECTIVES OF STATE 
FAILURE 
The intermediate perspective is useful for understanding the root causes and background 
conditions leading to state failure (Buzan 1991) in identifying structural factors associated 
with decay and in accounting for changes in political, social and economic demands. They 
may, under some circumstances, also be able to explain why each side ends up fighting. But 
these factors cannot explain violent conflict. For instance, how long could a group of people 
tolerate denial of their ontological needs? Why do very similar countries, sharing the same 
cultural features most commonly associated with conflict and poverty, have different 
outcomes of state ability to govern? It can be said that salient ethnic or social divisions, 
minority grievances, failing government institutions and a lack of national identity produce 
radically different conflict histories. For instance, why does violence erupt in Zimbabwe and 
not in neighbouring Zambia? And why was there a Rwandan genocide in 1994 and not in 
1990 when the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) first invaded from Uganda? Why and how do 
states slip from weakness towards failure? What does it take to drive a failing state over the 
edge of collapse? The list goes on and on (Jackson 1982: 3). 
 
Micro–level perspectives, therefore, seek to bridge this gap in our understanding by analysing 
it from three forms of dynamic interactions. The first are interactions between the 
belligerents themselves; the second, between the belligerents and outside forces who are in a 
position, through actions and statements, to alter the course of violence (Carment and 
Harvey 2001); and finally the role that avarice plays in propelling conflict. None of these 
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indicators single-handedly provides evidence that a strong state is becoming weak or a weak 
state is heading pell-mell into failure. But a judicious assessment of all three and other factors 
discussed in this chapter, taken together, should provide both quantitative and qualitative 
warnings.  
 
1.7.3.  GROUP AND SOCIETY REACTION 
The first dynamic, between the belligerents, escalates to violence in situations where 
governing elites, driven by ethnic or other communal hostility, or by insecurities, victimize 
their own citizens or some sub-sets of the community. An example is the case with Mobutu, 
where ruling cadres increasingly oppressed, extorted and harassed the majority of their own 
compatriots while privileging a narrowly based party, clan, or sect. In such a state of broken 
social contracts, the environment becomes conducive for ethnic or conflict entrepreneurs to 
mobilize support.  
 
As such, the level of violence resulting from the denial of needs then accounts for the second 
indicator of state failure (Azar 1986). Burton’s (1990b) human needs theory also supports this 
view. In “Human Theory of Conflict”, J. W. Burton postulates that in addition to the 
obvious biological needs of food and shelter, there are basic socio-psychological human 
needs such as identity, security, recognition, participation and autonomy which relate to 
growth and development. In his view, such development needs must be catered for if 
societies are to remain significantly free of conflicts. This is because whereas an individual is 
responsive to opportunities for the improvement of his/her life style, he/she refuses to 
accept the denial of ontological needs like security, dignity etc. As a result, any political 
system that denies or suppresses these human needs eventually generates protest and conflict 
(Burton 1990b). This issue will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 
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However, do the steady erosion of the economy and the increasing inability of people to 
meet their basic needs lead to the collapse of legitimate governance? Or does the collapse of 
legitimate governance lead to the steady erosion of the economy? For the purpose of this 
thesis, it is not necessary to answer such questions. What is important, however, and what 
has become increasingly clear is that economic collapse presents cases of state failure. In such 
cases, however costly and irrational it appears in human and material terms, violence 
becomes an important aspect in ensuring group solidarity, regulating behaviours and 
maintaining social hierarchy. In short, a collective group will pursue violence if it safeguards 
advantageous and long-term political and economic outcomes for them (ibid). This is little 
more than a Maslovian argument but it seems to be lost in much of the debates and policy 
documents as to why states fail and most importantly, how to reconstruct them. In my view, 
this economic dimension of the problem is essential for constructing a strategy for 
responding to state failure or basically the path out of state failure must be paved with 
economic development and economic stability.  
 
1.8. DEMOCRACY 
 
Democracy is predominantly a new phenomenon which the UN and most international 
institutions have ascribed to, to address today’s peace-building crisis - the rationale for it is 
that democracy addresses the economic, social, cultural, humanitarian and political roots of 
conflicts. It constitutes a comprehensive method of approach covering the broad range of 
new peace-building priorities: ‘top-down’ international regulation of elections, institutional 
development and economic management; and also ‘bottom-up’ assistance to develop a 
democratic political culture through civil society building (Chandler 1999: 110). 
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The result derived from these approaches has provided the international community the 
opportunity to respond to current and prevailing post-conflict issues, which have also 
become a challenge to them and a dilemma to war-affected nations. Like democracy, the 
term peace-building was also of late introduced into the efforts of the international 
community in their current strive to upgrade the response of both governmental and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) to armed conflicts and its devastating consequences. In 
its broad term, peace-building is also noted as a “reflection on new resolve to search for ways 
of responding earlier, more consistently, and less chaotically to conflicts” (Ploughshares 1995: 
1). 
 
However, despite a decade of the international community’s involvement in war zones, 
commentators are inclined to believe that the United Nations, regional organizations, 
national governments and NGOs still remain ill-prepared in terms of building lasting peace in 
regions of current or potential conflicts. The complications normally encountered when it 
comes to deal with conflict resolution in regions prone to insurgence or recurrence of fights 
and the like, still continue unabated. The international community is consequently faced with 
series of failures. This, in most cases, causes the international community to shift much 
attention to prescribing a democratic culture which is expected to consolidate a culture of 
peace. The challenges in the political arena and the structured scheme of approach have 
made democracy, as seen by political actors and the populace, as “the right and natural order 
of things” (Sorenson 1998: 102).  
Regarding peace-culture that democracy is expected to exhibit, this part of the work takes a 
brief look at already concluded peace-building efforts to examine whether democracy 
precluding peace-building has been successful in exhibiting pacifying effects.  The context or 
situations where such peace-building efforts have been employed are very essential. In view 
of the claim that democracy yields a counterpoising effect when implemented under 
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incompatible circumstances, this subchapter examines the dominant ideas that have been 
shaping the approaches by international institutions and arguments for and against those 
approaches in implementing its blueprint within the framework of democratization. 
  
1.8.1. DEMOCRATIZATION 
 
Schumpeter sees democracy as an “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decision 
in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of competitive struggle for 
people’s vote” (Schumpeter 1943: 269). This has been included in the efforts of international 
institutions in post-conflict settings, which have stimulated interesting debates. One of the 
earlier arguments is from Immanuel Kant in his essay “Perpetual Peace” (1795): Kant stated 
that it is a natural tendency for states to form a liberal democratic view point since democracy 
bestows legitimacy on the rulers which makes them capable of facing international threats. In 
other words, “states not organized as liberal republics will tend to be unsuccessful” 
(Sorenson 1999: 93), while states with a democratic culture will, through the pacifying effect 
of democracy, lead to a stable peace due to the fact that democracies rule through the 
people’s consent. In Kant’s words, “if the consent of citizens is required in order to decide 
that war should be declared…nothing is more natural than that would be very cautious in 
commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war. Among 
the latter would be: having to fight, having to pay the cost of war from their own resources, 
having painfully to repair the devastation war leaves behind, and, to fill up the measures of 
evils, load themselves with heavy national debt that would embitter peace itself and that can 
never be liquidated on account of constant wars in the future” (Kant 1983: 100). In sum, 
Kant’s argument in support of that democratization leads to peace derived from his claim 
that the mere existence of democracies, with its culture of peaceful conflict resolution; the 
bond or common moral values that democracies share which he refers to as a pacific union; 
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the economic cooperation between democracies, which when added together he believed will 
act as a recipe for peace to flourish between democracies; and with its spread will then affect 
the whole world.  
 
This view have also been shared and supported by Joseph Schumpeter and R. J. Rummel, 
who according to his empirical research into Libertarian States, stated that in conflicts in the 
period 1976-1980, only 24 percent of free states (meaning those that emphasize political and 
economic freedom) (Sorenson 1999: 94) were involved in comparison to 26 percent of partly 
free and 61 percent of the non-free states. His conclusion states that “the more libertarian a 
state is, the less it is involved in foreign violence” (Rummel 1983: 27-71). In other words, 
democratic states are more peaceful than non-democratic ones. 
 
Social scientists and commentators have for years supported Kant’s views on democracy. 
With their findings, Schumpeter and Rummel have both brought new impetus to the 
optimistic view. And of late the former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 
report entitled, “An Agenda for Peace”, he gave political currency to the concept of peace-
building which calls for “western democratic principles, declaring that, periodic and genuine 
election are a crucial factor in the effective enjoyment of a wide range of other human rights” 
(United Nations 1992). It concludes with the assertion that “democracy is one of the pillars 
on which a more peaceful, more equitable, and more secured world can be built” (ibid). 
 
 Axworthy also reiterated this sentiment when in his speech at York University in the 
creation of a new Canadian peace-building mechanism expressed the same sentiment about 
bringing assurance to the optimistic view. However, Melvin Small and J. David Singer have 
questioned these hopes in their research: they came to conclude that there is no significant 
difference between democracies and other regimes and that democracies are as war-prone as 
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other types of governments. Commentators and Realists have pursued this argument against 
democracy. Realism here refers to “a theoretical perspective on International Relations that 
purports to analyze the world as it really is, not as it ought to be” - the definition stated 
therefore supports the view that conflict is a fact of life and inevitable due to the forces 
inherent in human nature (Hoffman 1996: 160). It is very crucial here that the arguments 
made for democracy only emphasize that democracies do not fight each other in the 
international arena and not within themselves - as most African countries have in the 
contemporary period been experiencing intra-state wars. 
 
Roland Paris is one of the most forceful commentators against democracy, who refers to the 
present approach of the international community as ‘Liberal Internationalism’. He defined it, 
in its broadest sense, as an active involvement of international affairs, which is believed to be 
the opposite of isolationalism and internationalism. He also stated: “it connotes foreign 
policies that develop to enhance multilateral cooperation among states” (Paris 2001). The 
two concepts comprising liberal internationalism suggest an activist foreign policy that 
promotes liberal principles abroad, especially through multilateral cooperation and 
international institutions. To sum it up, Paris noted that as a single paradigm, liberal 
internationalism has been governing the conduct of peace-building in the post-Cold War era. 
It involves a regime change from beginning to the end, including both stages of what is 
generally termed, in comparative literature, as “transition” to a liberal democracy and its 
subsequent “consolidation” (Pridam and Vanhanen 1994: 2). However, as will be illustrated 
in the following chapters, a regime change does not always achieve the aim of peace-building. 
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1.8.2. THE PARADOX OF DEMOCRATIZATION ON PEACE-BUILDING 
 
One argument has been overlooked in the literature, that is, both democracy and capitalism 
encourage conflict and competition. Its also refers back to the definition of democracy by 
Schumpeter: democracy is an institutional arrangement for arriving at a political decision in 
which individuals acquire the power to decide by a means of a competitive struggle. 
Schumpeter noted that democracy thrives on competition and requires politically active and 
involving citizenry. Commentators refer to it as “a vibrant civil society” (Paris 2001) in order 
to counter-balance and scrutinize the power of the state and to provide a channel of 
expression. Indeed, democratic societies accept that conflict is a fact of life and seek to 
intensify it in areas where it is latent with the hope of channelling it through existing 
institutions (Fisher 1999). Coser, who first explored the stabilization effect of societal 
conflict, also explained this paradox: “by permitting the immediate and direct expression of 
rivalry claims; open societies are able to adjust their structures by eliminating the sources of 
dissatisfaction” (Coser 1956). However, amidst all these claims, Dahl noted that, 
“encouraging political activity can polarize the populace into a number of separated, 
potentially hostile communities” such as in Africa where multiparty democracy divides the 
populace along ethnic lines into separate ethnic cocoons. In view of this dilemma, Dahl went 
further to caution that “when a society is divided in this way, it may reinforce societal 
differences and work against the goal of establishing a stable democratic system particularly if 
ambitious politicians deliberately exploit inter-group differences to build a following” 
(Sandbrook 1996). 
 
This problem is supposed to have escalated the conflicts in nearly all the eight United 
Nations peace-building programmes - beginning from Namibia, El Salvador, Mozambique 
up to Sierra Leone. He concurs with Georg Sorenson’s assertion that to assume that 
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“Democracies do not fight each other” as “one of the strongest nontrivial or non-
tautological statement that can be made about international relation” (ibid), and as such 
democracy can be inherently violent like any others. This view has also been supported by 
commentators like Francois Furet (1985) who argued that “the adversarial politics of 
democracy can sharpen confrontations and conflict in divided societies, rather than fostering 
greater tolerance for different interests and opinions”. 
 
1.8.3.   EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION POLICIES 
 
Like democracy, capitalism also thrives on conflict and competition by which society 
competes for a large share of a country’s economy - an approach which seems fair but when 
replicated in some post-conflict situations, it can yield counter-intentional results. Therefore, 
it has rendered a lot of criticism from commentators for various reasons; for instance, it 
creates economic inequalities that have historically fuelled resentment and confrontation.  It 
exhibited detrimental effects through its structural adjustment programmes implemented 
through the IMF and World Bank. The programmes comprise structural changes and current 
management components: the former require countries to accept capitalist market forces, 
which compels governments to privatize. The latter further requires governments to accept 
so-called international standards. It also involves depreciating the exchange rate and 
decontrolling prices, reforming the tax system, reducing the fiscal deficits and maintaining 
tight controls on credit. 
 
These policies promote economic liberalization as a recipe for stable economic growth in the 
long run. However, they often lead to economic hardship and political instability in the short 
run. Mozambique and El Salvador are examples where those policies have, instead of 
alleviating potential conflicts, rather exacerbated those through SAP. This then concurs with 
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Fisher’s definition of violence: “actions, words, attitudes, structure or systems that cause 
physical, psychological, social or environmental damage and/or prevent people from 
reaching their full human potential” (Fisher 1999). This definition does not limit violence to 
killing, beating, torture, maiming and so on. According to new definitions of violence, it also 
comprises equally damaging elements of violence such as killing with a gun, killing through 
deprivation of foods and other essential needs to sustain lives - a punishment believed to 
have been imposed by international institutions or one in which one group of nations 
imposes deliberate suffering on others. 
  
War-shattered states that had to borrow large sums of money in order to rebuild their 
economies were faced with the consequential dilemma to be conditioned to restructure their 
economies in order to pay those debts. In most of the circumstances, it has caused severe 
hardship that have in return resulted in conflicts. It has been further complicated by the fact 
that leaders of the North and South are colluding into such arrangements whilst the rest of 
the people suffer. The result of such actions can be seen as “structural or institutional 
violence” (Fisher 1999). 
   
All of these problems come at the expense of the international community’s belief in the 
power of the ballot box, which it hopes can bring about peace and stability. Experience as 
well as empirical research have proven this notion to be naive and false since “the process of 
political and economic liberalization is inherently tumultuous and disruptive” (Paris 1997). 
 
1.8.4  THE NEED FOR CRITICAL THINKING 
 
What have we learned about democratization and liberalization, and how does it affect our 
understanding of peace-building? Boutros-Ghali’s “Agenda for Peace” still informs our 
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understanding of peace-building, rather than diminishing our faith in the efficacy of peace-
building. It has been argued “democracy is an unaffordable luxury for most developing 
countries where the need for development will outweigh the need for accountable 
governments” (Ake 1967). With democracy under the barrel of the gun, commentators have 
come up with various alternatives, which I will briefly examine. Paris states that an 
authoritarian solution for war-shattered states should not be rejected out of hand but 
cautions at the same time of promoting authoritarianism as a peace-building strategy. 
However, this will raise serious problems in most circumstances. A democratic government 
is preferable since it encompasses the institutions through which conflicts can be resolved. 
 
A second alternative is that of partition, which divides a war-shattered state into territorial 
discrete, political independent units. The resulting entities are to exist as sovereign states or 
autonomous regions within existing states. Chaim Kaufman endorsed this by noting that 
violent conflict hardens ethnic identities to the point that cross-ethnical political appeal 
becomes futile, meaning that victory can be assured by physically controlling the territory in 
dispute. However, he also noted some problems associated with this - the unwillingness of 
the international community to perform its task of providing the necessary security. A typical 
example of this is the Bosnian scenario, where the international community declared a safe 
area of Srebrenica and then stood by to allow it to be overrun in July 1995 by Bosnian Serbs, 
who then systematically killed thousands of civilians.  
 
However, it is not to be assumed that by the mere setting up of a democratic government, 
especially in conflict zones, peace will result easily. And so it requires that before addressing 
any political and/or social conflict in war-shattered states, donor agencies and NGOs alike 
are to seek a better understanding of the cultures, dynamics, relationships and issues of the 
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situation before drafting a method of approach - an approach, which pays no respect to any 
blueprint or democracy per-se but is specific to the conflict in question. 
 
Such an approach might in some cases not be compatible with the political reforms as 
democratic programmes basically tend to focus on constructing enduring structures to 
succeeding generations rather than on an environment of basic order and stability with 
sustainable resources. Thus, depending on the given context and stability of the environment, 
a peace-building approach focusing on short-term measures might be more feasible in an 
early stage of peace-building until mid-term and long-term democracy-enhancing measures 
can be implemented. 
 
1.9.  THE DUTY TO INTERVENE  
In the face of violence, especially from non-state actors, it is the belief of the state that it is its 
right to exercise “the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within its territory to 
restore order” (Tilly et al. 1987). Tilly et al. go on to suggest that while the successful use of 
coercion by a state in order to suppress local ethnically-based challenges in some cases 
enhances the assessment of its future utility, coercion against minority ethnic groups without 
consent can also be a normative factor since elites who use violence become habituated to 
violence (ibid).  While the state’s use of force helped to define it, drawing from Weber’s 
conclusion, Mason warns “when force is used, the authority itself has failed”.  
 
According to Hobbes (Schmitt 1996), “sovereignty is a combination of coercive power and 
consent, and it is this combination that provides legitimacy to political authority and resolves 
the problem of order within societies.” The coercive power of the sovereign will alone never 
be sufficient to maintain a political order. Only if the people understand why the polity must 
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be ordered, and only if they continue to view the sovereign as a legitimate authority and trust 
in its judgment, can a political order be secure. Therefore, state strength, when the state has 
failed, can only be achieved through negotiation with society rather than abrasion against it. 
Furthermore, legitimacy and state capacity are intimately related, and the state’s primary and 
routine reliance on force, in order to have its commands obeyed, signifies a drastic reduction 
in its legitimacy. As Baker and Ausink (1996) have pointed out succinctly, “A state which can 
only coerce its subjects is not governing them; it is at war with them.”     
 
In Africa, foreign interventions have been both frequent and varied, with both constructive 
and negative consequences. On the one hand, while foreign intervention helps to salvage war 
torn societies; on the other hand, foreign intervention complicates nation building as was the 
case with Mozambique. The same can be said also of the Economic Community of West 
African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), UNOMIL and UNAMSIL, in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone respectively. One thing to note here is that European intervention 
did not begin in the post-Cold War era of independent states. In fact, such intervention led to 
the colonial wars during the colonial scramble for Africa in the nineteenth century. 
Uhomoibhi observes that the Berlin conference, held at the behest of European powers in 
1884-1885, during which African territories were partitioned, was international intervention 
par excellence. 
 
Zartman (2004) pushes this debate regarding the motive of intervening parties further by 
examining some other reasons why it is carried out. In Africa, he believes that interventions 
have defined objectives. In some cases it is for protecting the life and property of its citizens, 
as was the case with France and Belgium in the Congo. In other cases, it is primarily to profit 
from the spoils of African states – what some critics have called “crass opportunism” (Mair 
2008). Another objective was to foster a specific geographic and political interest, as was the 
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case with the Cold War. To conclude on this section on foreign intervention, the evidence 
available suggests that foreign intervention did not necessarily provide a full or early solution 
to the perennial problem of state instability and state cohesion. 
 
1.9.  GIVE WAR A CHANCE? 
While war is evil, third party intervention does in rare circumstances help to exacerbate 
conflict when the conflict is not allowed to run its natural course: conflicts have typically 
been interrupted early on, before they could burn themselves out and establish the 
preconditions for a lasting settlement (Luttwak 2005). Luttwak goes further to controversially 
note that, “too many wars nowadays are becoming endemic conflicts that never end because 
the transformative effects of both decisive victory and exhaustion are blocked by outside 
intervention”. In addition, if and when conflicts are left to run their course, he questions the 
policy of the USA, for example, to back one side with the hope that it emerges as the winner 
and that it can reorder the affairs of the country. This tack was tried repeatedly throughout 
the Cold War, often with poor results (ibid). 
 
On the humanitarian assistance front, NGOs are said to have in many cases exacerbated the 
very conflicts and violence they were seeking to relieve by bringing in new resources into a 
conflict situation (Anderson 1999). During war, each side tries to acquire and control 
resources, and so NGO aid can present a new focus for struggle. Anderson lists a number of 
ways in which NGO assistance can become distorted and actually contributes to the conflict. 
Warring factions, she argues, may “tax the NGO for the right to deliver their aid” (ibid). 
Those ‘taxes’ then support the war effort. Aid may be stolen and redirected to the fighting 
parties. Resources given to victims may be passed on to friends and relatives who are 
engaged in fighting. NGO-built infrastructure, such as roads, may enable military troops to 
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travel further and faster. Local, NGO-trained specialists may be conscripted into military 
service. 
 
NGO actions and attitudes can also exacerbate conflict. Anderson (ibid: 48) notes, “NGOs 
must choose to employ some people (and not others), purchase goods from some (and not 
others), and target their aid toward some people (and not others); these decisions can fuel 
separate group identities, inequalities, and jealousies.” Publicizing human rights abuses can 
provoke both increased outrage and a defensive response in the perpetrators, and so further 
harden their opposition. Such publicity can also promote a dehumanized image of the 
perpetrators. Accordingly outside forces can be mutually reinforcing, mutually exclusive, or 
mutually incompatible. 
 
1.10.  CONCLUSION 
This chapter has sought to examine the concept of the failed state and, in particular, the 
historical, group and societal factors, both internal and external, that contribute to weak, 
collapsed and failed states, as the basis for subsequent analysis of the Sierra Leonean 
situation. Today, most of the debates on Africa in general and Sierra Leone in particular 
have mainly focused on definitional issues, the strengths and weaknesses of contending 
methodologies and evaluation procedures as well as the causes, manifestations and 
processes of state failure. Much less attention has been paid to the question of how Sierra 
Leone fits within the European notion of statehood and to what extent that link has 
contributed to state decay.   
 
In the history of the world no country has developed without the State and its people 
playing a central and proactive role. This has to be taken into consideration if the African 
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State is to be made more relevant towards the development of the continent. It can be 
inferred from Edward Said (2003) that Africans need to do more to keep the memories of 
the past and present alive, which would enable them to shape their destiny for a better 
future.  
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Chapter 2 
THEMATIC REFLECTION ON WAR TO POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION 
TRANSITIONS 
 
2.1.  INTRODUCTION 
Intra-state conflicts are now far more common than international conflicts. Of the 25 major 
armed conflicts listed by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute for 2000, all 
but two were internal (Collier et al. 2000). Ayoob (1996) estimates that in 1995 alone at least 
14 Sub-Saharan countries with a total estimated population of 175,000,000 experienced intra-
state conflicts and thus demanded the use of post-war reconstruction. It is interesting to note 
that apart from the successful Marshall Plan after World War II and aid to Uganda in the 
1980s, most of the post-war reconstruction programmes - especially those directed towards 
countries coming out of civil war - have failed. This includes UNOSOM, Liberia and even 
Sierra Leone after 1997. 
 
Robert Jackson (1990) believes that the primary reason for such failures rests in the 
conceptual deficit evident in official discourses in understanding the nature of these wars, and 
the theoretical vacuum in regard to their causes (Jackson 2002: 3). The net result is that many 
of the world’s poorest countries are locked in a tragic and vicious circle where poverty causes 
conflict and conflict causes poverty. Eighty percent of the world’s 20 poorest countries have 
suffered a major war in the past 15 years. On average, countries coming out of war face a 44 
percent chance of relapsing in the first five years of peace (Goodhand/Hulme 1999). Why 
and how can this trend be reversed? And why post-war reconstruction and not nation 
building? This chapter addresses the theory and taxonomy of state failure. The following 
chapter will narrow it to Sierra Leone. It addresses the method of reversing state failure and 
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the role of elections and socio-economic factors. The demobilising of combatants and civil 
society are among the many topics this chapter will discuss.  
 
2.2.  THEMATIC UNDERPINNING OF THE STUDY 
Theoretical understanding is necessary to provide a sound basis and sharper insight into any 
work of academic significance. It is for this reason that the following paradigms are 
examined:  
 
• ‘General Theory of Conflict’ (the need to know what it is before attempting to 
resolve it); 
• Theories on intervention (in conflict and post-war situations). 
 
2.3.  HUMAN NEEDS THEORY 
In the African context, it can be argued that ethnic heterogeneity per se is not the cause of 
conflict. Rather, it is policies and institutions that attempt to deny some ethnic groups 
security, identity, recognition, participation and autonomy. Hardly any one theory can 
adequately explain the sources of conflict and the failure that results, but the human needs 
theory as a framework of analysis of conflicts in Africa has a number of advantages. First, it 
rejects ethnicity and religious sentiments and focuses on structural and institutional 
deformities as the primary source of conflict. Secondly, it emphasizes that basic human needs 
are universal and that their frustration anywhere constitutes a threat to social peace and 
order. Thirdly, it holds that the satisfaction of basic needs is central to the functioning of 
political institutions. An application of this theory to the Sierra Leonean situation leads us to 
examine how the exclusionary policies of the colonial government and later how the All 
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People’s Congress era and the repressive Momoh regime contributed to the outbreak of the 
war and the eventual collapse of the Sierra Leonean state. 
 
2.4.  STUDY ON THE THEORY OF CONFLICT AND CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION 
Coser (1956) defines conflict as “a struggle over values or claims to status, power and scarce 
resources in which the aims of the conflicting parties are not only to gain the desired value 
but also to neutralise, injure or eliminate their rivals”. This definition intimates the types of 
values over which parties in conflict struggle. They could be tangible resources like food, 
money, land, mineral resources, etc., or intangible ones like power, status, identification, etc. 
But it is not always easy to draw the line – a particular conflict could be over a combination 
of these. In particular, the Sierra Leone crisis, which began with a struggle for power, became 
one of acquisition and exploitation of the country’s natural resources.  
 
Coser’s definition also places emphasis on the destructive aspect of conflict – the opposing 
parties in their attempts to achieve their goals try to neutralise their competitors or even to 
destroy them. But Stedman (1991) is of the view that conflict does not necessarily lead to 
violence (or the destruction of the opponent). It is when peaceful mechanisms for pursuing 
competing interests fail that violence emerges. This supports Stedman’s view that, “Although 
conflict may turn violent, violence is not an inherent aspect of conflict but rather a potential 
form that conflict may take” (ibid: 270). He cautions that, “concerns about security and 
survival co-exist with the issues that caused the conflict” (ibid: 388). Arguably, Stedman 
maintains that, given the circumstances in the above situation, resolution of conflict 
necessarily becomes more difficult since it must deal with the two levels – the underlying 
causes of the conflict and the ending of the violent expression of it.  
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Zartman (1995) emphasises that the potentially violent nature of conflict, therefore is a 
dilemma which governments face in dealing with demands and grievances before situations 
get out of hand and erupt into violence. Although he recommends that governments handle 
demands and grievances at an early stage, he observes that governments are often reluctant to 
do so. This explains why at the initial stages of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
(NPFL) incursion into Liberia, the Doe government tried to downplay its significance. 
  
Goodman and Bogard (1992) consider that for a negotiation to succeed in reaching a 
settlement, there should be an element of doubt on both sides. In their view, “if one side of a 
military conflict remains convinced that they have the time and resources to achieve their 
original goals, then they may enter negotiations with a slate of concealed motive” (ibid: 52). 
Such motives could be to test the determination of the other side to continue to fight or to 
allow for time to regroup their forces and prepare for a new offensive. The attitude of the 
NPFL, which occupied most of Liberia for much of the time during the peace process, 
confirms the above assertion. 
 
In their analysis of the conceptual bases of conflict resolution, Deng et al. (1996) highlight 
the fact that conflicts are usually approached from the perspective of the key leaders of the 
conflicting factions. While the role of such leaders cannot be ignored if any settlement is to 
succeed, it is essential to remember that often there exist differences between the objectives 
of the elites, the fighting men and the populace. Usually, the faction leaders are more 
concerned with the struggle for power and less for the lives of the ordinary citizens and the 
welfare of the community as a whole. The relevance of this point to the Liberian crisis was 
clearly demonstrated in 1994 when, after the Akosombo Accord ceded power on the Council 
of State to the faction leaders, the civilians demonstrated in protest and eventually 
institutionalised their protest in the formation of the Liberation National Conference of 
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Unarmed Citizens. There were also instances where the leaders negotiated peace whilst their 
combatants continued fighting.  
 
2.5.  STUDIES ON INTERNAL CONFLICTS 
Brown (1996) identifies three causes of internal armed conflicts. These are bad leadership; a 
strong sense of antagonistic history; and mounting economic problems. While it may seem 
simplistic to attribute the causes of all internal conflicts to just three factors, one cannot deny 
that those three factors were crucial in the Sierra Leone case. Momoh’s regime was one in 
which he did almost everything to perpetuate himself: the relationship between his Limba 
tribe and its Southern and Eastern neighbours the Mende was strained, and the economy was 
in far worse shape in 1992 than it was in 1985, when he took over. 
 
Zartman (1995) takes the peculiar problems of resolving internal conflicts further. He 
contends that internal conflicts are most difficult to negotiate because of their asymmetrical 
structure in which one party is strong and the other is weak both in terms of military power 
and legitimacy. At the same time, he sees negotiations as a better option for resolving internal 
conflicts than military victory. This is because a defeat of the rebellion often only drives the 
cause underground to emerge at a later date while victory for the rebellion may “carry with it 
the mirror image of the previous exclusions, triggering new repressions and exclusions”. The 
difficulty is that the intensity of internal conflicts prevents the parties from either 
communicating with each other or thinking of a mutually attractive solution. 
In such circumstances, mediation by a third party becomes crucial.  Yet mediation is difficult 
in a civil war, because the parties - for different reasons - are very reluctant to accept third 
party intervention. To the government side the mediator necessarily interferes in its domestic 
affairs and also recognizes and legitimises the rebellion. The rebels, on the other hand, are 
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suspicious that the interveners would support the government and prevent the rebellion from 
running its course. The net effect is that internal conflicts tend to be protracted unnecessarily. 
 
 It is true that the case studies in Zartman’s edited book, “Elusive Peace” do not include the 
Sierra Leonean crisis but his introductory discourse is generally applicable to the war 
dynamics and the settlement process in Sierra Leone. However, Zartman fails to consider the 
effects of other structural elements of internal conflicts, which mitigate against a negotiated 
settlement: He ignores structural obstacles such as the leadership conundrum and security 
dilemma and others, which King (1997) elucidates. This work takes a broader view and 
examines other obstacles to the peace process in Sierra Leone. 
 
2.6. STUDIES ON STRUCTURAL OBSTACLES AND INTERVENTION 
STRATEGIES 
Civil wars are known to prolong to the extent that belligerents tend to continue fighting even 
when it is apparent that doing so is no longer necessary (King 1997: 29). Traditionally, this 
phenomenon has been explained in terms of irrational acts of individual combatants or 
incompatible beliefs of the opposing sides (ibid: 56). King (1997) accepts that all civil wars 
contain elements of the two factors mentioned above, but introduces an additional 
theoretical explanation which he calls “structural elements of war fighting in internal 
conflicts” (ibid: 13). He further points out that uncovering the incentive for violent conflict 
(through the structural obstacle approach) reveals a better picture of the reasons for war 
from the perspective of the belligerents themselves. More significantly, it provides potential 
targets for outside mediators wishing to hasten the conclusion of a durable peace accord. 
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King identifies five main structural obstacles to resolving internal conflicts, namely leadership 
conundrum; diffuse decision-making and enforcement mechanisms; the gap between the 
military situation and political objectives; asymmetry in commitment, status and organization; 
and security dilemma.  Each of them is briefly examined here to highlight its relevance to our 
study.  
 
The problem with leadership arises partly because particular leaders may be so committed to 
the cause of the struggle or to retaining power that they are incapable of contemplating some 
form of compromise with the enemy. Some leaders (especially the insurgent group) may 
prefer fighting on and losing rather than returning to the status quo ante.  Worse still, as the 
war drags on, combatants on either side come to identify their own leadership with the 
struggle itself and refuse to accept any negotiated settlement that would diminish the status 
of the leadership. 
 
Problems of decision-making and enforcement arise in all conflicts because within the same 
group belligerents may be divided over the utility of continued war.  The situation is 
particularly serious in civil wars because “[f]actionalism among warring elites is often 
extremely intense, with belligerent parties breaking apart and reforming, coalitions appearing 
and dissolving and erstwhile allies becoming sworn enemies” (King 1997: 34). In addition, 
the non-traditional nature of combatants in civil wars can inhibit the leaders’ ability to 
communicate their desire to end hostilities to their subordinates. The culture of violence 
spawned by the war makes the combatants reluctant to surrender their weapons and return 
to civilian life. This is because apart from the gun guaranteeing their own safety, it also 
becomes their source of livelihood. 
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King argues that the assumption that parties normally accept the situation on the battlefield 
as a basis for peace does not apply in the case of civil war. For instance, the gulf which often 
exists between the situation on the battlefield and the negotiation table arises partly because 
civil wars by nature involve a relatively small space for compromise between the warring 
factions. The leaders in both camps see anything short of total elimination of the enemy as a 
form of defeat. For this reason, the military option remains foremost in their minds. More 
significantly, the original political objective that prompted the turn to violence may be lost as 
a result of interests developed in the course of the war. Belligerents may still pay lip service to 
their original political goals but the insurgent group may now have an interest in the 
continuation of violence that would ensure that funds raised from exploitation of resources 
remain solidly in rebel hands. Those original objectives may be transformed by the war 
experience itself. 
 
The asymmetrical relationship, which exists between contesting parties in civil wars, is 
another disincentive to a negotiated settlement. Warring factions in civil wars have marked 
disparities in terms of commitment, status and organization. Whereas for the insurgent 
group, commitment to the insurgency is all consuming and a matter of life-and-death, for the 
incumbent group, countering the rebellion is only one of the issues it must attend to. Thus, 
the incumbent group has to balance its commitment to fighting the rebellion with other tasks 
of everyday governance. In terms of status, the incumbent party enjoys international 
recognition, a seat at the UN, membership of regional organizations and some degree of 
popular legitimacy but the insurgents have to fight for all these privileges. In addition, the 
incumbent perceives the insurgent group as illegitimate and refuses to recognize it as a 
bargaining partner while the latter challenges the legitimacy of the incumbent. Regarding 
organization, the incumbent group, at least initially, is better organized with professional 
soldiers, while the insurgent forces are composed of non-traditional combatants (including 
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child soldiers), concerned more with their survival than long-term strategic operations (ibid: 
54).   
 
The conditions of widespread violence which civil wars spawn tend to create distrust 
between belligerent sides that is detrimental to negotiated settlement.  Due to a high level of 
distrust between the warring factions, each of the opposing sides tends to reserve a residual 
fighting force as a deterrent should the other renege on a negotiated settlement. The dilemma 
is that the reserved forces present a security threat to the opposing side and this in turn 
justifies each side’s unwillingness to disarm and accept a negotiated settlement. 
 
Subsequent chapters of this study will reveal that King’s paradigm of structural obstacles 
provides a very useful template to understanding why the Sierra Leone conflict lingered 
longer than DfID had initially anticipated. The second part of King’s analysis concentrates 
on the extent to which third parties (such as individual states, external powers, or regional 
organizations) may help circumvent the structural obstacles and promote a durable 
negotiated settlement. King prescribes a number of strategies, which he himself admits are 
not foolproof but provide useful guidelines for third party intervention. A few of these 
strategies are illustrated in the following segments. 
 
The first is to take advantage of leadership changes within the factions and to use the 
uncertain period after the departure of key leaders to press ahead with negotiations. While 
the mediators may benefit from the willingness of the new leadership to reassess the utility of 
continued conflict, there is also the possibility that a new leader might disassociate himself 
from the former’s commitment to negotiate. 
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The second strategy is insistence on the removal of recalcitrant leaders as a prerequisite for 
negotiation or as a component of a final peace settlement (ibid: 63). This prescription, 
however, looks more problematic than beneficial. It may easily boomerang and derail the 
peace process. Labelling a particular leader as an obstacle to peace may rally the belligerents 
on the side of the one targeted. 
 
A third way of securing the commitment of belligerent leaders is to guarantee their safety 
during the peace negotiation and its implementation. King succinctly illustrates this dilemma: 
“The prospect of war crime tribunals, the arrest of belligerent leaders and assigning blame for 
atrocities committed during the war all create disincentives for negotiations and generate 
equally strong incentives to renege on commitments during the implementation of a peace 
agreement” (ibid: 64). 
 
King concludes that third parties can help alleviate the security concern of and generate trust 
among belligerents to enable them to search for their own solution, but the extent to which 
they can perform this role is a function of how the mediators are perceived by the factions as 
important yet powerful arbiters (ibid: 77-78). The foregoing analysis provides a very useful 
basis for assessing DfID and the British government’s role in bringing an end to the conflict 
and in the post-war reconstruction phase in Sierra Leone. 
 
2.7.  STUDIES ON POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION 
The topic of post-war reconstruction is widely discussed. Much of the substance of these 
debates is relevant to the discussion of what to do towards failed states and post- conflict 
situations today, reasons for shifting the current debate away from nation building and 
toward the concept of post-conflict reconstruction. For clarity, the World Bank’s definition 
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of post conflict reconstruction focuses on the needs for “the rebuilding of the 
socioeconomic framework of society” and the “reconstruction of the enabling conditions for 
a functioning peacetime society [to include] the framework of governance and rule of law” 
(World Bank 2003). For Kumar (1996) it focuses on rebuilding both formal and informal 
institutions, or more specifically, it involves the rebuilding of physical infrastructure and 
facilities, creation of minimal social services, and structural reform in the political, economic, 
and social and security sectors. ‘Post-conflict’ does not mean that conflict is concluded in all 
parts of a given country’s territory. The term simply recognizes that most reconstruction 
tasks cannot be addressed until at least major parts of the country’s territory have moved 
beyond conflict (ibid). 
 
The general consensus from most of the literature on this issue is that using the term ‘post-
conflict reconstruction’ is preferred to ‘nation building’ on the ground that it is context-
specific, and unlike ‘nation building’, it provides what is needed to help reconstruct weak or 
failing states primarily after civil wars. Yarjah (2000) supports this view by outlining three 
reasons as to why ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ is preferable. His argument is as follows: first, 
post-conflict reconstruction recognizes the central role of local actors, “The citizens of the 
country in question will build their nation and bring about peace; outsiders can only support 
their efforts”. Secondly, ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ emphasises the overcoming of conflict, 
“All societies and peoples must build their countries”. Finally, ‘post-war reconstruction’, 
unlike ‘nation building’, carries less historical baggage. Despite the success of nation building 
in Japan, Germany, and Korea from 1945 to 1960, ‘nation building’, Yarjah argues, lost 
currency during the Vietnam War and is no longer fashionable. 
 
Post-conflict reconstruction as it is conducted today comprises four distinct yet interrelated 
categories of tasks, or ‘pillars.’ These are security, justice and reconciliation, social and 
 50 
economic wellbeing, and governance and participation (Kumar 1998). Complementing these 
are reconstruction of physical infrastructure and repair of all kinds of material damage; 
rehabilitation of institutions and services; repatriation of returnees and relocation of internally 
displaced persons (IDPs); demobilization of combatants and reintegration of all war-affected 
groups of the population. However, reintegration can mean ‘reinstating to an original state’. 
Reconstruction also, by and large, is a misleading notion. It also implies bringing societies 
back to those structures, which were to a large degree responsible for states gradually sliding 
to failure. If the original state was (part of) the cause of the original conflict, it is not wise to 
reinstate it. Following conflict, therefore, reintegration is likely to require the bringing 
together of the parties in different relationships or structures than previously. There may be a 
useful analogy in transplant surgery, where foreign body parts may be rejected unless there 
has been careful preparation, planning and sensitisation. 
 
Indeed Kuhne (2001) observes that “reconstruction of roads, houses, infrastructure, 
government buildings, hospitals etc., is the easy part. The much more difficult one is that 
societies which have suffered from state failure need far reaching socio-cultural, economic 
and political transformation. Otherwise they are unable to generate sustainable, democratic, 
rule of law and good governance oriented state structures” (ibid). 
 
With regard to reconciliation, whilst it implies promoting healing and harmony, it can also 
imply one or more parties becoming resigned or submissive to disagreeable outcomes (Azar 
1990).  People who continue to be marginalised have nothing to lose and may see potential 
gain from continued conflict. A holistic approach of necessity therefore should bring 
together different parties into a whole that offers opportunity for all. The term holistic can be 
defined (OED) as the tendency in nature to produce wholes from the orderly grouping of 
units, implying that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts and that all parts are 
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important. This can be developed to mean an approach to post-war reconstruction and 
reintegration that creates opportunity for all parties – and not just for some. 
 
2.8.  FOUR PILLARS OF POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION 
2.8.1.  SECURITY 
It is arguable that aspects of public safety, in particular, creating a safe and secure 
environment and developing legitimate and effective security institutions are a precondition 
for development. This is vital since the process of social recovery should not be disrupted 
and set back by renewed outbreaks of violence. Security in this sense encompasses collective 
as well as individual security, which is also a precondition for achieving successful outcomes 
in the other pillars of post-conflict reconstruction (Gutkind 1943). In the most pressing 
sense, providing security involves securing the lives of civilians in the aftermath of immediate 
and large-scale violence as well as restoring the territorial integrity of the post-conflict 
government (Zartman 1995a). The reality of there having been a conflict, symbolized by a 
breakdown of law and order, begs for a security sector reform and the reorganization and 
training of the army and police as well as the placement of these institutions under the firm 
control of a democratically elected civilian leadership (Hagman 1996). 
 
2.8.2  JUSTICE 
The ending of overt violence via a peace agreement or military victory does not always mean 
the achievement of peace (Licklider 1993). Rather, the ending of violence or a so-called ‘post-
conflict’ situation provides “a new set of opportunities that can be grasped or thrown away” 
(Luttwak 1999). Justice and order are important aspects of  taking initiative in a post-conflict 
situation where there is a need to end violence, disarm combatants, restore the rule of law, 
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and deal with the perpetrators of war crimes and other human rights abuses (Grant 2002). 
Public goods such as ‘justice’ are subjective and open to varying interpretations, and 
therefore escape quantification. But, if any lesson is to be learned from Sierra Leone’s civil 
war and the preceding decades of poor governance, it is that sources of political, economic, 
and social grievances cannot be ignored.  
 
The problem with this approach and how to deal with those accused of past human rights 
abuses and the question of amnesty or reconciliation is summed up by Bertram (1995: 387-
418.) She claims that one of the most troubling quandaries for peace builders is that a policy 
of impunity or blanket amnesty creates ominous implications for UN efforts to build 
democracy and a sustainable peace. The need for reconciliation is in most post-war situations 
today considered to be either an antonym for the need for justice, or as competing objectives 
in the process of making and building peace. In the interest of reaching a settlement, alleged 
perpetrators of human rights abuses have often been included in negotiations, and, in some 
cases, even in the new governments.  Sierra Leone is a prime example. However, as that case 
also demonstrates, Francis (2005) notes that “a peace agreement that allows power-sharing 
with criminals and amnesties for their crimes is perceived by the victims or survivors as an 
“unjust peace” and therefore “detrimental to post-war stability and reconciliation”. Francis 
argues that such a structure “perpetuates a culture of impunity that fails to deter future war 
criminals, [and] it also fails to produce a just peace” (Francis 2005). The work concurs with 
Francis in that “issues of justice and accountability for war crimes and gross violations of 
human rights should not be glossed over in the civil war peace settlement” (ibid: 364) and 
that short-term pragmatism is not a recipe for long-term peace and stability (Lambourne 
2004). More practically, justice should comprise the following: 
1. Apology: Apology, if it is seen as a sign of genuine repentance and accompanied 
by some act of reparation or restitution, can play a part. 
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2. Reparation: Some sort of practical service or financial reparation may be required 
from those who have committed crimes to those who were their victims. 
3. Compensation: Financial compensation from government, in the form of 
pensions. 
4.   Punishment: The punishment of those identified as particularly responsible can 
act as a sign of public imprisonment and acknowledgement, at the national or 
international level, that certain behaviours are intolerable, and may assuage the 
feelings of those who have suffered most (Kumar 1998). 
 
2.8.3.  SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC WELLBEING 
One factor that is often considered as contributing to or prohibiting a successful 
reconstruction is the politicization of ethnic homogeneity (Dobbins et al. 2003: 161-2). The 
historical results have been mixed: Japan and Germany are ethnically homogenous while 
Somalia, Haiti and Afghanistan are ethnically or clan-divided. However, fragmentation was 
also present in Bosnia and Kosovo, and they have achieved a level of stability although their 
reconstructions have not been completely successful.   
 
In any case, it is not hetero- or homogeneity per se that leads to or prevents a successful 
reconstruction, but rather the ability of the populace to coordinate around the aims of the 
reconstruction. Indeed, a self-sustaining order requires the flexibility to handle heterogeneity 
on some margins. As the example of Japan illustrates, the order needs to be robust enough to 
handle the various views and beliefs of the populace at large. This is not to say that divisions 
within a society have no impact on the self-sustainability of the order, but rather that we 
cannot reach a general conclusion on the impact of heterogeneity. In other words, there is no 
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guarantee that the reconstruction of a country where the populace is homogeneous on some 
margins will be successful and vice versa.  
 
The economic condition of the post-war country also influences the post-war process. Japan 
and Germany had a well-established economic system prior to the U.S. occupation, which 
provided a foundation for the reconstruction process. In the first year after World War II, it 
is estimated that Japan’s GDP was 50% of what it was in 1939 while Germany’s GDP was 
about 75% of what is was in the pre-war period (Dobbins et al. 2003: 159-160). In countries 
such as Somalia and Haiti, major economic reforms were never undertaken. In these 
countries, an advanced exchange economy did not exist prior to reconstruction. The state of 
affairs remained one of widespread conflict, making the implementation of economic policies 
difficult. With that said, it is worth noting that however good an economic reconstruction 
programme is, in a state of anarchy it can be mired into a state of underdevelopment and 
stagnation. In short, good economic policies are a necessary, but not sufficient condition for 
success in post-war reconstruction. 
 
2.8.4.  GOVERNANCE AND PARTICIPATION   
Governance involves setting rules and procedures for political decision making and for 
delivering public services in an efficient and transparent manner, while participation 
encompasses the process of giving the population a voice in government by developing a 
civil society structure that generates and exchanges ideas through advocacy groups, civic 
associations, and the media. In attempting to carry out post-conflict reconstruction, a 
government may not be in a position to offer such political goods and, therefore, the goal for 
practitioners is to strengthen the political authority through the holding of elections. Grant 
(2002) agrees and reiterates further that, after a civil war, where the legitimacy of the 
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incumbent government may be either questionable or fragile, democratic elections should be 
considered an essential first step.  
 
However, the need for post-war reconstruction also overlooks the critical fact that elections 
in themselves do not necessarily yield (positive) results. “In the absence of supporting 
institutions,” Coyne observes, “Elections can be counterproductive and actually impede the 
achievement of a successful reconstruction” (Coyne 1999). Zakaria (2003) notes that “The 
problem with democracies such as this is that they tend to promote the tyranny of the 
majority rather than the opposite”. The election of Hitler in Germany or the election of 
military juntas in Chile, South Korea and Taiwan all serve to illustrate the point that 
democracy or having an election are not in themselves enough to obtain the desired 
outcome”. Based on the lessons learned from the above examples, one can then theorise that 
if elections take place in the absence of the basic infrastructure for democracy survival, the 
reconstruction may very well fail. Democracy can only be effective when citizens are 
committed to it. Without this commitment, democracy can bring tyranny and chaos.  
 
2.9.  CONCLUSION  
A theoretical framework provides the basis for understanding the dynamics of civil wars and 
for the evaluation of peace processes. The presented theories and studies cover different 
phases and aspects of conflict resolution: from the causes to conflict management up to post-
conflict reconstruction. The human needs theory focuses on the denial of the provision of 
human needs such as security and participation to some groups, which, according to Burton, 
lay at the core of conflict. The underlying causes of a conflict have to be taken into account 
in order for a peace settlement to be a lasting solution to the conflict. Stedman notes that the 
resolution of a conflict is challenging as one has to deal with two levels – the underlying 
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conflict causes and the concerns resulting from war such as security and survival. Bad 
leadership, a strong sense of antagonistic history, and mounting economic problems – 
Brown’s causes of internal conflict are all potentially relevant for the Sierra Leonean case 
study. The concerns that are directly resulting from war activities can become even more 
important during the peace negotiations and shortly after the signing of a peace agreement as 
the combatants want their physical and financial security to be ensured during peace time. 
According to King, third parties can play a major role in helping to generate trust among 
warring factions and to alleviate their security concerns. They can, furthermore, help to 
circumvent the structural obstacles to resolving internal conflicts such as asymmetry in 
commitment of the warring factions, and promote a durable negotiated settlement. As the 
focus is on post-conflict reconstruction, the last part of Chapter Two introduces the concept 
of post-conflict reconstruction. For Kumar, post-conflict reconstruction involves the 
rebuilding of both formal and informal institutions – rebuilding of infrastructure, creation of 
social services, and structural reforms. The four pillars security, justice and reconciliation, 
social and economic wellbeing, and governance and participation comprise all important 
sectors of post-conflict reconstruction and will be revisited in the following chapters, 
applying the relevant theories and concepts to the Sierra Leonean case study.    
 
The case of Sierra Leone indicates that policymakers need to rethink both the widely 
accepted characteristics of weak and failed states, and the feasible policy prescriptions 
available to the international community in dealing with them. The misdiagnosis of the Sierra 
Leone conflict, as the next chapter will show, led to policies and interventions which resulted 
in ineffective and perverse outcomes.   
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Chapter 3 
THE EVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL WAR IN SIERRA 
LEONE 
 
3.1.  INTRODUCTION 
In his human needs theory, Burton (1990a) postulates that if societies are to remain 
significantly free of conflict, development needs must be catered for. Whereas an individual is 
responsive to opportunities for the improvement of his/her life style, he/she refuses to 
accept the denial of ontological needs like security, dignity etc. As a result, any political 
system that denies or suppresses these human needs eventually generates protest or conflict. 
This remains Burton’s first law of conflict and will to a large extent form the basis of this 
study.  
 
Without making excuses for the inhumane activities that took place, it can be argued that the 
denial of ontological needs manifested itself in Sierra Leone by the amputation of limbs and 
hands and with human beings seeking to harm each other. Because of this, we require more 
convincing explanations with less room for the unknown, while avoiding the temptation to 
describe the violence as pathological without understanding the reasons that bred it.  
 
This chapter addresses the historical evolution of the state, and Sierra Leone’s social, political 
economic development under colonial rule, the first few years of independence, the conflict 
period, and the attempts that were made to resolve it.   
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3.2.  COLONIAL RULE AND THE POST-INDEPENDENCE SIERRA 
LEONE 
By 1821 Freetown had become so prominent that other colonies such as the Gold Coast 
were placed under the governor of Sierra Leone. In 1863 an advisory legislative council 
was established in Sierra Leone. The British were reluctant to assume added responsibility 
by increasing the size of the colony, but in 1896 the interior was proclaimed a British 
protectorate and the Colony and Protectorate of Sierra Leone was established. The 
protectorate was ruled “indirectly” (i.e., through the rulers of the numerous small states, 
rather than by creating an entirely new administrative structure) and a hut tax was imposed 
in 1898 to pay for administrative costs. In 1889, Bai Bureh and other chiefs in the interior 
and the Poro secret society in the South waged the Hut Tax War. The British, although 
well equipped, did not achieve an easy victory over these opposing, well-determined 
indigenous people. The Colonial government suspected the Creoles of causing the 
conflict, and as a consequence, the Creoles found themselves being excluded from trade 
and commerce in favour of the Lebanese. This led to a constitution adopted in 1951 that 
gave additional power to Chiefs, most of whom were put in power by the Colonial 
government. With the Creoles being a small minority in the combined colony and 
protectorate, it was not surprising that they were defeated in the elections of 1951, which 
were won by the protectorate-based Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), led by Dr. Milton 
Margai (a Mende).  
 
On April 27, 1961, Sierra Leone became independent, with Margai as prime minister. He 
died in 1964. He was succeeded by his brother, Albert M. Margai. Following the 1967 
general elections, Siaka Stevens of the All People’s Congress (APC) party, a Temne-based 
party was appointed prime minister by the governor-general (a Sierra Leonean who 
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represented the British monarch). However, a military coup led by Brigadier David 
Lansana in support of Margai ousted Stevens a few minutes after he took the oath of 
office. 
 
The Lansana government itself was soon toppled and replaced by a National Reformation 
Council (NRC), headed by Col. Andrew Juxom-Smith. In 1968, an army revolt overthrew 
the NRC and returned the nation to parliamentary government, with Stevens as prime 
minister. The following years were marked by considerable unrest, caused by ethnic and 
army disaffection with the central government. After an attempted coup in 1971, 
parliament declared Sierra Leone to be a republic with Stevens as president.   
 
3.3.  SIAKA STEVENS’ NEO-PATRIMONIAL STATE 
Already a weak creation of colonization and decolonization, state collapse took place under 
the long reign of Siaka Stevens (1968-85) and his All People’s Congress (APC) Party. The 
Party drew its support primarily on the interior Temne and Limba people from the northern 
part of the country, reacting against the previous predominance of the coastal Mende people 
from the South and East (Reno 1995). Stevens introduced warlord politics to Sierra Leone. 
By warlord politics, Reno (1995) meant "attempts made by rulers to control, using non 
economic and bureaucratic means to enhance their own power rather than the state". Putting 
that into context, Siaka Stevens’ rule can be seen as the perfect example of warlord politics.  
 
President Stevens systematically reduced Sierra Leone’s capability to govern its territory in 
order to maximize his own personal power. To this end, Stevens "sold chances to profit to 
those who could pay for it through provision of services" (ibid). He created a private military 
force to terrorize his own people and to aggrandize himself, especially in the diamond fields. 
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As the official rule of law receded, the law of the jungle, presided over by Stevens, took its 
place. State Institutions were either broken down or corrupted. The state became entangled 
in a civil war, fought primarily over the remnants of his reign, encouraged and assisted by 
‘invisible hands’. 
 
Siaka Stevens’ neo-patrimonial state was not about development; it was about enriching 
himself and a small group of followers (Reno 1995). The state services were up for sale to the 
highest bidder in a context of patron-client relationships (Chege 2002). It is also said that the 
state autonomy required for development is autonomy from classes and groups involved in 
zero-sum activities, that is, speculation, corruption, usury and the like. In Sierra Leone, those 
groups were Siaka Stevens himself and his clique. The state elite were thus part of the 
development problem and not at all part of the solution (TRC Volume 3a). 
 
Having looted an estimated $500 million and leaving a balance of barely $196,000 in foreign 
reserves in the Bank of Sierra Leone on the day he left office, Stevens retired in 1985 and  
designating the army chief, Major General Joseph Saidu Momoh, as his successor. It was 
under Momoh, Stevens’s handpicked, inept successor, that state collapse was consummated. 
Gen. Joseph Momoh, a former military officer, was even less skilled in statecraft than was 
Stevens. Momoh remained in power until 1992. Public institutions were already a hollow 
ineffective sham compared to what they had been in the 1960s (Pham 2006). At one point in 
1986, Pham observed, “it even hosted a state visit by Yasir Arafat who was just driven out of 
Beirut by the Israeli army. They contemplated making a quick $8million by selling to the 
Palestinian leader an island on which to regroup his forces” (Pham 2001). In another 
scenario, as Charles Taylor attempted to launch his invasion from Sierra Leone into Liberia, 
Taylor travelled to Sierra Leone and offered to pay Momoh but as Ellis succinctly observed 
in his study of the Liberian civil conflict: “The notoriously venal Momoh promptly sought 
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from [then Liberian president] Samuel Doe a higher sum, turning the approach into an 
auction, an action for which his country was later to pay dearly” (Ellis 1996). 
 
In the public’s eye, the state lacked legitimacy. Corruption and illegality became the source of 
livelihood, as public educational and the health services vanished. It was in Momoh’s reign 
that the tinder for the conflict began to gather. In 1987 the government stopped paying 
salaries, notably to schoolteachers and the military (Hayward 1989). Structures of authority 
disintegrated (Clapham 1998); unemployed youth wandered the streets of Freetown and the 
interior and took to drugs and petty crime; soldiers turned to brigandage. Disaffected soldiers 
were the political entrepreneurs who put the match to the tinder.   
 
3.4.  RUF INVASION 
The Liberian conflict had direct effects on neighbouring Sierra Leone: it was believed that 
Taylor never forgave Momoh for not allowing him to use Sierra Leone as his launching pad 
and just as he was on the verge of victory in early 1990, the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), decided to intervene in the Liberian conflict with its own 
ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). As Francis, observed “Momoh not only 
permitted ECOMOG to use the Lungi International Airport, near Freetown, to bomb areas 
in Liberia controlled by Taylor’s rebels, but sent Sierra Leonean units to join the intervention 
force” (Francis 2006). 
 
It was because of this resentment against the Momoh regime that Taylor decided to assist a 
group of dissidents alleged to have gone to Libya to train to overthrow the corrupt and venal 
Momoh government. He then helped form the RUF under Colonel Foday Sankoh, a 
charismatic former Sierra Leonean army corporal who had been jailed for several years in the 
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1970s for his alleged role in the failed 1971 revolt against the Stevens’ regime. This was to 
force the government of Sierra Leone to withdraw its troops from Liberia. Taylor, by 
forming and supporting the RUF, wanted to pressure the Sierra Leone government into 
withdrawing its support from ECOMOG (Abdullah 2004). 
 
The government of Sierra Leone overwhelmed by corruption and a crumbling economy, was 
unable to put up a significant resistance. Within a month of entering the region from 
Kailahun, the RUF overran much of the eastern part of the country (Abdullah 2004: 207–
208). Following up on its initial success, the RUF targeted economic centres and diamond 
mines in the south-eastern and south-western parts of the country. At first, the RUF 
ostensibly fought for a redress of the iniquities of Sierra Leonean society. The APC regime 
exploited the rich diamond resources for the sole benefit of its elite in the face of the low 
living standards in the country.  
 
The RUF first displayed some of its brutal tactics and attacks on civilians and carried out 
public executions of minority ethnic groups. These were attempts to emulate Taylor’s 
successful tactics of ethnic incitement in Liberia. The RUF murdered more than a hundred 
Fulani and Madingo traders in its first two months of operations (Francis 2005). Soon people 
who had been displaced began to flee towards the Sierra Leonean capital Freetown.  The 
RUF had two major calling cards: dead civilians; and hundreds, possibly thousands, of living 
civilians with their limbs crudely amputated. 
By January 1995, facing demoralized and under-equipped government troops, the RUF 
controlled the three most important mining operations in the country, including the Koidu 
diamond area. Rebel troops now controlled territories only miles from the capital, 
Freetown. Faced with imminent defeat and the inability of government troops to hold off the 
RUF, the government of Sierra Leone turned to the South African company Executive 
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Outcomes (EO), staffed by many former members of the South African Defence Force 
(SADF).  Hiring EO brought some immediate results; the RUF was swiftly beaten back from 
the capital, and within a month the government regained control of the diamond producing 
areas. It is worth noting that EO operations were partly financed by the diamond operations 
in Sierra Leone. Swift series of defeats and the loss of control of important mining regions 
brought the RUF to the negotiating table (Pham 2006).  
 
3.5.  NPRC (FROM PROTEST TO COUP D’ETAT)   
With the government not paying salaries to the military, structures of authority disintegrated. 
However, despite the wide level of corruption, the government won increasing support from 
donors throughout the 1980s, perhaps, as Hanlon observed, “Because it was also faithfully 
introducing IMF policies such as devaluation” (cited in Gberie 2005). As a result of the non-
payment of salaries, dissatisfied junior officers led by Captain Valentine Strasser in April 1992 
came to Freetown to protest against their current situation. Within a day, this protest led to a 
coup. Members of the armed forces seized the Sierra Leone Broadcasting Station (SLBS), 
occupied the presidential offices and installed a five-member military junta under 27-year-old 
Captain Valentine Strasser. Momoh was forced to flee to Guinea and Strasser announced the 
formation of a National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) (Kaplan 1994). The current 
president of Sierra Leone, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, then a senior official with the United 
Nations Development Programme, offered his services to the young putschists and became 
the chairman of their national advisory council (Pham 2006). 
 
On assuming power, the NPRC claimed an expeditious end to the war as one of its principal 
aims, and exploring unique opportunities to open dialogue with the RUF. By the time of the 
coup, the RUF had been confined to remote areas of Kailahun District in the east of the 
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country and Pujehun in the south. The NPRC’s anti-corruption and anti-elite rhetoric was 
popular across the country and appeared to be in tune with the RUF’s own pronouncements. 
Expectations that the coup offered prospects for a peaceful end to the war were raised in the 
first week, when RUF spokesmen broadcast messages through the BBC announcing a 
unilateral ceasefire and a readiness to work with the NPRC in the interest of ‘peace and 
reconciliation’. Both sides celebrated what they saw as an end to a repressive and corrupt era.  
 
However, this promising start to peace did not gain momentum. The NPRC vacillated in 
dealing with the RUF, and publicly offering an amnesty in return for unconditional surrender 
without initiating further overtures. Meanwhile, Strasser dismissed the RUF in much the 
same terms as Momoh referred to them as “bandits sent by Charles Taylor” to wreak havoc 
in Sierra Leone (Gberie 2005). In retrospect, Strasser’s successor, Julius Maada Bio, said the 
young soldiers had convinced themselves that, with the resources of the state at their 
disposal, they would – and should – easily crush the RUF rebels, rather than negotiate and 
share power with them. 
 
In October 1992 the RUF were to prove the NPRC wrong by taking over Kono, the 
principal mining town (Abdullah 1998). As a result of this and with pressure from the 
international community for a negotiated settlement and a return to democracy in November 
1993, Strasser issued a timetable for a transition to democracy to culminate in general 
elections in late 1995. A month later, the NPRC released a "Working Document on the 
Constitution" to serve as the basis for public debates leading to a constitutional referendum 
in May 1995 (Hirsch 2001: 153.) However, before this could happen, Strasser’s deputy, 
Brigadier General Julius Maada Bio ousted him in 1996 and provided him with a safe exit out 
of the country. Unlike other African leaders, Strasser faced a kinder fate, with his safe exit out 
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of Sierra Leone and into the UK. A scholarship was procured for him by the British 
government - funded by the United Nations to study at Warwick University. His academic 
career was short-lived: the military ruler-turned-scholar was recognized by a fellow student 
from Sierra Leone and ensuing campus protests led to his removal. 
 
The new leader, Bio, under increasing foreign and domestic pressure, was forced to hold 
elections, which were boycotted and sporadically disrupted by the RUF. James Jonah, a 
colleague of Kabbah at the United Nations, was appointed Chairman for the Electoral 
Commission and after Tejan Kabbah’s election victory, was made minister of finance. Bio’s 
greatest achievement was the re-launching of negotiations with the rural rebellion and 
handing over power to Kabbah in March 1996. Tejan Kabbah continued negotiations begun 
by Bio and made substantial concessions to the rebels that paved the way for the Abidjan 
Agreement of November 1996.   
 
3.6.  THE FAILED 1996 ELECTION  
After the successful 1996 ceasefire in Sierra Leone, Britain and the United States pushed hard 
for early elections. The three main reasons for this were that, firstly, they backed Kabbah 
whom they knew would likely be elected; secondly, they refused to accept the RUF in a 
transitional government; and finally, they wanted to speed up their own exits from the 
country (ICG 2001). In choosing this strategy, the international community and institutions 
and/or their representatives forgot about the most important aspect of the conflict, the peace 
process, and the establishment of dialogue with the rebels (Hirsch 2001). 
 
The outcome was that presidential and parliamentary elections were held in February 1996, 
even though they were violently opposed by rebel forces, resulting in 27 deaths. Neither 
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candidate—Ahmad Tejan Kabbah (Sierra Leone People’s Party) nor Dr. John Karefa-Smart 
of the United National People’s Party (UNPP)—received a majority of the vote, and a run-
off election was held on 15 March 1996. Kabbah won the election with 59.4 per cent of the 
vote but he remained president of Sierra Leone for only 14 months. In May 1997, he was 
toppled by the army, led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma, who formed the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC) on 25 May 1997 and promptly made common cause with the 
rebels.   
 
The subsequent decade after the first cease fire and coup saw a battle for control over the 
capital and the rest of the country by various loyal and dissident military and rebel groups. 
Kabbah was restored to power ten months later and was again chased out of the capital for 
several months in early 1999, before being restored once again. During this period, a 
legitimate civilian government was in place (scarcely in power) from the March 1996 elections 
until the May 1997 coup, from March 1998 until the end of the year, and again after the 
spring of 1999 – for a period of four years. 
 
3.7.  THE ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL  
The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) was formed on the 25 of May 1997. With 
the signing of the Abidjan Peace Accord and with the RUF appearing to have been defeated, 
President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah ended the contract with EO (Mills 1999). This was followed 
by a string of reforms, dealt with separately in the analysis section in chapter six. The army 
staged their first coup, which caused Kabbah to flee the country and the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC), with Major Koroma at its head, assumed control of 
Freetown. Koroma declared an end to the war and the AFRC invited the RUF to share 
power. The RUF was given free access to the capital, all anti-government demonstrations 
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were banned and political parties were abolished. Images and reports of widespread looting, 
rape, and murder soon revealed the horror of the situation to the world. The period of 
AFRC/RUF control of Freetown resulted in chaos, referred to by the RUF as “Operation 
Pay Yourself” (Phillips 2003).  
 
This prompted the Commonwealth to suspend Sierra Leone’s membership in July 1997, and 
on 8 October 1997 the United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions against Sierra 
Leone, barring the supply of arms and petroleum products to Sierra Leone (ibid: 73).  By 
September 1997 fierce fighting had broken out between junta soldiers and the West African 
peacekeeping troops: The Nigerian-led ECOMOG force returned to battle with the 
AFRC/RUF for control of Freetown. By the February of 1998 the AFRC/RUF was forced 
out, restoring President Kabbah to power, and the leader of the RUF, Foday Sankoh, was 
arrested in Nigeria and returned to Freetown. Pursued by ECOMOG, the AFRC/RUF 
returned to the countryside (Oludipe 2000). A broken force, the RUF then began a 
systematic campaign of murder, mutilation, kidnapping and, terrorizing the countryside 
under an operation known as “Operation No Living Thing” (Radio Netherlands 21 January 
2000).   
 
Subsequently, the AFRC/RUF infiltrated forces into Freetown catching ECOMOG by 
surprise.  The result was another brutal battle in Freetown as ECOMOG and RUF forces 
fought for control in January 1999. Britain was urgently training Sierra Leonean troops, while 
US Special Forces were training Nigerian battalions for peacekeeping duties in Sierra Leone. 
It was at this juncture that momentum began building up in the international community to 
negotiate peace between the rebels and the government, and a United Nations peacekeeping 
force was sent. At the end of 1999 UN peacekeepers began arriving in Sierra Leone. 
Currently, (2008) UN peacekeepers with support from British forces have helped to restore 
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some stability and relative peace to Sierra Leone after several failed peace agreements 
between the rebels and the Sierra Leone government. The RUF leader died in captivity. 
However, the country has yet to return to complete normality. 
 
3.8.  CONFLICT AGENDAS AND MILITARY DEADLOCKS 
External intervention to contain the conflict was carried out by four agents: the essentially 
Nigerian-led force of the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG); the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS); the United Nations Observer/Armed Mission in Sierra 
Leone (UNOMSIL/UNAMSIL); and the British Army (Fowler 2005). Three peace 
agreements were signed as a result of these efforts: the Abidjan Accord of November 1996 
(Garcia 1997), the Conakry Peace Plan of October 1997 (Ibid), and the Lome Peace 
Agreement of July 1999. The West African peacekeeping force ECOMOG entered Sierra 
Leone in 1995 to help the NPRC and, later, the Kabbah government to fight the RUF rebels. 
After the May 25, 1997 military coup of the AFRC, and its establishment of a coalition 
government with RUF rebels, hundreds of additional Nigerian soldiers assigned to 
ECOMOG in Liberia moved to Sierra Leone to defend Freetown airport. The civil defence 
forces, especially the Kamajors, also assisted the ousted SLPP government. 
      
3.9.  WEST AFRICAN RESPONSE 
3.9.1.  ECOWAS 
The inauguration of ECOWAS in 1975 should be seen as the culmination of several attempts 
over a period of one and a half decades (from 1960 when most West African states gained 
independence) to form a sub-regional organization embracing the whole of West Africa. 
Initial attempts had floundered firstly as a result of the rivalry between Ghana (under Kwame 
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Nkrumah) and Nigeria (under Tafawa Balewa) in the early 1960s and later the struggle for 
supremacy in the sub-region between Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire along Anglophone-
Francophone lines. 
 
Most of these rivalries were put aside and by 1975 the first treaty was signed, ushering in the 
passage of more treaties. These include the ECOWAS Treaty of 1975, the ECOWAS 
Protocol on Non-Aggression, signed in 1978 in Lagos, and the ECOWAS Protocol Relating 
to Mutual Assistance on Defence (MAD) (Conteh-Morgan/Magyar 1998). The Treaty of 
1975, which created ECOWAS, envisaged an economic community which aimed at 
promoting “[c]o-operation and development in all fields of economic activity … and in social 
and cultural matters for the purpose of raising the standard of living of its peoples, of 
increasing and maintaining economic stability of fostering closer relations among its 
members and of contributing to the progress and development of the African continent’’ 
(ibid). 
 
The ECOWAS MAD Protocol was signed in May 1981 at the Freetown summit two years 
after it had been proposed by Senegal and Togo. But it is significant to note (as would 
become common place with issues relating to ECOWAS’ role in Liberia), that the defence 
pact proposal was vehemently opposed by such member states as Mali, Guinea-Bissau and 
Cape Verde (Adebajo 2002). This highlights that the establishment of an economic union 
should have in it defence implications that transcend national (or territorial) boundaries 
(Adebajo 1999). The protection of joint services as well as industrial and economic ventures 
jointly owned could not be left in the hands of the individual states, especially (as in the case 
of ECOWAS) as some of its members are too weak to protect themselves. Under such 
circumstances a common security arrangement becomes necessary. It was against this 
background that the ECOWAS Non-Aggression Pact was signed. 
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In its preamble, ECOWAS leaders admitted that the community “can attain its objective save 
in an atmosphere of peace and harmonious understanding, among its members. The 
protocol, therefore, demands inter alia that members refrain from threats or the use of force 
against the territorial integrity of the political independence of other members states; refrain 
from committing, encouraging or condoning acts of subversion; and prevent the use of their 
territories as bases for launching subversion; and also to “respond to all peaceful means in 
the settlement of disputes arising among themselves” (Olonisakin 2000). While the 
agreement on non-aggression created a friendly atmosphere and generated trust among it 
members, it was inadequate in addressing external aggression or externally supported 
domestic insurrection and revolt. It was to cater for this inadequacy that the Protocol relating 
to Mutual Assistance on Defence came into being. 
 
3.9.2.  ECOWAS PROTOCOL RELATING TO MUTUAL ASSISTANCE ON 
DEFENCE (MAD)  
Articles 2 and 3 adopted the principles of collective security and collective defence 
respectively. In article 2, any armed threat or aggression against any member state was to be 
considered as one against the entire community; and Article 3 required member states to give 
mutual aid and assistance to members affected. 
 
The protocol provided further that units from the armies of ECOWAS countries would 
constitute ad-hoc Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC), in case of an emergency. 
It therefore did not create a permanent ECOWAS standing army. This would mean that 
when the time came for ECOWAS to enter Liberia, unlike NATO, there were no standby 
units, and ECOMOG had to rely solely on personnel contributed on a voluntary basis by 
some member states. 
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The AAFC task was to carry out joint military exercises. It was placed under the command of 
a Force Commander appointed by the ECOWAS Authority and who together with the Chief 
of Defence Staff of the assisted state was to implement the decisions of the Authority. The 
actions of the Force Commander were to be subject to the competent authority of the 
member state or states concerned. 
 
This last provision could easily be applied in situations of external threat against a member 
state. In the case of internal conflict in a failed state (for instance, Liberia) the provision could 
create problems since there would be no competent political authority – a problem to 
confront the first ECOMOG Commander in Liberia. 
 
The protocol also provided for a Defence Council comprising ministers of defence and 
foreign affairs of member states under the current chairmanship of ECOWAS.  In addition, 
the Chiefs of Defence Staff of member states were to constitute the Defence Commission 
with the responsibility of examining the technical aspects of defence. Article 12 provided for 
the appointment of a Deputy-Executive Secretary for military affairs whose functions 
included updating plans for the movement of troops and logistics, initiating joint exercises 
and managing the military budget of the secretariat. These observations among others, do 
not deny the fact that together, the protocols on Non-Aggression and Mutual Assistance on 
Defence provided some legal basis for ECOWAS’ intervention in Sierra Leone.   
 
3.9.3.  ECOMOG IN SIERRA LEONE 
A small ECOMOG unit has been in Sierra Leone since the mid-1990s. Their initial role was 
to assist Sierra Leone when it was clear that Charles Taylor was helping the RUF. This small 
unit was restricted to guarding key installations. Their full involvement in the conflict came in 
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1998 when they were mandated by Ministers of Foreign Affairs from ECOWAS countries 
and supported by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to reinstate the elected 
government of President Tejan Kabbah. A ministerial committee was formed to monitor the 
situation in Sierra Leone in 1998 as ordered by the OAU heads of state. ECOMOG forces 
under the command of a Nigerian general were supported by yet another mercenary outfit— 
the British-based firm Sandline International—hired by the exiled then President Kabbah. 
ECOMOG and Sandline launched an offensive against the combined AFRC/RUF forces in 
February 1998 that eventually restored Kabbah to power the following month (Pham 2006). 
 
The following year, in January 1999 the AFRC/RUF forces returned to Freetown, taking 
ECOMOG by surprise and forcing Kabbah to flee the country once more. The result was 
another brutal battle in Freetown as ECOMOG and RUF forces fought for control. This was 
not to last for long as ECOMOG forces, with reinforcement from Nigeria, returned to battle 
and recaptured the Capital city. The fight for the capital city cost the lives of some 7,000 
civilians and two-thirds of the city destroyed (Kaplan 2001).  
 
The resurgence of the RUF brought a realisation that the war could not be won militarily, 
and this forced president Kabbah and his Nigerian backers to enter into negotiations. Pham 
observes that the fighting claimed estimated 800 peacekeepers and cost them about $1 
million daily. This forced the two Sierra Leonean parties to enter into negotiations which 
resulted in the July 7, 1999, Lomé Peace Agreement. 
 
3.10.  CIVIL DEFENCE FORCES (CDF) 
The Civil Defence Forces were another major player in the civil war. They have their origin 
in traditional hunters and secret societies. In the South they called themselves the Kamajors 
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(Muana 1997) and are also referred to as the Tamamboroh in the North and the North-East 
of Sierra Leone. These traditional warriors differ to a large extent by culture, aims and 
objectives and thus avoid fighting together but remain connected by a common cause.  
 
Both civil defence forces originated from the secret societies which historically had been the 
setting in which young men were trained to defend their community. But as Bona recounts, 
they also “function as educational centres (including sex education). The societies for men in 
the South and East of Sierra Leone are called Poro while in the North are the Gbanbani and 
the Soko; the ones for women are called Bundo” (Bona 2000). They are responsible for 
initiation rituals by which boys and girls become accepted as full men or women. 
Traditionally, these have the power to declare war. Due to these multiple functions, the secret 
societies, which amalgated with Civil Defence Forces such as the Kamajor and Tamanboroh, 
soon became a force for the RUF to contend with. 
  
However, unlike the Tamamboroh who remain out of politics, the leader of the Kamajors 
was the Minister of Defence, and because the Kamajors originated from the South and East 
of the country, a SLPP stronghold, they soon became more or less a gang carrying out the 
‘dirty work’ of the SLPP. With political backing from Freetown and later from Guinea when 
the government was deposed, the Kamajors set up checkpoints between Bo and Kenema 
harassing travellers and killing those they suspected of belonging to the RUF. In Freetown 
they took over hotels and went about in daylight lynching those whom they thought gave out 
RUF odour (Muana 2000). Their attitude made it very difficult for people from the North to 
come to the South. The Temne had problems with the CDF in the areas under their control. 
Even though commentators such as Chege note that Sierra Leone did not experience the 
ethnic fratricide often blamed for state collapse, it was clear that ethnicity was an issue. 
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However, that part of the conflict was swept under the carpet, because of the barbarity of the 
RUF.   
 
3.11.  THE ABIDJAN ACCORD (1996) 
The election of a civilian government in 1996 undermined any legitimacy the RUF might 
have claimed and relegated it to an insurgent threat. Further, with the assault of EO and the 
Kamajors, supported by the SLA, on the RUF positions and the destruction of the RUF 
headquarters southeast of Kenema in November 1996, Foday Sankoh agreed to sign the 
Abidjan peace accord. A senior diplomat in Freetown noted that, ‘always military pressure 
was needed to be put on before negotiations could succeed’. 
 
It was no surprise that a pre-condition imposed by Foday Sankoh for negotiation and a cease 
fire was the removal of EO from Sierra Leone. Unwisely, Tejan Kabbah agreed. In its place a 
UN peacekeeping force was to be established. However, it never arrived. Donors were not 
willing to meet the U.S. $47 million bill for 700 soldiers, and Sankoh continued to dispute the 
agreement, maintaining that the UN presence should be less than 100. Nevertheless, EO was 
finally asked to leave by President Kabbah, who believed the RUF was sincere about peace. 
Three months later, without any external force to defend his government, he was deposed in 
another military coup led by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). 
 
However, in the annual summit meeting of the heads of state and government of the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Harare, Zimbabwe, just a day after the 1997 coup, 
the leaders  present at the meeting, who as Pham (2006) observes, “had themselves come to 
power through military coups and in contrast to the OAU’s usual practice of non-
interference in the internal affairs of member state”, called for “the immediate restoration of 
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constitutional order” in Sierra Leone and urged “all African countries and the international 
community at large to refrain from recognizing the new regime and lending support in any 
form whatsoever to the perpetrators of the coup d’état”. The leaders of ECOWAS to assist the 
people of Sierra Leone to restore constitutional order to the country and to implement the 
Abidjan Agreement which continues to serve as a viable framework for peace, stability and 
reconciliation in Sierra Leone” (McEvoy-Levy 2006). 
 
3.12.  THE CONAKRY ACCORD (1997)  
The AFRC regime was not recognized by any foreign government or by the Sierra Leone 
people. After extensive bloodshed and destruction, the Conakry Accord was signed in 
October 1997 by a delegation sent by the AFRC leader Johnny Paul Koroma. It was intended 
to restore the Kabbah government. But it clearly became a ploy to buy time in the face of 
international pressure and a domestic boycott by government employees, who refused to 
work under the AFRC regime and shut down key government functions. Under cover of the 
accord, the AFRC stockpiled weapons and attacked remaining ECOMOG positions at the 
country’s international airport at Lungi (Garcia 1997). 
 
3.13.  THE LOME ACCORD (25 MAY 1999 to 7 JULY 1999) 
The January occupation of Freetown brought a realisation to both parties to the conflict that 
it could not be won militarily. In March 1999, President Kabbah visited several key countries 
in the sub-region, including Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Togo to discuss the situation 
in Sierra Leone and possible ways forward. This was a complete reversal of the path formerly 
followed of trying to defeat and kill the RUF rebels. Present at these talks were the 
ECOMOG troop-contributing countries, namely Nigeria, Guinea, Ghana, and Mali. The 
governments of the UK and the USA (the USA being represented by the United States 
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presidential special envoy for the promotion of democracy in Africa, the Rev. Jesse Jackson); 
and the UN Secretary-General’s special representative for Sierra Leone, Francis G. Okelo. 
 
In their presence on May 18 1999, the Sierra Leonean government and the RUF signed a 
cease-fire agreement, which came into effect on May 24, 1999. Under the agreement, both 
parties were to maintain their respective positions and refrain from hostile or aggressive acts. 
On June 2, 1999, the government and the RUF decided to ask UNOMSIL to establish a 
committee to effect the immediate release of prisoners of war and non-combatants in 
accordance with the May 18 cease-fire agreement. The agreement also achieved one of RUF’s 
central goals – the RUF was brought into the government, gaining four cabinet positions. It 
also headed a number of public sector directorships and filled some ambassadorial posts. The 
exit of the Nigerian peacekeeping troops was also achieved. 
 
Foday Sankoh was rewarded with the status of vice president and chairmanship of the 
Strategic Mineral Resources Commission, effectively giving him access to the country’s 
diamond resources. Under the Lome agreement, and most controversially, there was a 
blanket amnesty for all crimes committed during the war, however terrible (ICG 2002). The 
accord also promised the rebel leader and his followers a “complete amnesty for any crimes 
committed...from March 1991 up to the date of the agreement.” 
 
Indeed, it was the Lomé Peace Accord that effectively ended the war. Although there were 
some hitches such as a return to hostilities when some UN soldiers were captured by a group 
of RUF fighters culminating in the shooting down of some 20 demonstrators at the residence 
of RUF leader Foday Sankoh.  
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3.14.  UNITED NATIONS’ RESPONSE 
The United Nations’ initial reaction to the 1997 military coup by the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC) was to condemn it and to place sanctions against the 
government formed by the rebels. The United Nations Security Council commended 
ECOWAS on its efforts to restore the ousted government of President Tejan Kabbah and 
urged member states to assist ECOMOG with financial and logistical support. It also 
condemned the atrocities perpetrated by the rebels, particularly against women and children. 
 
In July 1998, the UN Security Council unanimously approved a resolution to establish the 
United Nations Observer Mission to Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) and a 6,000-strong UN 
Armed Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) (Dobbins 2005). Their responsibility as spelled 
out by the UN was “to monitor and help ECOMOG with the implementation of a program 
for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants (the DDR program); 
reporting on the security situation; monitoring respect for international humanitarian law, 
including at disarmament and demobilization sites; and advising the government of Sierra 
Leone and local police officials on police practice, training, re-equipment, and recruitment, in 
particular on the need to respect internationally accepted standards of policing in democratic 
societies”(UN Resolution 1181, July 13, 1998; cited by Human Rights Watch 1999). 
 
However in late 1999 and early 2000, UN peacekeepers were themselves disarmed by RUF 
forces. The situation deteriorated in early May 2000 when the RUF killed seven UN 
peacekeepers and captured fifty others. The number of peacekeepers taken prisoners by the 
RUF increased to over 500 as the UN forces, under the command of Indian Major General 
Vijay Kumar Jetley, who was experiencing difficulties with the Nigerian component of his 
command, apparently surrendered to the rebels without firing a shot (Pham 2005). This 
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prompted the Security Council to increase UNAMSIL’s personnel to 11,100 and later to 
17,500, the largest UN peacekeeping operation in the world at the time. UNAMSIL’s mission 
was revised to include protecting the government of President Kabbah. Additionally, “the 
main objectives of UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone remains to assist the efforts of the 
government of Sierra Leone to extend its authority, restore law and order and stabilize the 
situation progressively throughout the entire country and finally to assist in the promotion of 
a political process which should lead to a renewed disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration program and the holding, in due course, of free and fair elections.” (United 
Nations 2001). 
 
On January 14, 2002, the commander of UNAMSIL, General Daniel Opande, declared the 
Sierra Leone war officially over after the surrender of some 45,000 demobilized rebels of the 
RUF, Kamajor militias, and armed gangs called the “West Side Boys,” and renegade soldiers 
of what remained of the Sierra Leonean army. Today, UN peacekeepers, with support from 
British forces, have helped to restore some stability and relative peace to Sierra Leone after 
several failed peace agreements between the rebels and the Sierra Leone government. The 
RUF leader died in captivity.  
 
3.15.  THE ROLE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM 
The United Kingdom has maintained an interest in Sierra Leone since independence and 
remains committed to the country today.  It contributed the bulk of the funding to the 
February 1996 election earlier. The so-called Sandline Affair (known also as the 'Arms to 
Africa Affair') and the publicity surrounding atrocities in Sierra Leone intensified British’s 
interest. In March 1998 it was reported that the British private security company Sandline (an 
associate of Executive Outcomes) had violated an arms embargo on Sierra Leone. Sandline 
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had purchased weapons and provided a small number of personnel and a helicopter in 
support of the February 1998 Nigerian assault on Freetown to reinstate President Kabbah. 
Sandline dubbed ‘mercenaries’ in the British press claimed that the UK government had prior 
knowledge of its intention to assist Kabbah. While the Labour government condemned the 
affair as an affront to ethical foreign policy, it appeared to many that the company was 
supporting the restoration of democracy against a barbarous AFRC/RUF junta and could, 
therefore, be seen as being on the 'right' side in Sierra Leone's war. 
 
Sandline’s intervention raised a more fundamental issue. In the absence of other international 
assistance, President Kabbah had little choice other than to arrange a commercial deal to 
obtain the funds to pay Sandline for its support and to request the help of Nigeria, which 
then was under the dictatorial rule of Sani Abacha. The international media coverage of 
atrocities by the RUF in Freetown in January 1999 fuelled further pressure on the UK to 
assist in resolution of the Sierra Leone conflict. These events resulted in a marked increase of 
UK funds to restructure the Sierra Leone armed forces in 1999. As noted earlier, the UK’s 
policy to train and equip SLA troops to inflict a military defeat on the RUF was a high-risk. A 
military offensive against the RUF might have been essential given the failure of Sierra 
Leone’s elected government to stabilise the country and end the war. However, if pursued in 
the absence of an appropriate political strategy it could have proved disastrous. Even if a 
reorganized SLA, supported by British troops, could have decisively defeated the RUF, the 
consequence might have resulted in further regional destabilisation since RUF forces could 
regroup in Liberia and renew their offensive in Guinea. Moreover, SLA forces, unless 
regularly paid and effectively commanded, might well have begun to live off the land as did 
many troops in Sierra Leone in the past. 
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Finally, a British withdrawal after a comprehensive military victory over the RUF would tip 
the balance of military power and risk restarting the war, as demonstrated by the aftermath of 
the withdrawal of Executive Outcomes in 1997. All the problems which helped create the 
war in the first place remained aggravated by the events of the past ten years. Such was 
obvious despite Whitehall denials that British involvement in logistics and training needed to 
continue for a long time. Habits of ill-discipline and corruption are endemic in the Sierra 
Leone armed forces, and many of the same soldiers are being recycled into the system.  
 
Familiar problems – especially ‘lost’ wages and rations – are re-emerging as soldiers are 
placed under Sierra Leone command following their UK training. To reorient the SLA, the 
latter needed to ensure it was being effectively led. For that to happen, British officers must 
be placed in the chain of command, probably as deep as the rank of major. That step, while 
deemed to be essential by British officers on the ground, is politically risky for a Labour 
government already accused of ‘mission creep’ by its political opponents. It would also create 
unprecedented dependence by an African country on a former colonial power. The necessity 
for outside commitment to Sierra Leone goes further than the military sphere. In effect, a 
military option alone is doomed to failure in the sense that it cannot by itself stabilise Sierra 
Leone and could cause serious military repercussions throughout West Africa and further 
destabilising a troubled region. A military option, while necessary, can only achieve stability if 
it is part of a medium-term political strategy.  
 
3.16.  CONCLUSION  
As of 1999, of the country’s estimated population of 4.7 million people, more than half (2.6 
million) were either internally displaced or had become refugees in neighbouring states. Even 
though the causes of the conflict did show institutional breakdown and widespread neglect, 
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Sankoh and his associates chose to exploit those genuine concerns by criminality, torture, 
drugs, plunder, and rape in battle (Chege 2002). The RUF distinguished themselves in war 
with forced conscription of adolescent boys; sexual enslavement of girls; shocking human 
mutilations; and wholesale destruction of settlements, schools, and government buildings. In 
fact, Chege’s writing in 2002 noted that three years after the conflict, nobody knows with any 
certainty the total number of war casualties. A conservative estimate is 70,000, with hundreds 
of thousands of amputees and maimed people. The situation in Sierra Leone today (2008) is 
totally different from that reality such that it would be wrong to write that the international 
community and institutions totally failed in resolving the conflict in Sierra Leone.  
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Chapter 4 
METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1.      INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH  
This chapter discusses the research design used for the study, including the methods used 
for analysis of the data. It draws on my experience of being a Sierra Leonean and doing a 
field research in the country. The work discusses physical risks both visible and invisible 
that were encountered during the fieldwork. The chapter also discusses other issues I 
encountered while conducting the research, specifically with regards to ethics, the relevance 
of informed consent, and issues such as describing the research and following strategies 
necessary to gain access to subjects. 
 
A further challenge was to develop an approach that could provide detailed feedback and 
guidance and test its feasibility for implementation, whilst being mindful of views of 
community people and those of the international community. To address this, a two-stage 
methodological approach consisting of qualitative fieldwork—conducting in-depth 
interviews and group discussions and a small scale survey—was used.  
 
4.2 RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY 
Post-conflict reconstruction is a crucial part of a peace process as the fundamental pillars 
of society such as the rule of law and security are being (re)constructed during this phase, 
laying the foundation for state capacities which were non- or hardly existent during the 
conflict. Post-conflict reconstruction, thereby, also contributes to the transformation of a 
collapsed state to a failing state in the aftermath of a civil war. The context of a failed state 
for post-conflict reconstruction is highly significant for the field of conflict resolution as 
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civil war activities go along with an increasing difficulty of the state to govern its territory 
and execute its governmental functions up to the collapse of state institutions. Conflicts are 
not to be isolated from their context, including state capacities, asymmetry of power 
relations, involvement of third parties, and so on. They cannot be analyzed appropriately if 
treated separately from the given environment and situation. Furthermore, the more 
challenging a conflict environment is, the more difficult is the successful implementation of 
post-conflict reconstruction. Thus, the study contributes to the understanding of the 
challenges posed to post-conflict reconstruction in the context of a failed state.     
 
The peace process in Sierra Leone takes up the empirical part of the study. The Sierra 
Leonean civil war and its peace process have not received as much scholarly and media 
attention as, for instance, the civil wars in Rwanda and Bosnia. The literature on Sierra 
Leone focuses mainly on the political economy of the conflict and the military intervention 
of third parties, and neglects the evaluation of the post-conflict reconstruction process. The 
aim of the study is to convey a fieldwork and survey in Sierra Leone to gather first-hand 
data on the post-conflict reconstruction process and, based upon the gathered results, to 
draw up conclusions and recommendations for policymakers for future post-conflict 
reconstruction efforts in the context of a failed state.  
 
4.3.       GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS OF RESEARCH INTEREST  
The research areas of interest included communities in the Bombali, Tonkolili, Port Loko 
and Kambia districts, all in Northern Sierra Leone, which had been severely devastated by 
the war. The basis for the selection of these geographic locations was mainly because most 
of the rural settlements, encompassing private housing, schools, health posts and 
significantly the social fabrics in the rural communities and elsewhere, were seriously 
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destroyed beyond comprehension. During the ten years conflict, the vast majority of the 
mutineers hailed from the rural communities in Northern Sierra Leone. Of significant 
importance is that the region of interest contains the Temne people, the tribe of the late 
rebel leader, Col. Foday Saybana Sankoh. It also shares a boundary with neighbouring 
Guinea, a causative agent of a potential spill-over as a transit point for rebel groups into 
Guinea, Liberia and the Ivory Coast. This also makes it a linchpin in any research that 
attempts to understand and hopes to contribute to the stability of the sub-region. In my 
meetings with communities, I endeavoured to find out first what their understanding of the 
conflict were and then to seek to juxtapose that with that of donor agencies, especially 
DfID and its Community Reintegration Programme. I also gathered evidence on 
community perceptions, people’s attitudes, expectations and experiences, tracing where 
those overlap with the reconstruction and nation building programmes being implemented 
in the region.    
 
4.4.      QUALITATIVE FIELDWORK  
The methods employed in this research were qualitative in nature. This approach was 
adopted to allow for individuals’ views and experiences to be explored in detail. Qualitative 
methods neither seek, nor allow data to be given on the numbers of people holding a 
particular view nor having a particular set of experiences. The significance of qualitative 
research is to define and describe the range of emergent issues and explore linkages, rather 
than to measure their extent.   
 
4.4.1.      SCHEME OF INTERVIEWS AND GROUPS  
Due to the sensitivity of conflict issues within the various communities that suffered greatly 
or played a major role in the civil war and owing to the fact that the majority of people in 
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the selected area were illiterates, face-to-face interviews of representative communities and 
strategic organisations in the northern and western parts of Sierra Leone (Figure 1) were 
conducted in most cases.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Selected chiefdoms for the research project are shown coloured. The grey areas are those areas within 
Port Loko District that were still in rebel hands at the time of filing. 
 
In order to accommodate some of the interviewees’ limited literal level in exceptional cases, 
face-to-face interviews were considered to make it easier to breakdown the interview 
question in simpler terms for the understanding of the participants without losing the real 
sense of the question. This approach was economically viable in terms of both cost and 
time management. In some cases the survey was conducted via questionnaires.  
 
4.4.2.     CONDUCT OF INTERVIEWS AND GROUP DISCUSSIONS  
In-depth interviews and group discussions were used via non-directive techniques. Each 
interview and group discussion was exploratory in form so that questioning could be 
Sierra Leone 
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responsive to the experiences and circumstances of the individuals involved. The question 
structure, which listed the key themes and sub topics to be addressed and the specific 
issues for coverage within each context, were based on a topic guide. The following 
demonstrates the main interview questions presented in an interview-friendly atmosphere 
to convey the following structures:  
1. Whose idea was the programme in the first place - of your organisation or 
community?    
2. What are the assumptions underpinning the design?    
3. What was the motivation for your organisation or original interest in the project?    
4. To what extent does the design of the programme relate to your organisation’s 
wider objectives?     
5. What was the process before they committed funds to the programme?    
6. What was given as a justification for their intervention?  
7. What was the objective of your programme as designed in the long frame (goal 
and purpose)? 
8. How was the target group defined and what was this based on?     
9. What other options were considered and rejected, and why?    
10. Does the project have a holistic focus: Is this focus on the previously 
marginalised, certain ethnic group victims of the war or its perpetrators? 
11. Is the project in Sierra Leone a unique one or a continuation of a project 
developed elsewhere? 
 
4.5 CONTENT ANALYSIS OF REPRESENTATIVE TRANSCRIPTS 
To extract the emergent evaluative impressions and themes, a Content Analysis—a scholarly 
methodology used by researchers in the social sciences to analyse recorded transcripts of 
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interviews with participants—was performed on the coded data. Neuendorf (2002) defined 
Content Analysis in the context of an in-depth analysis employing quantitative or qualitative 
techniques of information or messages using a scientific method with attention to objective-
intersubjectivity, a priori design, reliability, validity, replicability, and the like.  
According to Krippendorff (2004), six major questions must be addressed: 
1. Which data are analysed? 
2. How are they defined? 
3. What is the population from which they are drawn? 
4. What is the context relative to which the data are analysed? 
5. What are the boundaries of the analysis? 
6. What is the target of the inferences? 
In terms of the interview protocol adopted, the questions were derived from the aims and 
objectives and research questions of the study. The questions were structured to capture the 
subjective perceptions of respondents and or interviewees’ experiential insights of the 
dynamics of the Sierra Leone civil war. Over all, 40 transcripts were representative for 
analysis. And of the interview questions, 11 questions that correlate to the main research 
questions and objectives were coded for analysis (Table 2). This was to ensure that a tidy 
analysis that matches the interview protocol format can be obtained. The type of content 
analytic strategy executed was a combination of both manifest and latent content analysis, as 
described by Gottschalk (1995). Manifest content is the visible or apparent elements of the 
responses, such as the particular phrases or words used by the participants, as well as the 
manner and the number of times they were used. Further, to grasp the meaning of particular 
words or phrases as used by a particular respondent or interviewee, I turn to latent content 
analysis which seeks to unravel the underlying aspects of the information or message 
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interpretively. For example, in the questionnaire or interview data used in this report, words 
such as “corruption”, “nepotism”, “unemployment” and “mismanagement” were interpreted 
as negative mental impressions. Some qualitative research authors refer to this combination 
as thematic analysis (e.g. Gottschalk, 1995; Smith et al., 1992). 
 
Table 2: Statistics 
Questions Valid Missing 
What were the underlying causes of the war? 40 0 
What were the immediate causes of the war – what sparked it off? 40 0 
Why did some people join the fighting? 40 0 
Why did some people NOT join the fighting? 40 0 
To what extent was ethnicity an issue in the origin and the implementation of the war? 40 0 
What were the perceptions of community and political participation before, during and 
since the war? 
40 0 
To what extent did the CRP engage with the communities that it was trying to assist? 40 0 
Has the DfID/CRP improved the opportunities for the vulnerable? 40 0 
What were the objectives of the post war reconstruction project? 40 0 
Did the project design facilitate these objectives being achieved? 40 0 
What lessons have been learned? 40 0 
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Results 
Table 3: Causative agents of the civil war 
What were the underlying causes of the war? 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Effects of colonization 10 25.0 25.0 25.0 
Hopelessness about future 19 47.5 47.5 72.5 
Corruptions and non-accountability 11 27.5 27.5 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0  
 
Table 3 shows the various categories that were created to capture the responses. The 
categories were firmly grounded in the data. This was carefully done through a spiral process 
of expansion, merger and re-categorisation. 
As shown in Table 3 above, responses show that interviewees or respondents’ were given the 
benefit to state what they thought were the main causative agents of the war. The histogram 
below (Figure 2) shows that hopelessness about the future was a major agent of the war. 
 
Figure 2: Histogram of causative agents of the war 
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Table 4: Stimulus for the war 
What were the immediate causes of the war – what sparked it off? 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Party military e.g. Siaka 
Steven's APC 
14 35.0 35.0 35.0 
Unemployment 18 45.0 45.0 80.0 
Not caring for and paying the 
military 
8 20.0 20.0 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0  
 
When questioned about stimulus for the immediate causes of the war, 45% of the 
interviewees strongly believe that the high level of employment in Sierra Leone can not be 
isolated (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3 Histogram for stimulus of the war 
 
To further exemplify, below are in vivo extracts from some of the 45% of interviewees: 
“Unemployment and a lack of opportunity” 
“Unemployment and lack of opportunity” 
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Table 5: Stimulus for joining in the fight 
Why did some people join the fighting? 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid To amass wealth 12 30.0 30.0 30.0 
Faith in God 15 37.5 37.5 67.5 
Baseless RUF 13 32.5 32.5 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0  
 
As shown in both Table 5 and Figure 4, faith played a major role in recruiting for the war. 
One particular in vivo response vividly captures this remarkable stimulus, as presented below: 
“The faith I have in God” 
 
Figure 4 Stimulus for joining in the fight 
 
The above histogram is reminiscent of a mental state about the factors that influence one to 
join the fighters during the civil war. 
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Table 6: Needless to join the fighting 
Why did some people NOT join the fighting? 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Proponent of peace 11 27.5 27.5 27.5 
War is stupid 18 45.0 45.0 72.5 
Worried about their life and 
safety 
11 27.5 27.5 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0  
 
While a fair balanced proportion was of the split opinion (Figure 5) that peace and security 
were necessary recipes for stability and therefore it would be good not to join the fighting, 
45% of the participants thought it was a stupid idea to actually join the fighting. When asked, 
one interviewee answered as follows: 
“I fight my own war…Stupid to fight some ones war” 
 
 
Figure 5 Histogram representing opinions on not joining the fight. 
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Table 7: The role of ethnicity in the war 
To what extent was ethnicity an issue in the origin and the implementation of the war? 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Not at all 9 22.5 22.5 22.5 
A little bit 19 47.5 47.5 70.0 
Very much 12 30.0 30.0 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0  
 
The role of ethnicity in the war presents mixed opinion as demonstrated in Table 7 and 
Figure 6, and exemplified in the following in vivo extracts: 
“Yes it was used by some to push their agenda forward” 
“No but it was use after the election…Yes it did, for instance the Kamajors in the South and the Gbethies in 
the North” 
“Ethnicity became an issue with the election of 1996. Before that, it was between bad and good” 
“To a lesser extent” 
“Ethnicity was not  one of the causes of the war…Ethniccity did not  prolong the war in Sierra Leone” 
 
 
Figure 6 The ethnic factor of the war 
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Table 8: Community perceptions 
What were the perceptions of community and political participation before, during and since the war? 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Peaceful co-existence 9 22.5 22.5 22.5 
Despondency 13 32.5 32.5 55.0 
Limited participation 11 27.5 27.5 82.5 
Positively 7 17.5 17.5 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0  
 
 
An interesting indication manifested in responses with respect to the perceptions of 
community and political participations reveal a nearly fair balance as demonstrated by Table 8 
and histogram below. One in vivo response is quoted as follows: 
“The perception of communities in terms of Political participation before and during the war, was one of 
political apathy, and after the war, saw active political participation” 
 
Figure 7 Community perceptions of the dynamics of conflict 
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Table 9: The CRP stimulus 
To what extent did the CRP engage with the communities that it was trying to assist? 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Don’t know 11 27.5 27.5 27.5 
Focus group discussions 10 25.0 25.0 52.5 
Youth Groups 10 25.0 25.0 77.5 
Community consultation 9 22.5 22.5 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0  
 
The bar chart (Figure 8) and Table 9 show clearer diagrammatic and numerical views of 
participants with regards to the extent of CRP’s engagement with communities. One 
enthusiast’s in vivo quote is as follows: 
“It changed communities positively” 
 
Figure 8 The CRP stimulus and communities 
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Table 10:  Improved DfID/CRP opportunities 
 
Has the DfID/CRP improved the opportunities for the vulnerable? 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Care for the wounded and 
displaced 
15 37.5 37.5 37.5 
Resettlement 15 37.5 37.5 75.0 
Absolutely none 10 25.0 25.0 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0  
 
The statistics shown in Table 10 is cleared painted graphically in Figure 9 below in terms of 
whether DfID/CRP improved opportunities for the vulnerable. One interviewee’s in vivo is 
presented as follows: 
“The people of Sierra Leone but most importantly the youth. There is no hope for them” 
 
 
 
Figure 9 DfID/CRP improved opportunities 
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Table 11: Objectives of post war reconstruction 
What were the objectives of the post war reconstruction project? 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid To address the past 9 22.5 22.5 22.5 
To create home and 
opportunities 
18 45.0 45.0 67.5 
3 13 32.5 32.5 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0  
 
Majority of the participants attempted to response to this question as objectives as possible, 
45% interviews concurring that the main objects of post-war reconstruction to evolve 
opportunities for survival. Below are three in vivo extracts: 
“Address the cause of the conflict” 
“To create hope and opportunities for the people of Sierra Leone” 
“To address the grievances of the past” 
 
Figure 10 Post war reconstruction 
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Table 12: Project design versus objectives 
Did the project design facilitate these objectives being achieved? 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid No 13 32.5 32.5 32.5 
Yes 27 67.5 67.5 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0  
 
With regards to the graphic representation of Table 12 and respective figure 11 based on the 
subject-matter, below are in vivo extracts: 
“Yes” 
 “No, what it did then was to address the effects of the war and not the underlying issues which go all the way 
to the West” 
 
Figure 11 Project design versus objectives 
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Table 13: Lessons learned 
What lessons have been learned? 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Naive to align with incumbent 11 27.5 27.5 27.5 
Peace is a decision 6 15.0 15.0 42.5 
Community consultation is 
roadmap 
16 40.0 40.0 82.5 
Roads and bridges don’t solve 
conflicts 
7 17.5 17.5 100.0 
Total 40 100.0 100.0  
 
The participants presented diverse views on the lesson learned as demonstrated in Table 13 
and Figure 12, and also in the sample in vivo extracts: 
“Democracy is a very expensive luxury and in a post war situation, democracy may not be the best idea” 
“They cannot solve the conflict by building road and bridges. Trade restriction and issues like debt has for 
more reaching effect African states than post war programmes” 
“At post war, it is naive to align with the incumbent since they may be the cause of the conflict” 
 
Figure 12 Lessons learned 
 
 
 100 
Executive Summary 
From the content analysis presented above a number of notable indicators from the 
emergent themes are positive and constructive. These indicators can seriously be taken to 
show the impact and potential of such fieldwork in war-torn environs. The analysis 
unravelled a potentially relevant and productive area of lessons learned that reveals 
development of ideal framework for reconstruction programmes. 
 
4.6.  THE ANALYSIS OF QUALITATIVE MATERIAL USING MATRIX 
MAPPING  
Material collected through qualitative methods is invariably unstructured and unwieldy. 
Much of it is textural, consisting of verbatim transcriptions of interviews and discussions. 
Moreover, the internal content of the material is usually detailed and in micro-form (for 
example, accounts of experiences and inarticulate explanations). The primary aim of any 
analytical method is to provide a means of exploring coherence and structure within a 
cumbersome data set whilst retaining a hold on the original accounts and observations 
from which it is derived.  
 
Qualitative analysis is essentially about detection and exploration of the data, deriving sense 
of the data by looking for coherence and structure within the data. Matrix Mapping works 
from verbatim transcripts and involves a systematic process of sifting, summarising and 
sorting the material according to key issues and themes. The process begins with a 
familiarisation stage and includes a researcher’s review of the transcripts. Based on the 
coverage of the topic guide, the researchers’ experiences of conducting the fieldwork and 
their preliminary review of the data, a thematic framework is constructed. The analysis then 
proceeds by summarising and synthesising the data according to this thematic framework 
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using a range of techniques such as cognitive mapping and data matrices. When all the data 
have been sifted according to the core themes, the analyst begins to map the data and 
identify features within the data: defining concepts, mapping the range and nature of 
phenomenon, creating typologies, finding associations, and providing explanations.  
 
The analyst reviews the summarised data; compares and contrasts the perceptions, 
accounts, or experiences; searches for patterns or connections within the data and seeks 
explanations internally within the data set. Piecing together the overall picture is not simply 
aggregating patterns. It also involves a process of weighing up the salience and dynamics of 
issues, and searching for structures within the data that have explanatory power, rather than 
simply seeking a multiplicity of evidence. This report is mainly based on the themes and 
issues arising from the analysis of the qualitative data from the interviews and group 
discussions.   
 
4.7.  SURVEY SAMPLE  
Respondents for interview were determined on the basis of their involvement and 
experience during and after the war. The key subject areas and issues within which 
questioning took place included understanding the causes of the conflict and lessons 
learned from it; the reconstruction programme, its design and delivery, performance, 
sustainability issues; role of external agents, local dominant groups and ordinary people in 
the rebuilding process.  
 
In particular, interviews were conducted within a broad sect of society, with chiefs, village 
elders, councillors, victims, perpetrators, religious leaders, health, education, police, arm 
force personnel, staff of local and international NGOs, government ministries or 
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departments, civil society, etc. In essence, this sample was prompted by my personal 
experience and with others by recommendations from community elders and DfID staff.  
 
4.7.1.  CONDUCT OF SURVEY  
Potential respondents were sent electronic or hard format invitation letters as same for the 
depth/focus group respondents. The extension of invitation was followed up by email 
including the draft guidance and a short information sheet. Respondents were sent a 
reminder two days before the deadline, and those who had not completed the 
questionnaire after this deadline were called and extension given for them to complete it.   
 
A crucial part of a good research design concerns making sure that it addresses the needs 
of the research. To put this in another way, somehow we need to ensure that the questions 
asked were the right ones. It is also important to avoid the problem of having inadequate 
data and inadequate inferences from the data that the method of analysis is known, and it 
should inform the preceding stages of the research.  
 
As such, researchers are advised in all cases to start their research by setting down the aims 
for the research, the hypothesis and its objectives, to review the relevant literature and also 
some preliminary research which in my case was done amongst colleagues at the Graduate 
School and with NGOs in Sierra Leone. It was based on fulfilling the above aims that my 
interview schedule was designed and questions selected for the field work. 
 
4.7.2.  SURVEY QUESTIONS  
Questions raised were phrased towards providing answers to the associated risks of state 
failure, and associated structural or root causes of conflict and violence.  Since the research 
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was conducted within the North of Sierra Leone and within the confines of the DfID 
Community Reintegration Programme, the research examines the peace-building 
mechanisms being developed there and implemented vis-à-vis conflict prevention and 
mediation. Most important is its holistic approach to addressing the root causes. It assesses 
how holistic those approaches are?   
 
One of the major components is to question whether they addressed the root causes or if 
the process of supporting post-war reconstruction after civil war reinforces the old 
structures and continue to marginalize the poor. Or do they provide the opportunity for 
the previously marginalized to be integrated into the decision-making process and to 
establish a better future? With the benefit of hindsight, did the process of reintegration 
adopted by the CRP recognise and address the root causes of the war and provide an 
opportunity to rebuild communities in which all could benefit – including the previously 
marginalized? If not, did this reflect the way the project was planned or the way that it was 
implemented?  
 
4.7.3.  RESPONSES TO THE SURVEY  
From the sample of 400 individuals, 50 responses to the survey were received (interviewed 
or questionnaire). Although this was a small number of responses, it was relatively 
representative of the overall targeted sample population. It was also imperative that a 
distinction between the roles and those of other players engaged in the reconstruction 
process could be drawn. Before the interview, I first selected 1 young male, 2 middle-aged 
males, and one older male all of high socio-economic status, and continued until all the 
boxes were completed. A sample of 50 is used, with male and female sections evenly 
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matched. Interviews were only undertaken with persons who fitted these categories. In 
total, 50 people were interviewed, which excluded members of the communities as follows: 
 
Table 14: Selection Method 
 
GENDER 
M AL ES 1Sub- 1Total FEMALES 
1Sub- 
1Total 1Total 
Age 15/ 20 
21/ 
45 46+  
15/ 
20 
21/ 
45 46+  
Socio- 
Economic 
Status 
High 1 2 1 4 1 2 1 4 8 
Middle 1 6 2 9 1 6 2 9 18 
Low 2 7 3 12 2 7 3 12 24 
  25  25 50 
 
Table 14 illustrates the selection method involved in the selection process used for the 
interview. A sample of 50, with male and female sections matched to represent the total 
population of the community. 
 
4.7.4.  ANALYSIS OF THE SURVEY DATA  
The data from the survey was entered into an Excel spreadsheet developed for this 
research. It was then analysed by producing pivot tables to give cross tabulations of 
answers to questions by organisation type. The data from the open ended questions was 
analysed by putting comments into a matrix, and looking for commonalities and 
differences between answer types.  
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4.8.  THE USE OF QUANTITATIVE DATA IN THIS REPORT  
Graphs showing responses to the survey questions have been omitted and replaced by 
qualitative responses. Data from the open ended questions in the survey are included 
alongside the qualitative data, and are identified as being survey answers. 
 
4.9.  CHALLENGES FACED DURING THE RESEARCH  
There were several challenges faced by the research team in the undertaking of this research, 
each of which is outlined below, together with recommendations for future research of a 
similar nature.  
 
4.9.1.  ETHICAL CHALLENGES 
Since the research was dealing with communities and addressing human behavioural 
patterns, ethical considerations, especially confidentiality and informed consent were 
carefully handled. It requires me not to disclose transcript of an interview if its sensitivity 
would bring undue harm to the interviewee or when he or she wishes me not to do so. 
Berg defines informed consent as the knowing consent of individuals to participate in an 
exercise of their choice, free from any element of fraud, deceit, duress, or similar unfair 
inducement or manipulation (Berg 2009). To establish trust and appear unbiased, my 
approach was to listen carefully and not to offer any personal views. I sought to develop 
rapport, knowing when to probe and prompt.  
 
The building of trust is a developmental task as trust is not something that suddenly 
appears after certain matters have been accomplished. But it is something to be worked on. 
Trust is not established once and for all. It is fragile. Even trust that has taken long time to 
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build can be destroyed overnight in the face of an ill-advised action. Techniques learned at 
the Graduate School serve as a reference; coupled with continuous supervision with my 
supervisor and lessons learned from a pilot project I made with colleagues at the Graduate 
School served as an invaluable resource during my research trip.  
 
4.9.2.  INFORMED CONSENT 
Bearing in mind the fragility of the Sierra Leonean with the situation as regards the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Special Court (SC) to try perpetrators of 
the near-ten year civil war, it was apparent that gaining informed consent was going to be a 
difficult task. However, as Eisner notes, “As researchers, we must find an acceptable 
balance (to whom) between our rights as researchers and the right of participants to self 
determination, privacy and dignity” (Eisner 1991). In view of the prevailing circumstance, I 
applied the twin principle of confidentiality and informed consent. Confidentiality in this context 
means that people know that some of the colleagues were interviewed but do not know 
what was said, whilst anonymous means that people did not know that some of them were 
interviewed.  These scenarios compare with ballot casting—For instance, when one votes 
in an election how one voted is confidential but one is not necessarily anonymous - i.e. it is 
known that they voted. Within a village people may see that I am interviewing specific 
people (i.e. it is not anonymous) but will not know what they say (i.e. it is confidential). 
 
4.9.3.  RAISING EXPECTATIONS 
Hypothetically, reintegration programmes tend to re-enforce old social structures and do 
not provide an opportunity for the marginalized. In probing communities about such 
issues of opportunity and marginalisation, I was mistaken for an aid worker. I therefore 
sought to clarify my purpose, to avoid raising such expectations.   
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4.8.4.  RE-OPENING OLD WOUNDS 
The dirty war tactics that were employed in the conflict left a legacy of being one of the 
most vicious of civil wars in the world. As such, probing into these areas was dealt with 
exercising great sensitivity and caution to avoid re-opening old wounds of subjects 
questioned, especially on issues they did not wish to respond to or which they deemed 
provocative. It is obvious that re-living distressing and painful experiences may be a very 
potent experience and could cause long-term psychological distress. To prevent me from 
causing this or inadvertently probing into these areas that respondents did not wish to talk 
about, I employed restraint and also tried to know when to stop. Being a native of that 
country offered me with broader knowledge of the cultural characteristics which also 
helped. 
 
4.9.5.  SECURITY RISKS 
A lack of knowledge of what could go wrong during fieldwork can be frustrating to the 
researcher as a person and to the project. As mentioned earlier, there is partial truth in the 
idea of safety because of researcher ‘familiarity’ with terrain or environment (Griffiths 
1998: 361). Familiarity is not necessarily a guarantee of safety because of unpredictable 
events stemming from suspicion, change of political climate and traditional/cultural 
conservatism.  
 
As such, safety was a fundamental issue of this research for both communities and me.  
Even though I was familiar with the environment and know that there was relative peace, 
the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission unintentionally heightened 
tensions in Sierra Leone. Thus, identifying certain individuals as victims had the potential 
of putting them in danger, whilst involving the community in some of the circumstances 
 108 
did resemble investigating financial dealings of non-governmental organizations. Bringing 
communities together for discussion, especially ex-combatants may inadvertently be 
putting them at risk. On the contrary, these potential limitations did not in any away divert 
the substance of this work. 
 
4.10  RECOMMENDATIONS  
This section discusses views of members of the international community and that of 
community people and identifies the recommendations which were felt to be most 
important.   
 
4.10.1.  LONG-TERM PLANNING 
The first recommendation relates to the fact that the study was conducted over a six month 
period (December 2004 – May 2005), producing a snapshot of persons and organisations 
involved in the reconstruction process during that particular period. It is possible that the 
views of the post war community, including those that were affected by the war, may have 
changed over time. Further, there is also problem with the representative population 
studied. Although I spared no means to inform victims about the study, the response rate 
was relatively low. Participation was entirely voluntary, possibly resulting in a selection bias 
which may have influenced the findings of the study.  
  
4.10.2.  LEVEL OF ENGAGEMENT 
The second limitation has to do with the extent to which the findings can be generalized 
beyond the cases studied. The number of cases is too limited for broad generalizations. 
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4.10.3.  TRUST AND RESPECT (RECOMMENDATION 1)  
Trust and respect was also identified as a key recommendation and was understood to link 
closely to other recommendations such as long term planning (rec 1) and levels of 
engagement and power (rec 2). Honesty and truth were felt to be key factors in building 
trust and respect with communities. They provide an effective premise for community 
engagement. To further exemplify, below is in vivo quote of an interviewee: 
“…I think if you’re trying to engage any kind of community at any level you must attain high 
trust and respect from that community. Without that, no intervention that you try to get into the 
community will work. So I think that’s paramount really in terms of engaging communities.”  
 
4.10.4.  TRAINING (RECOMMENDATION 2) 
Training and an understanding of the history of the causes of conflict for those working on 
the reconstruction programme was considered to be an important factor of the work, but it 
is also stressed that the resources need to be available for this training.   
 
4.10.5.  CULTURAL SHIFT (RECOMMENDATION 3)  
This was a recommendation which respondents particularly felt they were already working 
towards. Arguably, most people who work within this remit are aware of the dangers and 
consequences of stereotyping, as stereotyping target groups can reduce the effectiveness of 
initiatives, resulting in set targets not being met. One particular in vivo text extract vividly 
captures this call, as presented below: 
“My general experience is probably 80 maybe 90 percent of the people from the west who work in 
the reconstruction programmes in one way or another are usually fairly sensitive to the dangers of 
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stereotyping, because they know that if they over-stereotype or they overdo the sort of target group 
recognition they won’t be able to achieve their objectives.”  
 
4.11.  CONCLUSION 
The work attempts to put into practice issues about access, ethics, security risk, politics and 
the researcher’s role in the field. I have also indicated that the researcher as an ‘insider’ or 
‘outsider’ has strengths and constraints. Thus, an advance familiarity with the field of 
research interest can in some ways threaten research work. For instance, an outsider’s 
research interview questions can be construed as being invasive at all cost simply to extract 
information. 
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Chapter 5 
FIELD WORK RESULTS AND THEMATIC REFLECTIONS ON THE 
COLLECTED DATA  
 
5.1.  INTRODUCTION 
An understanding of the war and its root causes are important recipes for successful post-
conflict reconstruction. Without such understanding, reconstruction efforts face the risk of 
failure (Bredel 2003). It is only after when the potential causative agents are identified will 
reconstruction stand a chance to address potential threats to the achievement of sustainable 
peace and stability.   
 
With Sierra Leone in the frame, the general consensus from most literature is that it failed. 
This then raised the issue about what should be an adequate response of the international 
community to a post-conflict situation such as Sierra Leone that has left a failed or severely 
impeded state. Unlike other types of civil wars with limited international and regional 
ramifications, the issues surrounding failed states are very complex; leaving them alone or 
supporting one side may only contribute to exacerbating the conflict as demonstrated by the 
Sierra Leonean scenario. 
 
5.2.  BACKGROUND TO THE DFID POST-CONFLICT 
RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAMME 
With the resumption of conflict in Sierra Leone in 2000, DfID intervened in the post-war 
reconstruction phase in Sierra Leone directly and also indirectly through Agrisystems. A U.K. 
based NGO was asked to submit a design proposal for the rebuilding of Sierra Leone (DfID 
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2002). The context for the intervention was spelt out as follows: “With the support of the 
President of Sierra Leone, DfID has decided to make a direct intervention in order to assist 
in the implementation of the DDR programme. Ensuring that the reinvigoration of 
reintegration activities extends beyond ex-combatants and brings broader development 
benefits to communities in Sierra Leone” (DfID 2004). 
 
The overarching objective of DfID is to underpin the promotion 
of sustainable peace, security and stability in Sierra Leone (Programme Goal) through the 
provision of livelihood opportunities. An effective programme is the key element of the 
British Government’s overall strategy for achieving peace in Sierra Leone. It is also an 
essential component of DfID’s current development strategy. This is heavily weighted 
towards assistance to the security sector and rebuilding a democratic process. In recognition 
of the fact that increased security will allow NGOs and other agencies to deliver 
humanitarian relief and provide a firmer foundation for longer-term development work 
which is needed if sustainable progress is to be made towards meeting the international 
development targets of democracy. The goals of the post war programmes were defined by 
DfID's idea but the design of the activities to achieve those outputs was undertaken by 
Agrisystems and the NGOs concerned.  
  
Britain is the largest bilateral donor to Sierra Leone. The UK supports an extensive 
programme including reconstruction of war-damaged areas, reintegration of former 
combatants, training and strengthening of the police and armed forces, judicial reform and a 
wide-ranging programme of governance. 
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The UK government committed to a ten-year programme of support to the social and 
economic development of Sierra Leone. The agreement, known as a Poverty Reduction 
Framework Arrangement (PRFA), committed Britain to £120 million of support for 
development programmes. This funding is a combination of bilateral funds from the 
Department for International Development (DfID) budget and from the Africa Conflict 
Reduction Pool. These were collectively funded and managed by DfID, the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Ministry of Defence. 
 
5.3.  DfID/COMMUNITY REINTEGRATION PROGRAMME (CRP) 
The CRP is aiming to re-establish inclusive social, economic and cultural networks at 
community level in northern Sierra Leone. This is leading to reintegration of former 
combatants and other war-affected people into viable and stable communities. The CRP 
began in March 2001 and initially covered three Chiefdoms within Port Loko District. It has 
since been extended to forty-two Chiefdoms within the Districts of Bombali, Tonkolili, 
Kambia and Port Loko. Management of the CRP is contracted out to Agrisystems Limited, a 
consultancy specialising in post-conflict management.  
 
The work involves understanding community needs, fostering reintegration and 
reconciliation, reviving agricultural production, supporting small-scale enterprise 
development, rehabilitating physical infrastructure and improving water, sanitation and 
health. The CRP has direct and indirect beneficiaries. It has worked directly to identify and 
cater for the priority needs of approximately 100,000 people in more than 200 communities. 
Indirectly, between 700,000 and 800,000 people are benefiting within the targeted 
Chiefdoms. Additionally, the CRP also assisted the work of the national Commission for 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR) by providing vocational training 
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programmes and toolkits for over 5,000 ex-combatants and unemployed youths. The 279 
projects so far supported under the CRP have: 
• Through women’s groups and agricultural associations, provided seeds and tools to more 
than 12,000 rural families; 
• Returned more than 7,000 acres of agricultural land to sustainable production; 
• Supported more than 160 small businesses and associations through business skills 
training and the provision of grants for revolving credit; 
• Constructed and rehabilitated five key road arteries including repairs to bridges, culverts 
and ferries (e.g. the Mabanta Ferry, in Port Loko District); 
• Rehabilitated 15 schools; 
• Built and rehabilitated civic structures, including 14 Police Stations, court barries, markets 
and a customs building; 
• Supplied 20,000 families with clean, affordable water; 
• Conducted 80 community-based health education and HIV/AIDS campaigns. 
 
In addition to these works, the value-added component is significant. The Programme has 
helped to: 
• Build capacity of implementing partners and local government, that will leave behind a 
core of national expertise able to design, implement and monitor community-based 
programmes; 
• Promote reconciliation and unification through the funding and management of sporting 
and cultural events; 
• Address environmental and production concerns through the establishment of 
community forest nurseries and community fisheries to offset the over-exploitation of 
scarce natural resources. 
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A total of £12.9 million was committed to the programme and it was finished in September 
2003. 
 
5.4.  DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILISATION 
By 15 May 2000, about 20,042 ex-combatants (XCs) were disarmed—4,949 of these were 
from the RUF, 10,055 from the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and 9,038 
from the Civil Defence Forces. About seven percent of these were children, and were put 
under the care of UNICEF rather than NCDDR. However, there were other challenges: 
when the Peace Accord was signed in 2001, about 40% of the country was in the hands of 
the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) who twice that year broke the ceasefire and destroyed 
the demobilization centres. As a result the United Nations had to suspend the demobilization 
in four of the seven centres.  
Military sources recount that from 45,000 that were in the process of being demobilized and 
reintegrated, only a mere 6,000 was accounted for (Reuters, 27 July 2000). The demobilised 
child soldiers that were with UNICEF, with the breakdown, also went back to the RUF, 
thereby presenting a huge problem for the NCDDR to have to go through the whole process 
all over again. However, despite the problems associated with intimidation from some 
quarters of the RUF on those intending to disarm and a lack of funds, a renewed vigour was 
brought into the process with the timely arrival of the British Army. The United Nations 
Mission in Sierra Leone also in October 2000, called for a thorough overhaul of the 
programme (United Nations 2002), a speedy demobilization process (United Nations 2000) 
and the provision of incentives, which is seen as a vital prerequisite for reintegration.   
 
Since the long-term plan of both DfID and the United Nations was to transform these 
disgruntled and malcontent elements, efforts were first and foremost put into extensive 
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security sector reforms and in training and equipping about 8,500 of the former SLA forces. 
The shortage of funds which also led to a breakdown of the former accord was also saved 
with $1580 million from the international community and a further USD 306,094 to the 
Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) by the Japanese government (IRIN, 30 November 2000). 
This yielded huge returns with eventual disarmament and demobilisation of almost 720 
former combatants by January 2002 from all warring parties, including 4,751 women (6.5%) 
and 6,787children (9.4%), of which 506 were girls (DfID 2002).  
 
From the outset, there was the recognition of the large presence of child soldiers (up to 50% 
of fighters in rebel forces were believed to be under 18) and women (estimates ranged 
between 10% and 30%) among the various forces. 42,330 weapons and 1.2 million pieces of 
ammunition were also collected and destroyed marking the official end of the civil war in 
Sierra Leone (Bundu 2001). On the other hand, the demobilised CDF ex-combatants 
returned to their communities, as they saw the process basically as involving disarmament 
and registration, without the need for encampment and resettlement faced by the RUF and 
the RSLA. Two factors posed a challenge to the fragile peace; first the continued close-knit 
connection of former RUF fighters and second, even though the RUF has been disarmed, 
demobilized, and metamorphosed into a formal – albeit unsuccessful – political party, yet like 
the CDF, former RUF combatants have not completely ‘disappeared’. Some former RUF 
combatants have crossed into Liberia. While Liberia’s civil war recently came to a close, the 
UN has yet to make its presence felt in much of the outlying areas of that country. 
 
5.5.  COMMUNITY REINTEGRATION PROJECT (CRP) 
CRP provided employment for ex-combatants and resettling internally displaced peoples 
while rebuilding essential infrastructure. The programme tested a number of approaches to 
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the reintegration of XCs through reconciliation with Other War-Affected Persons (OWAPs), 
adopting a holistic approach in which both XCs and OWAPs could see a future for 
themselves through co-operation and through belief in a shared future. The pilot phase of 
the CRP has therefore delivered 31 projects in a range of fields including infrastructure, water 
and sanitation, shelter, small business development, livelihoods and social reintegration 
(DfID 2002).    
 
5.6.  SECURITY SECTOR REFORM 
Through the International Military Assistance and Training Team (IMATT), the Sierra Leone 
Army has been restructured and is undergoing a retraining programme. While the Sierra 
Leone Army is responsible for maintaining national security, the Police also have a key role 
to play in ensuring long-term security. During the war the Police were among the first targets 
of the rebel forces. DfID and UNAMSIL have provided support in the restructuring of the 
Sierra Leone Police through staff training and the development of the infrastructure. In 
preparation for the withdrawal of UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone which eventually took place in 
2005. 
 
The Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission were established to address 
issues of justice and reconciliation. The purpose of the Special Court was to bring to justice 
‘those bearing the greatest responsibility for war crimes committed since 1996’. The Court 
was created at the request of the Government of Sierra Leone, with the support of the 
international community through the UN. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was 
established in 2002 to give a report on the causes of the war (including an historical narrative) 
and to offer a road-map with recommendations on a range of reforms necessary to prevent a 
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new conflict. These include governance, corruption, management of the diamond mines and 
the national recovery plan.  
 
An Infrastructure Reconstruction Programme (SLIRP)—provided support to the re-
establishment of government services in newly accessible parts of the country by building or 
rehabilitating key infrastructures. A Law Development Project (LDP) was introduced to  help 
restore and strengthen the legal institutional framework and update the legal code.  
 
5.7.  GOVERNANCE REFORM 
Admittedly, it is easier to measure the impact of large-scale reconstruction projects that 
rebuild physical infrastructure. Yet, reconstruction of the social fabric of Sierra Leonean 
society is equally important (Thomson 2007). Public goods such as ‘justice’ are subjective and 
open to varying interpretations, and therefore escape quantification. But, if any lesson is to be 
learned from Sierra Leone’s civil war and the preceding decades of poor governance, it is that 
sources of political, economic, and social grievances cannot be ignored. Two essential legal 
prerequisites are needed in these, human rights and restructuring the judicial system in 
general. On the area of human rights, the confidence and security perception of people, 
including ex-combatants depend, to a large extent, on how past and present human rights are 
dealt with.  
 
Judicial reform is necessary if people’s desire for justice and reconciliation is to be met. There 
is a compelling need to bring the perpetrators of violence to justice if the current peace-
building momentum is to be sustained. The United Kingdom’s DfID and the IMATT, each 
have instituted several programmes aimed at ameliorating civil-military relations throughout 
Sierra Leone. The hybrid court set up by agreement between the government of Sierra Leone 
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and the UN has been addressing serious violations of war crimes. However, because of its 
limited operational time, the court system at the district level needs to be revamped to bolster 
its effectiveness. Immediately after the conflict, there were no courts in the country outside 
the capital Freetown, and the Provincial cities of Bo and Kenema, thus making access to legal 
redress for most people in the North and East of the country impossible. Addressing the 
acute shortage of legal manpower should be a central component of any judicial reform. Bah 
for instance noted, “there are only 20 practising judges for the whole of Sierra Leone, most 
of whom sit only in Freetown with the two magistrates in Bo and Kenema the only 
exceptions. There are only about 100 lawyers within jurisdiction. Of this number; eight are in 
Bo and Kenema, while there are no practising lawyers in the Northern Province”. Through 
the DfID temporary work programme, which I shall be dealing with later, courts were 
reconstructed and incentives put forth to encourage judges and police to go to the interior.  
 
5.8.  ADDRESSING CORRUPTION 
Government corruption and weak capacity were problems well before the civil war began 
(Grant 2002), thus, the simple act of holding “free and fair elections” should not be expected 
to solve these problems. If reconstruction plans were to be effective, it was considered 
especially by DfID that attention should be focused in addressing one of the leading causes 
of Sierra Leone’s civil war: corruption. Not only are foreign donors wary of corruption, but 
so too – and perhaps most importantly for long-term reconstruction and sustainable 
economic growth – are foreign investors. Of course, eradicating corruption is easier said than 
done. Grant argued, nevertheless, that some relatively inexpensive though useful changes 
could be implemented for the short term, such as drastically improving transparency in 
government accounts and its awarding of contracts. To assist in this venture, the DfID 
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suggested to the government to replace some of the top Sierra Leone civil servants with 
British civil servants to take Sierra Leone through the transition.  
 
On 3 February 2000 the Sierra Leone Government moved further by enacting the Anti-
Corruption Act. This paved the way for the founding of the Anti-Corruption Commission 
(ACC), which came into being on 1 January 2001 with the assistance of the United 
Kingdom's Department for International Development (DfID). The ACC is tasked to 
counter the ever-increasing corruption in Sierra Leone and will pay particular attention to 
corrupt payments to government officials and the misappropriation of public and donor 
funds. However, improving government capacity or eradicating corruption was no easy feat 
when the government was also implicated in the practice. It was therefore practical to discuss 
ways of reducing government corruption otherwise government ability to implement policy, 
enforce laws and regulations, and ensure that scarce funds reach those segments of the 
population in greatest need might be affected. Sierra Leone’s present score is still low in 
terms of ‘Anti-Corruption and Transparency’ at 3.01 out of a possible 7 points. If the 
perception grows that corruption has decreased in Sierra Leone, then international and 
bilateral aid and lending agencies will have greater confidence in allocating assistance to the 
country.  
 
5.9.  THE LAW AND JUDICIARY 
Like Sierra Leone’s other most basic institutions, the legal and penal system was destroyed in 
the war. The rebels targeted the police and prisons. Through the Law Reform Commission, 
DfID has funded the rehabilitation of courts, provided equipment and is helping to train 
personnel of the judicial department. The organisation has also helped to restore and 
strengthen the legal institutional framework, and updated the legal code. Two police training 
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programmes (UN Civilian Police training through UNAMSIL, and the Commonwealth 
Police project) are supporting the recruitment and training of the police. 
 
The legal system is based on English law and customary laws indigenous to local tribes. The 
judiciary comprises of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal, High Court, and Magistrate 
Court. The Supreme and Appeal Courts sit only in Freetown. The High and Magistrate 
Courts sit in any of the districts. To date Sierra Leone has not accepted compulsory 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) jurisdiction.  
 
5.10.  SPECIAL COURT 
The SCSL was established to bring justice to those bearing the greatest responsibility for war 
crimes committed since 1996’. The Court was created at the request of the Government of 
Sierra Leone and supported by the international community. The work of the Prosecution 
team, under Chief Prosecutor, David Crane, began in July 2002. Twelve people have so far 
been indicted, including former Liberia President Charles Taylor, former Interior Minister 
San Hinga Norman, and former Member of Parliament (MP) Johnny Paul Koroma. Nine of 
the twelve indictees are presently in custody facing trials. Sam Bockarie, a key lieutenant of 
rebel leader Foday Sankoh was reported killed in Liberia shortly after he was indicted. 
Koroma’s whereabouts are unknown, some believed he may also have been dead. 
 
The Special Court is the first international war crimes tribunal to address the abuse of 
children in war. The Chief Prosecutor of the Court confirmed that far from being prosecuted 
for their enforced role in the war, the Court will champion children’s right to live in peace by 
establishing crimes against children as war crimes. 
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5.11.  THE MEDIA 
DfID supported media development and reform to promote responsible journalism. It has 
helped develop Sierra Leone’s broadcasting policy and the general legislative framework for 
the media by establishing an Independent Media Commission (IMC). Through the 
Thompson Foundation and independent media training institutions the UK provided the 
necessary training for improved radio, television and print broadcasting. 
 
More than 24 different newspaper titles are now circulated in Freetown, with a more limited 
circulation going to the provinces. Most journalists are freelance. Fourteen radio stations are 
currently operating throughout Sierra Leone including: the Sierra Leone Broadcasting Service 
(SLBS), its subsidiary FM stations, and a number of independently-operated stations, 
including Voice of the Handicapped and believer Broadcasting Network. The British 
Broadcasting Corporation, Radio France International and Voice of America run a 24 hour 
FM broadcasts in Freetown. The IMC licenses newspapers and radio stations. 
An umbrella organization of journalists called Sierra Leone Association of Journalists (SLAJ) 
advocates the welfare of journalists. While freelance journalists are not tied to any editorial 
policy, stories inevitably have a commercial value and may be bought for the headline 
potential rather than for investigative rigour and veracity. To enhance journalism in the 
country, the University of Sierra Leone, Fourah Bay College, started a very popular degree 
course in Journalism in 2003.  
 
5.12.  CONCLUSION 
DfID, through its post-conflict reconstruction programme, has demonstrated that to sustain 
a war-to-peace transition beyond relief, the international community has to use resources for 
two overlapping purposes: 
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1. Programs aimed at building the structural bases for durable peace by means of 
projects to enhance security, justice, dispute resolution, reconciliation, gender 
equality, and good governance; and 
2. Policies and programs to promote broadly based economic development. However, 
this can move forward only if government and society embrace its basic goals. 
Unfortunately, in the numerous instances where government and important sectors 
of the population have not embraced a specific peace agenda (Angola, Liberia, 
Israel/Palestine, Sri Lanka) the international contributions to peace are likely to be 
limited to local impacts.   
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Chapter 6 
ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSATIVE FACTORS AND THE IMPACT OF DFID’S 
POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAMMES IN SIERRA LEONE 
 
6.1.  INTRODUCTION 
This part of the work comprises of an in-depth assessment, identifying the significant points 
arising from the study. This chapter places emphasis on missing gaps in research and 
literature in order to make tangible recommendations for further research. With reference to 
empirical evidence from Sierra Leone, the work refers to how factors both geographical and 
external influences assisted in pushing Sierra Leone towards the abyss of total collapse. The 
outcome of the chapter reveals limitations to the work with reference to achieving the 
aforementioned research goals. That is, to ascertain as to whether the DfID approach has 
created opportunity for change or addressed the root causes of the problems or the like. As a 
consequence, another area generating interest is to delve into whether the DfID approach 
provides the opportunity for the previously marginalized to be integrated into the decision-
making process and to establish a better future.  
 
6.2.  COLD WAR EFFECT 
With the slave trade being the first root and colonialism the second, it can also be inferred 
from literature that the consequences of the Cold War constitute a third root cause of “failed 
states” (Rotberg 2004). The argument is that during the Cold War smaller and weaker states 
like Sierra Leone were used as pawns by the Superpowers in their struggles for global 
hegemony. Because of the strategic and ideological considerations in this rivalry, it was easy 
for the importance of such states to be bloated beyond what reality would have warranted. 
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With the end of the Cold War and the subsequent withdrawal of the so-called superpower 
patrons, several of the developing countries rapidly collapsed under the weight of their 
poverty, incapacity, lack of social cohesion and poor leadership.   
 
In Sierra Leone, Siaka Stevens was propped up and sustained while the institutional basis of 
the state atrophied. The Soviet Union and the USA, and even Cuba provided him with 
military advisers and training at the peak of the Cold War. Tom Ofcansky, an African affairs 
analyst with the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, revealed in an 
interview what had already been suspected. With the end of the Cold War and the eventual 
withdrawal of tens of thousands of ex-Soviet soldiers, much of Eastern Europe remained 
unchanged. In Africa, the collapse of the Cold War led to an eventual collapse and 
fragmentation of the state and the development of numerous rebel groups, which in turn led 
to a great demand for small arms. The availability of small arms served as a catalyst in Sierra 
Leone and led to a situation where conflict entrepreneurs fostered their monetary gains by 
targeting the disenfranchised, pretending to champion the cause of the Lumpenproletariat. 
Ofcansky noted that the youth were recruited and often drugged before battle to prepare 
them to wreak havoc.    
 
6.3.  THE NATURAL RESOURCE FACTOR 
The assertion that the basis of the civil war was to engage in profitable crime under the guise 
of warfare is supported by the fact that diamonds fuelled the conflict. Azar notes that the war 
was not grounded in ideology but fostered by those persuaded by the material wealth offered 
by Sierra Leone’s diamond and mineral resources. This resulted in the view of the conflict as 
a result of greed rather than grievance (Azar 1990). In such case, while using warfare as a 
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cover for criminal activity, targeting civilians was a means to an end, with the Sierra Leonean 
diamond mining sector being the objective.   
 
Sierra Leone, a tiny nation, rich in natural resources, has several diamond mines, and is 
known for its production of gem quality diamonds (Hirsch 2001). These diamonds come 
from the districts of Kenema, Kono and Bo, located in the central and eastern areas of the 
country. Recently they have also been found in the north, specifically in Sanda Tendaren. In 
post-colonial Sierra Leone, diamonds have become the most important resource, accounting 
for 60 to 70 per cent of the government revenue (Clapham 1996) from the 1950s when they 
were first discovered. This gave Sierra Leone the potential for a ready source of foreign 
exchange. In short, as Clapham points out, “If you are looking for an African state with 
physical, social and economic infrastructure appropriate to success as an independent state, 
you would have had difficulty finding a better candidate than Sierra Leone” (ibid).  
 
In his “greed and grievance” debate, Collier’s analysis of African conflicts points to strategic 
minerals as the main agent responsible for the Sierra Leone’s conflicts (ibid: 2000). This 
prompts one to wonder why countries like Botswana and Ghana, that are notably rich in 
diamonds and gold respectively, remain relatively peaceful. Even though he has some 
disagreement with Collier, Clapham agrees with the former in this respect. In defence he 
notes that, unlike Sierra Leone, Botswana’s diamonds were derived largely from kimberlite 
pipes, which require sophisticated deep mining techniques and can thus be brought under 
control only by multinational corporations. On the other hand, Sierra Leone’s diamonds are 
derived from alluvial deposits which make them easy to obtain for anyone with a spade and 
sieve who is prepared to sift through the gravel beds in which they are found. This, added to 
the fact that it is a resource particularly difficult to bring under state control, given its very 
high unit value, the relative ease with which the diamonds could be mined without needing 
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capital or sophisticated processing and transport facilities, and the extreme ease with which 
they could be smuggled, made diamonds in Sierra Leone, an indicator for state failure rather 
than prosperity.  
 
Historically, it is worth noting that on their discovery during colonial rule in the 1950s, 
diamond mines were placed under and monopolized by the Sierra Leone Selection Trust 
(SLST), an offshoot of De Beers, by the colonial government (Abdulah 1998). Following the 
collapse of the Krio, the SLST monopoly was challenged by a new group of entrepreneurs, 
the Lebanese, also a client of the colonial government. The Lebanese, having been boosted 
by the colonial government in earlier periods used their commercial linkages to the West, and 
with the political backing from the colonial administration and prominent Sierra Leoneans, 
were able to inherit the trade, which they monopolized up to the present date (Williams 
2002). The third and maybe the most crucial difference between Botswana and Sierra Leone 
lay in the fact that Botswana had an ethnically homogenous society, which gave its politicians 
some assurance of their hold on power. In Sierra Leone, however, it was the opposite and 
with politicians desperate to cling on to power they developed a craving for illicit wealth since 
“access to diamond money was the critical source of leverage” (Reno 1995).   
 
As the saying goes, ‘he who controls the microphone has control over the argument’. This 
was true regarding the relationship between Sierra Leone’s politicians, paramount chiefs and 
the Lebanese. The result was a patrimonial state in which politicians were willing to 
compromise for access to funds, further ushering Sierra Leone towards what Reno referred 
to as a “Shadow State” (Rotberg 2003). The eventual result, was a civil war and since 1991 
the economic opportunity presented by the breakdown of law and order sustained the high 
levels of violence which plagued Sierra Leone (Riley 1996). However, it is worth taking into 
 128 
consideration that the plundering of natural resources is best achieved in an atmosphere 
where there is neither accountability nor means to restrain the actors (Richards 1996).    
 
6.4.  FLAWS IN REGIME 
While state collapse is recognized as providing the basic opportunity that leaders and their 
followers seize to pursue conflicts, the state may also subdivide into a number of specific 
areas where it no longer performs its core functions, making such areas vulnerable to 
destabilize by diverse agencies. Such was the Sierra Leone scenario. It is worth noting that 
not all such agencies were hostile to the state. But the fact that they performed state 
functions further weakened the state as much as did the rebellion itself. These functions 
included general order, territorial control, population control, control over armed forces, and 
provision of security (Jackson 1990). Sierra Leone’s economic decline in the 1980s hampered 
the government’s ability to respond effectively to the rebellion. 
 
By the early 1990s, Sierra Leone’s economy was in decline and coupled with high level 
corruption among state officials, the country embraced mass discontent and political 
instability. Political uncertainty and economic decline undermined effective policy-making 
and diminished public confidence in the state’s ability to secure their interests and lives 
(Kaplan 2000). Coup plots were rife as President Momoh’s sole legal party struggled to 
negotiate a long-delayed transition to a multiparty system. The state’s security apparatus was 
also ineffective as wages failed to keep up with inflation or remained unpaid for weeks. Army 
morale sunk to low levels, as soldiers began moonlighting and joined in the looting and 
harassment of the peasantry. The net effect was a government that had to turn to foreign 
actors for security assistance (Francis 2005).  
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Involvement in the Liberian Civil War increased from 1991 until Sierra Leone became simply 
a theatre in that conflict, with little control over its own territory. Military units from Nigeria 
and Guinea joined the Sierra Leone army in mid 1991 and helped to recapture back several 
towns from the RUF (Abdullah 1998). This infuriated Taylor who threatened attacks on 
Lungi airport and launched cross border raids in support of the rebels. Sierra Leonean troops 
responded with their own attacks on rebel bases inside Liberia. Sierra Leone by default had 
become a new front of the Liberian conflict and so by May 1992, the Nigerian and Guinean 
presence was transformed into a regular ECOMOG mission. On the other side were 
ULIMO and remnants of Doe-loyalists who had fled to Sierra Leone and joined in counter-
offensive measures against Taylor’s forces (Reno 1995). The Sierra Leonean government’s 
failure to exercise control over such elements provided an excuse for Taylor’s retaliations that 
fuelled the escalation and occasionally tipped the scales in the RUF’s favour. 
 
6.5 PRIVATISATION OF SECURITY FUNCTIONS 
The privatisation and alienation of security functions have been specific results of Sierra 
Leone’s failure. With the collapse of the army, the government increasingly relied on private 
and foreign security agencies for protection, many of which were also affiliated with mining 
firms. These actors “privatised” the conflict and introduced the ethos of commercial profit 
seeking as a major current underlying the conflict (Musah/Fayemi 2000). The government’s 
need to elicit the help of private security was exacerbated by two additional factors—first, the 
inadequacy of assistance received from ECOMOG and UNAMSI; Second, the imposition of 
a UN arms embargo on all parties to the conflict. The effectiveness of ECOMOG and 
UNAMSIL was hampered by the absence of a UN Security Council authorization to use 
force (Nwokedi 1992). The foreign forces also lacked adequate knowledge of the terrain as 
well as the capacity to deal with the guerrilla tactics employed so efficiently by the RUF. 
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Fluctuations in numbers caused by periodic troop withdrawals by some contributors also 
meant that the peacekeepers were not a reliable security force for the Sierra Leonean 
government. Private security firms therefore had to be employed to supplement the 
peacekeepers and provide strategic training for the Sierra Leone army.   
 
As a consequence of this, Executive Outcomes (EO), a South African Private Military 
Corporation (PMC) recruited by the National Provisional Ruling Council in a complex deal 
to supplement the army, was marked for criticism (Reno 1995). In the deal, the nearly 
bankrupt government, in need of access to the country’s wealth, allowed a diamond mining 
company to pay EO for the cost of their military operation, in return for access to diamond 
areas captured by EO. The outcome was very successful, with EO being able to establish 
their military superiority in just a year after their arrival in 1995. In March 1996, EO’s 
presence was strong enough to hold a successful election (Collier et al. 2003).  
In assuming power, President Kabbah became very dependent on EO for security and in 
dealing with the conflict at the expense of the army. It also led to Kabbah taking more 
seriously the demands of outside mediators who argued that the Sierra Leone’s marauding 
army was undermining his government’s legitimacy (Reno 1995). The result was a 
government attempt to distance itself from the army and develop an alliance with the 
Kamajors, a militia group of Mende background. Furthermore, in a desperate attempt to 
reverse the situation, Kabbah went further to polarise the stance of the army by approving a 
radical cut in army enlistment and diversion of resources from them. This led to the army 
attempting three coups and finally joining the RUF after being disbanded by the Kabbah 
government (Bundu 2001). 
 
It was at this juncture of the conflict that the government decided to take a u-turn from 
pursuing a military victory with the help of EO to that of a peaceful path through the 
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Abidjan Peace Accord in November 1996. There it was agreed that EO should be withdrawn 
despite its effectiveness in fighting the RUF. On the contrary, the RUF resumed its resistance 
following the withdrawal of EO from Sierra Leone in 1997, rendering the agreement 
completely worthless. The lack of an effective army or the delegitimisation of the army turns 
on its head the Weberian notion of state, where the state has a monopoly on the legitimate 
use of force. A monopoly becomes a liability when the government is unable also to 
monopolise the extracting of resources still available from the diamond-mining sector to 
finance its war operations (Reno 1995). As a result, the government was left with no option 
but to privatise the army again to another category of private specialty entities willing to 
provide security for mining operations and to pay the government in cash or in kind for a 
role in the diamond fields. Groups such as Diamond Works and its subsidiary, Branch 
Energy, had to find their own security for mining operations in the Koindu area. Other 
commercial mining operations secured assistance from a wide array of private specialty 
groups (examples include British companies such as Lifeguard, the Gurkhas, Defence 
Systems Ltd, Sky Air, Occidental, and American companies such as Military Professional 
Resources Inc [MPRI] and International Charters Inc.). Most of these commercial and 
security firms also had important connections with major players in the conflict and this 
further complicated the roles of those players in the search for a solution. The subsequent 
failure of the government to monopolise both factors and the privatisation of the security 
function to mercenary groups can be seen as a factor in the failure.  
 
6.6.  POLITICAL INSTABILITY 
The proliferation of political parties particularly on the side of the government, characterized 
the Sierra Leone conflict. Political instability fed uncertainty and often benefited the rebels 
who took the opportunity to form alliances with supporters of ousted or removed regimes. 
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Sierra Leone had five different governments in the decade since the outbreak of violence 
(Bundu 2001). Each of the post-Momoh regimes came to power promising a swift end to the 
war and proceeded to reach out to the rebels with upgrades in offers that yielded no 
corresponding dividends. The RUF also suffered its share of political uncertainties, so it 
became difficult to know with whom to negotiate and on whom to rely for implementation 
of an agreement. A rift between Sankoh loyalists and followers of Sam Bockarie unsettled 
peace agreements in 1996, although it did little to weaken the RUF (Hirsch 2001). Attempts 
in March 1997 to remove Sankoh (who had been detained in Nigeria) from the RUF 
leadership weakened negotiations. Such political uncertainties disrupt peace efforts, delay the 
implementation of agreements, and provide opportunities for escalation. Use of 
unconventional tactics in the conflict frustrated the government army and its supporters, 
many of whom lacked training and experience in guerrilla warfare.  
 
The collapse of the Sierra Leonean state began soon after independence in 1961. Sierra 
Leoneans refer to the regime of President Siaka Stevens, who established a socialist one-party 
state from 1968 to 1985, as the “17-year plague of locusts” (Hirsch 2001). Successive regimes 
merely accelerated the country’s slide into economic atrophy and anarchy. Swarms of 
“locusts” stripped government agencies of anything of value. Reduced to an empty shell, the 
government even lacked the funds to print money (Reno 1995). Civil servants, teachers, and 
police went without pay and invented various fraudulent devices to survive. Scores of ghost 
workers were added to the government payroll and their salaries were collected by living 
workers. In one government department 75 per cent of the staff were found to be 
nonexistent. State institutions collapsed and the country’s only radio broadcasting tower was 
carted off and sold by a bureaucrat, depriving the President of the ability to speak to the 
people (ibid). When it started in 1991, Sankoh’s Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was 
originally a rebellion against the vampire state. But they quickly earned the opprobrium of the 
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people as they rampaged across the country, killing, raping, and hacking off the limbs of 
innocent people. Women and children who stood in their way were not spared (Richards  
1996). 
 
6.7.  THE PEACEKEEPING ELEMENT 
The UN did not authorize the intervention to use force in its operation, even though it is 
established under its Chapter VII (United Nations Resolution 1999a). It is alleged that it 
cooperated too closely with ECOMOG troops who were considered as being biased towards 
the government (Alao 1999). These were issues that limited the effectiveness of UNAMSIL. 
It is likely that a proper identification of the rebels as the villains in the conflict could have 
helped to authorize an intervention whose sole purpose was to help the legitimate and 
democratically elected government of Sierra Leone regain control of its territory and 
population, restore its state, and end the rebel insurgency. After the UNOMSIL debacle at 
the end of 1998 and the authorization of UNAMSIL in 1999, the UN should also have 
authorized a change in mandate to peace enforcement (Olonisakin 2000). Such a move could 
have averted the embarrassing episodes of hostage-taking that continue to plague the 
mission. The UN intervention in Sierra Leone was instrumental in legitimizing the Lome 
Agreement that endorsed the RUF as a partner in government (Adebajo 2002). That 
agreement was largely unpopular among civil society as it banned on-going efforts to put the 
RUF leadership on trial for human rights violations. The presence of UNAMSIL, however, 
facilitated the repatriation of some refugees and helped the government’s effort to raise funds 
for reconstruction. Despite its ineffectiveness as a military force, the intervention helped 
bring much needed credibility to the peace process. Unfortunately that process was not used 
to end the crisis in Sierra Leone.  
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The first UN intervention had a clear exit plan. It was mandated for a period of six months 
subject to review as necessary. When the conflict intensified to a point where the mandate for 
the intervention appeared to be untenable, UNAMSIL quickly withdrew. The second 
instalment, on the other hand, entered with an open-ended commitment to monitor the 
implementation of the Lome Agreement (ibid). The UN Security Council did not modify its 
rules of engagement even as its forces came under persistent RUF attack. Contributing states 
such as India therefore withdrew their troops when they perceived the intervention as 
unhelpful to their interests. Such unilateral withdrawals hurt the overall purposes of the 
mission, although it was the only way contributing states could exit the process in the 
absence of a general UN policy on collective exit (United Nations Resolution 1999a). The 
mission’s principal goal of facilitating the implementation of the Lome Agreement was largely 
unattained. This was due to its ineffectiveness and the government’s continued weakness in 
the face of RUF atrocities (Abdullah 1998). 
 
The British intervention, dubbed ‘Operation Palliser’, was triggered by the “disappearance” 
of 500 United Nations peacekeepers in Sierra Leone (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Sierra_Leone.12/10/04). The withdrawal of ECOMOG troops in late April 2000 created a 
huge security vacuum that United Nations peacekeepers under Force Commander Vijay 
Jetley of India were unable to fill. The RUF exploited the situation to escalate its attacks on 
the UNAMSIL. Five hundred UN troops were taken prisoners by the RUF in May, 
prompting the UK to dispatch a “rescue” force to the country. The British deployment came 
in the aftermath of the major clashes of the war and as Taylor’s Liberia, a major backer of the 
RUF, was seeking international legitimacy and therefore had become a less visible threat. The 
presence of the United Nations force (UNAMSIL) also eased the British entry by helping to 
legitimatize the intervention. The intervention comprised 800 paratroopers, with strong air 
force and naval support.  
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The British intervention sought to realize several immediate and long-term goals. In the short 
term, the mission sought to reverse RUF gains and change the conflict structure in favour of 
pro-government forces. To accomplish this, it launched an operation to rescue the 500 
missing United Nations peacekeepers and also to repel the imminent RUF capture of 
Waterloo and possibly Freetown (BBC, 11/10/04). To save Freetown, troops were 
dispatched to secure the local airport and then deployed throughout the capital and its 
environs as a buffer to the RUF offensive. The long-term goals were geared toward capacity 
building assistance to help pro-government forces consolidate the gains of peace and 
security. To this end, the British troops provided technical training and assistance to the 
Sierra Leone army that had been in complete disarray following the sudden death of its 
Nigerian Chief of Staff, General Maxwell Khobe in April 2000. British experts also assisted 
the UN in tactical planning and strategic deployments as well as with logistics such as 
helicopters to transport Jordanian peacekeepers to defensive positions. 
 
The British mission was short-lived and geared toward the accomplishment of relatively 
limited goals. It gave a much-needed boost to government forces but nevertheless produced 
little lasting effect. Its capacity development program was crucial to the emergence of 
UNAMSIL as a credible force in Sierra Leone. However, longstanding operational difficulties 
as well as the UN’s reluctance to authorize the use of force robbed the UN mission of 
opportunities to reverse RUF gains in the conflict (Zartman 1995a). The military and non-
military balance remained constant over the period of intervention, even though the 
intervention evolved into a technical support group later and its size was drastically reduced 
to 251 members. It is certain that the British originally intended for the intervention to be a 
“rescue mission”. It was supposed to be a short, precise, trouble-shooting mission that would 
avoid mission creep, deliver quickly, and exit as soon as possible. However, events on the 
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ground convinced the British to tackle capacity building as a way of ensuring that their exit 
would not create an imbalance similar to the one created by the ECOWAS disengagement.  
 
The immediate goals were better defined and hence easier to achieve than the long-term 
ones. As a direct result of the intervention, the RUF was forced to release the 500 UN 
hostages. The British impact was felt again, in late August 2000 when the West Side Boys (a 
pro-AFRC faction originally supportive of the government) abducted eleven British soldiers 
and a Sierra Leonean as leverage for the release of their leader (BBC, 6 January 2003). The 
British troops intervened to secure their release just as the United Nations was dealt a heavy 
blow by India’s announcement of a pullout. British assistance was also directly responsible 
for the successful deployment of the Jordanian UN contingent in Sierra Leone. Without their 
helicopters and operational cover, the Jordanian troops could have become stranded or 
restricted to non-contested terrain while the RUF continued to devastate the diamond-rich 
northwest. In terms of long-term goals, the impact of the British intervention was quite 
muted, above all because of the advanced stage of disrepair into which the government army 
had fallen before the intervention. Poor training and lack of adequate equipment was 
exacerbated by petty quarrels among the ranks and with allies such as the Kamajor militias. 
British capacity-building effort yielded better results for UNAMSIL, which became more 
professional and handled superbly the rescue of 233 peacekeepers (mainly from India) held 
hostage by RUF in Kailahun soon after the British intervention. 
 
It can be concluded that military intervention is not the best approach to conflict resolution 
as it takes a state from failure to collapse (Bundu 2001). ECOMOG participated in looting 
Liberia (Aning 1999) and also diamonds in Sierra Leone. The conflict began due to the failure 
of governance, the dissolution of the economy, and the breakdown of the social fabric in 
Sierra Leone, and will only end when these elements are restored (Zartman 2004). The Sierra 
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Leone experience raises serious questions about the non-military side of the conflict 
management operation. Conflict management “doctrine” indicates that one can only end a 
conflict by negotiating with one’s enemy and that any party to the problem must be a party to 
the solution; yet there are limits, if not on the participants, at least on the conditions under 
which their participation can be envisaged. Some enemies are beyond the pale, incapable of 
making and holding an acceptable agreement (Stedman 2002). The deliberate atrocities of the 
RUF, whose hallmark was amputation, characterised them as objects of punishment, and not 
freedom fighters or one interested in power-sharing. What about Renamo of Mozambique 
(Chase-Dunn/Manning 2002); UNITA in Angola; Taylor’s NPFL (Aning 1999); the 
Palestinians or the Israelis in the Middle East? It is too easy to qualify one’s enemy as beyond 
the pale and not worthy of negotiation. 
 
6.8.  MULTI-PARTY DEMOCRACY OR ETHNICITY? 
Following the resumption of the conflict, the British government pushed for early elections 
which Kabbah won in the face of lack of a genuine democracy movement. Kabbah’s nearest 
rival, Ernest Koroma of the All People’s Congress (APC) won 27 seats. The last two seats 
were taken by former junta leader Johnny Paul Koroma’s Peace and Liberation Party (PLP), 
which presented problem on two fronts: first, Koroma was widely expected to be indicted 
for war crimes and crimes against humanity for incidents that occurred during the war and 
secondly, 70% of his votes came from a special ballot cast by the army. The candidate of the 
RUFP - the RUF’s political evolution - Pallo Bangura - received less than 2% of votes and his 
party failed to gain a single seat. However, Bangura declared that RUFP would accept the 
people’s verdict. President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was re-elected and the governing SLPP 
retained its parliamentary majority in May 2002.   
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The result however was a deep domestic dissatisfaction, particularly among the younger 
generation with respect to corruption, tribalism, age factor and the indifferent nature of its 
government. Rather than preventing decay, elections accelerated it by openly encouraging 
competition which in the absence of a genuine democratic platform leads to conflict. It is 
worth noting that a lack of democratic political culture over a long period of time until 1996 
and the practice of a politics of exclusion of youth and certain ethnic groups, nepotism, and 
tribalism that are at play in pre war Sierra Leone, led to antagonism that caused the war in the 
first place. There is also lack of structure and clear-cut political ideology by parties in Sierra 
Leone. Many people believe that a de facto one party rule is presently in operation due to the 
overwhelming majority of the SLPP in Parliament. This has rendered parliament ineffective 
and MPs are not able to represent effectively their constituencies. 
This was also the case in the 1996 election which was expected to produce stable 
governments in Sierra Leone. In the period leading to the first election in 1996 and the 
previous election in 2002, DfID forced ‘democracy’ on a large section of the society that had 
requested “Peace Before Election” in the PEBEC campaign led by Hylton Fyle. Fyle’s 
campaign was for power sharing and not winner takes all elections, a disturbing 
characterisation of democratic, competitive election. With hindsight, it may not be wrong to 
say that the British government and its DfID made a big mistake in pushing for elections and 
thus failed to see the larger picture, that is, the transition from authoritarianism to stable 
democracy is a very disruptive process in itself since it encourages the conflict that exists 
underground to manifest itself freely, but without the checks and balances, and the restraint 
of a well established democratic system. The complex situation following triggered by the 
elections created highly undesirable side effects such as the killing and amputation of more 
people in post-elections, thereby placing emphasis on the conundrum of democratization in a 
collapsed state (ICG 2003: 1, 2004: 24). Therefore one may argue that state collapse was not 
the best place for Sierra Leonean democracy to have started.  
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6.9.  REINSTATEMENT OF COLONIAL STATE SYSTEM 
Another very controversial issue is the reinstatement of the chiefs. In the previous chapter I 
have argued that despite pressure for decentralization and a move away from the practice of 
the past, Kabbah convinced the British government to support the rebuilding of the 
paramount chief system, which traditionally was the lowest level of administration and which 
covered the entire country except the area around the capital, Freetown. It had been the basis 
of rule of British colonial authorities.  
Traditionally, chiefs handled dispute resolution and tax collection. Because of the war, 63 of 
the 149 paramount chiefs had been killed or died, and nearly all the others had fled from 
their areas. DfID in 2000 established a paramount chief’s restoration programme, which, 
among other things, built houses for 50 chiefs (DfID 2002). Elections to fill the 63 vacancies 
were held in late 2002 and early 2003; taxpayers (mostly men) elect councillors who then elect 
the paramount chiefs, who hold the position for life (Malan et al. 2003). Within Sierra Leone, 
however, there were substantial objections to the programme. Chiefs are seen as being an 
important cause of the war, through their corruption and alienation of the youth. As long ago 
as 1955-56 (during colonial times) there were uprisings against the abuses of power of chiefs 
and their demand for illegal taxes and fees, which were described by a commission then as ‘a 
civil war rather than a disturbance’ (quoted in Fanthorpe 2001). The World Bank (2003: 44) 
reports that ‘chiefs’ rule has led to mismanagement, power abuse and failure to ensure the 
delivery of decentralized services’. DfID (2002: 35) notes that ‘over the last 20 or 30 years, 
this [customary court] system has fallen into decay and been the subject of considerable 
abuses’. Reinstating them by and large is to many, a reinstatement of colonial rule and thus 
raises the question of neo-colonialism. Glentworth (2002) notes: “local people and 
particularly women and the youth are no longer prepared to put up with the kind of 
exploitation that they previously suffered” under the chiefs.  
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Findings from my field work have pointed to the need to redress the bias of customary law 
and social system at the village and chiefdom levels which protect the ‘influential’ at the 
expense of the poor and vulnerable. In particular, the Forced Labour Ordinance of 1932 
remains in force, allowing chiefs and their extended families to force young people and 
outsiders to work for them (Moore et al. 2003: 22). DfID (2002: 87) admits that the 
chiefdom system can succeed only if there are ‘new relationships between the chiefs and their 
people. Chieftaincy can only really be effective and accepted if chiefs’ behaviour avoids 
repeat of past mistakes—vindictive and exploitative punishments through the courts, 
arbitrary seizure of land and property, etc. Chiefs in diamond mining areas are using the 0.75 
per cent diamond tax they receive for personal gain instead of, as intended, for the benefit of 
the community (Malan et al. 2003).  
 
Chiefs are using aid money for personal enrichment and to reward political supporters 
(Fanthorpe 2001). Chiefs are also complaining that the British-built houses are not grand 
enough and not compatible with their status: Paramount Chief Sigismond Caulker Quebboka 
told the Salone Times (5 Feb. 2004) that he cannot stay in a house with such small rooms and 
no parlour. The return of chiefs has brought tensions in some areas as the government also 
tries to restore civil administration. Some chiefs are refusing to cooperate with district 
officers and there are conflicts with local governments elected in 2004 (Malan 2004a). Zack-
Williams (1999) argues that Britain has chosen to rectify and rebuild a discredited feudal 
tradition and delay the development of grassroots democracy. Archibald and Richards (2002: 
358, 360) note that “standard NGO practice in post-war Sierra Leone” is to work with village 
development committees (VDCs). The problem is “that VDCs were invariably comprised of 
elders and members of elites who excluded some groups and individuals. ‘In a majority of 
cases VDC members had registered themselves as the ‘most needy’ residents or (allegedly) 
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diverted inputs to their kin residing in urban areas. IDPs women and youths were excluded 
because they had no representatives (or ‘friends’) on the committee”. 
 
6.10. CONCLUSION 
This study is set out to address the mind-boggling questions concerning the inability of 
International community, the state of Sierra Leone and its institutions to resolve the civil 
war. The study has already showed that, Donor-led post-war reconstruction programmes 
tend to reinforce earlier social structure and a return to the status quo rather than create 
opportunities for the previously marginalised.  
This brief overview of some of the factors responsible for Sierra Leone’s conflict has 
demonstrated that in order for action to be taken for reconstructing failed states, it is 
imperative that the global and local alliances making for state collapse be taken into 
consideration. The study has raised interesting discourses while also painting a vivid 
picture of the multifaceted factors that are responsible for the conflict. Any action 
therefore to address them must seek to correlate with the challenges they face. 
Also, it can be concluded that third party intervention in such conflicts as that of the Sierra 
Leone case, do not necessarily resolve the conflict. Instead, it exacerbates the conflict 
situation because of the mutual suspicion of the third party. Governments battling internal 
strife such as Sierra Leone are quick to either accuse the mediator(s) as interfering in 
domestic affairs or accused of supporting rebel insurgency. Rebels usually see the third party 
intervention as necessarily geared toward supporting the embattling government. 
The conflict in Sierra Leone, as the study already revealed, failed because of the emphasis put 
on post-war reconstruction to the detriment of addressing the fundamental root causes of 
the conflict. In that situation, the conflict is not truly resolved. Donor-led post-war 
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reconstruction or interventions are interested in the absence violence. But, absence of 
violence does not mean peace, but negative peace. For, the injustices that culminated in the 
conflict remained unresolved 
 
The study also showed that, conflicts such as that of Sierra Leone could not have been 
resolved by only military intervention. But it needed all parties either directly or indirectly 
involved in the conflict to agree on the need for peace as a sufficient condition for resolving 
the conflict. Other important considerations for peace include the need to address issues of 
bad governance, corruption justice for the marginalised and their like. If all these factors are 
put on the table for negotiation, may not only lead to an effective post-war reconstruction, 
but a strong foundation for nation building. 
 
6.11. RECOMMENDATIONS 
On the basis of the findings of this study, the following suggestions are offered. The rationale 
is to serve as a guideline for policy debate and for institutions committed to peace-building in 
Sierra Leone and else where in the African Continent. 
 
Firstly, it is recommended that, persons who consciously or unconsciously contributed to the 
civil war, maimed and killed law-abiding citizens, must be arrested and prosecuted by either 
the International Criminal Court or the local courts in Sierra Leone. This would be the first 
step in the resolution of the Sierra Leonean conflict; rather than enduring the ongoing 
management and escalating cost by the state. 
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Secondly, it is recommended that, Donor-led post-war reconstruction should be interested in 
unearthing the root cause(s) of the pre-war. This will enable such issues to be addressed 
when negotiating with the warring factions. Funds should be channelled through accredited 
foreign or domestic NGOs to champion the post-war reconstruction efforts. This will be a 
better option than put funds in the hands of a government that is unable to assert its 
authority to its own territory. The danger is that, such funding may be used to buy more 
weapons to fight the insurgents. 
 
Thirdly, it is suggested that, intervening in conflicts such as that of Sierra Leone, need a better 
understanding of the local people and the dynamics of the conflict before any meaningful 
intervention could be made. To this end, all persons or warring factions should be identified 
and brought to the negotiation table. Sidelining anyone of the factions in the conflict has the 
potential to ravel to peace process. 
 
Finally, adequate compensation should be paid to citizens who suffered before and during 
the conflict by the state. Those who lost their relations if possible, should be compensated by 
the state. Those, whose livelihood has been cut short as a result of deformity, should be 
cared for by the state.   
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